- (1.) This petition has been filed by the tenant-petitioner against the order of the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, dated 13th December, 1975, whereby he confirmed the order of the Rent Controller, directing the ejectment of the petitioner.
(2.) On 8th March. 1973, an application for ejectment of the tenant petitioner was filed by the landlady-respondent from the premises in dispute, i.e. House No. 89, Sector 19-A, Chandigarh, on the grounds of non-payment of rent and the personal need of the landlady. This petition was contested by the tenant- petitioner and on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed : 1. Whether the respondent is liable to be ejected on the grounds alleged in the application ? 2. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist between the parties ? 3. Whether the property in dispute is scheduled building and precluded from the operation of Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as alleged ? The learned Rent Controller accepted the application of the landlady- respondent holding that the landlady has made out a case for the ejectment of the petitioner from the house in question on the ground of her personal necessity. The plea taken by the petitioner that the property in dispute is scheduled property and thus precluded from the operation of Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was found against him. The learned Rent Controller has observed that the tenant has not brought a bit of evidence on record to show if one of the rooms of the property has constantly or regularly been used by him as office for practising as an Advocate. Feeling aggrieved against this order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller, the tenant-petitioner went up in appeal and the learned Appellate Authority affirmed the order of ejectment passed by the Rent- Controller, but on different grounds. It has been held by the Appellate Authority that the house is being used both for residence and professional activities and for that reason has to be termed as a 'scheduled building' as defined in the Act. According to this definition, a residential building which is being used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in the schedule to the Act, partly for his residence has to be described as a scheduled building. Admittedly, the lawyers are included in that schedule. The learned Appellate Authority took the view that it can be presumed that the house was only given for the residence of the petitioner and not for allowing him to carry on his profession as lawyer. It may not have at that time even been contemplated by the respondent that the petitioner would change the user in such a manner as to debar her for all times to come to get the house vacated for her own residence. According to the Appellate Authority, in a way, the petitioner has changed a residential building to a scheduled building without the consent of the landlord and, thus, by such an unilateral act, the respondent could not be debarred from obtaining back the house. He took the view that virtually it is a case in which the building has been used for a pur pose other than that for which it was leased. Taking this view of the matter, the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller was maintained. Now the tenant petitioner has come to this Court against the said judgment of the Appellate Authority.
(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the landlady sought ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of her personal necessity, the ejectment, if at all, could be ordered on that ground alone. The ground which was never taken by the landlady herself in her application for ejectment, i. e. changing the user of the building, could not be made a ground against him at the appellate stage. In other words, according to him, it is not permissible to make out a new ground of ejectment at the appellate stage when no such plea was taken in the ejectment application itself. For that the learned counsel relied upon Atma Ram and others v. Kanwar Mohinder Singh and others, 1976 RCJ 336. The proposition of law is well settled and cannot be disputed. A ground not taken in the application for ejectment cannot be made a ground for ejectment either before the Rent Controller or at the appellate stage. Admittedly, change of user was never pleaded in this case by the respondent in her application.;