M.M. Punchhi, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision petition at the instance of a tenant against whom an order of ejectment was passed by the Root Controller, Chandigarh, which has been confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh.
(2.) THE facts may be stated thus: Khazan Singh landlord is the owner of House No 1209, Section 18 -C, Chandigarh, and R. K. Jain is the tenant On May 25, 1977, the landlord filed an application for ejectment of the tenant on three grounds but ultimately confined his claim to gone ground, namely. - That the Petitioner wants the demised premises for his personal use and occupation." To the above referred to averment in the petition the tenant in his written statement averred: It it stated that the Petitioner does not require the premises for his own use and personal occupation. The Petitioner is carrying on business in Ludhiana and settled in Ludhiana. The Petitioner wanted an increase of the rent to Rs. 450/ - per month and the respondent did not agree to the said increase and as a consequence thereof the Petitioner has presented this petition in this Hon'ble Tribunal seeking.... This solicited replication from the landlord, who counter averred is under: Petitioner wants himself to live in the house and lead a retired life peacefully. Petitioner is not active partner of any business at Ludhiana. Moreover by living at Chandigarh Petitioner wants to get himself treated at P. G I for his major defect in his right foot, because of which he cannot walk. Petitioner never asked the Respondent to increase the rent." The respective averments of the parties were not only supported by their evidence, but were improved upon. The landlord added that he felt insufficiency of accommodation when his daughters and children came during vacations and that his landlord at Ludhiana was pressing for the vacation of the house. He also added that his son works on his behalf in a factory where he is a sleeping partner and he does not go there personally. The tenant on the other hand stated that he had found the Petitioner to be limping by foot even in the year 1957, when the tenancy commenced tie claimed the application to be not bonafide. On that evidence the Rent Controller ordered eviction of the tenant Petitioner, relying upon the judgments of this Court in Shri Siri Ram Nagpal v. Shri Lal Chand and Anr., 1977 (2) Rent. L. R. 828 and Jagan Nath v. Sat Paul and Anr., 1977 (2) Rent L. R 614, which are to the effect that the landlord is entitled to the exercise of his choice of his living in his own house and with regard to insufficiency of accommodation he is the sole judge. Reliance was also placed on Kedar Nath Bhatnagar v. Shri Dharam Paui, 1978 (2) RL. R. 614, wherein It has been held that the landlord is best judge of his requirement, to(sic) the same effect is Ajit Singh v. Tarhchan Singh, 1977 (2) RL. R. 678, recognising the entitlement of the landlord to live comfortably in his house and of his being the sole arbitrator of his requirement. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner vehemently contended that the approach of the Rent Control authorities In deciding the controversy between the parties was erroneous in law. Stressing the point he urged that the items of necessity pointed out by the landlord in bis petition and improved upon in his statement are only reflective of reasons or excuses on his behalf and are not sufficient to come within the ambit of the word "requires" used in Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. In support thereof he cited a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others, A I.R. 1914 S. C. 1059, wherein their Lordships have settled that the word "requirement" of a landlord seeking ejectment of a tenant must reflect an element of need and not a mere wish or want. The decision of their Lordships in Phiroze Bamanji Desai's case (supra) was taken aid of in repelling a landlord's contention by S. P. Goyal, J. in decision reported in Shri Rattan Chand Jain v. Shri Charan Singh(6). There the landlord's assertion that the premises were required for nig grand children and also that he wanted to shift from his village to the town, was considered to be an 'excuse" and not an instance of "need" as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai's case (supra)
(3.) ON the other hand the learned Counsel for the Respondent -landlord has contended that the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority were conscious of the statutory obligation for the land -lord to prove his need for the premises in dispute. In particular he referred to the findings from the judgments which may be reproduced, one after the other, as under: Rent Controller: Learned Counsel for the Respondent cited Rottan Chand Jain v. Chat an Singh, 1978 (1) R. C. R. 265, to argue that the statement of the landlord cannot be accepted unless there is element of need and not mere desire. However, in the present case the element of need is proved in as much as the petitioner wants to sad(sic) retired life in Chandigarh His landlord is pressing him hard to vacate the rented accommodation at Ludhiana and the Petitioner wants to get treatment of his fractureo leg in P. G I Chandigarh. I, therefore, hold that the Petitioner requires the demised premises for his own use and occupation." Appellate Authority 10. It is true that the Court is not to look to the mere desire or wish of the landlord and it if bindly(sic) relied upon his statement must be satisfied about the bonafide need of the applicant. It is open to the tenant to raise an objection and bring some prima facie material on the record to show that the application is not a bonafide one. The Court cannot proceed with initial assumptions of lack of bonafide on the part of the landlord. In the present case, as already stated, the circumstances put up by the landlord were not assailed in cross examination or rebutted by evidence. The tenant has miserably failed to prove that the applicant even approached him for enhancement of rent. 11. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the leg of the applicant was already fractured when he gave the house on rent to the Appellant. His client admitted that the applicant had a limping foot. The fact that the applicant took a decision to get himself treated at the P. G I. Hospital somewhat late is no ground to disbelieve him. It is emphasized that he is living in a small rented house along with his son at Ludhiana. It is quite probable that he bonafide wants to shift to his own spacious house at Chandigarh to lead a comfortable life disabled as he is. If the applicant's witness admitted that sometimes he went to his small factory and did some business for an hour or so it does not show that he is embodied in business there and could not pull himself out. This is particularly so when the business is being managed by bit own son acting as a Manager. 12. As a result, therefore, I have no reason to doubt the bonafide of the landlord in making this application and seeking the relief.... (Emphasis supplied).;