- (1.) This judgment will dispose of Appeal Nos. 883 of 1976 and 884 of 1976 filed by Som Nath. Appellant in both these appeals is the same person but the respondents are different. In Appeal No. 883 of 1976 Ishar Kaur and others are the respondents and in Appeal No. 884 of 1976 Labh Singh etc. are the respondents. These arise out of the single judgment. The facts giving arise to these appeals are as under :- Mukadam Singh was an allottee of the land in dispute in lieu of the land he left in West Pakistan. He died somewhere in the year 1959 and left behind various heirs. The pedigree table is as follows :- Labh Singh used to live in village Shah Pur Afgana district Patiala, but the other heirs of Kundan Singh lived in village Kawan. After the death of Mukadam Singh, the mutation of the entire property of Mukadam Singh situate in village Kawan was entered in the names of Tej Kaur, Balbir Kaur and Sampuran Kaur. Proprietary rights were also conferred by the revenue authorities in the same year under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1954. These allottees sold the property in dispute to the present appellant for Rs. 6,000/- and the sale was effected on 21st October, 1963. Labh Singh filed suit No. 381 of 1969 against the present appellant and the vendors. Ishar Kaur and her sisters brought another suit No. 63 of 1971. Suits were to the effect that they are also the heirs of Mukadam Singh and are entitled to their respective shares in the property and that the sale in favour of the appellant is not binding on their rights. The claim of the respondents was contested by the present appellant and the parties contested on the following issues :- (1) Whether the plaintiff is the son of Mukadam Singh deceased ? O.P.P. (2) Whether there had been any family settlement ? If so in what terms ? O.P.P. (3) Whether defendant No. 4 Som Nath is bona fide purchaser for real consideration ? O.P.D. (4) When Mukadam Singh died ? O.P.P. (5) Whether the suit is barred by time ? O.P.D. (6) Whether defendants No. 5 to 8 are the daughters of Mukadam Singh deceased ? If so its effect. O.P.D. (7) Whether the suit of defendants No. 5 to 8 is within limitation ? O.P.D. (8) Relief. The learned trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the present appellant filed separate appeals before the learned District Judge, Ferozepore, who affirmed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the appeals. Before the learned District Judge only issue No. 3 was pressed. No argument was addressed on any other issue. Before me also, the challenge is made to the findings on this issue.
(2.) Mr. Behl, learned counsel for the appellant, canvassed before me that protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is available in this case to the appellant vendee, who is a bona fide purchaser for consideration from the true and ostensible owners. His argument is that the vendors during the life-time of Mukadam Singh were his Mukhtiar-I-Am and the property used to be leased out to the appellant by them, that after his death mutation was also entered in their names; that the proprietary rights were also conferred by the Central Government on them and that the appellant verified all these facts and considered them to be the ostensible owners; purchased the land in dispute for consideration and that the Courts have gone wrong in holding otherwise. It is true that the proprietary rights were conferred on the vendors. It is also true that the mutation was entered in their names and during the life-time of Mukadam Singh they used to lease out the land on his behalf. Mr. Behl also relied upon two judgments of this Court in Kali Ram and others V. Union of India and others, 1976 78 PunLR 475, and Rattan Singh and another V. Chief Settlement Commissioner Haryana and others, 1978 PunLJ 47. In Kali Ram's case it was held that Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act protects the bona fide purchaser for consideration. In this case the Central Government had conferred proprietary rights on the vendor. The vendor subsequently sold the property to the plaintiffs. In the mean-time the Central Government cancelled the proprietary rights and in that situation, it was held that the vendees' rights were to be protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act as the Central Government had conferred the rights on the vendor and on the basis of those proprietary rights the vendees purchased from the vendor. Thus he was a bona fide purchaser and is protected under Section 41 of the Act as the Central Government had conferred the rights on the vendor and on the basis of those proprietary rights the vendees purchased from the vendor. Thus, he was a bona fide purchaser and is protected under Section 41 of the Act as the Central Government had impliedly given consent to the transaction. In Rattan Singh's case the observations are similar and are in the following terms :- "When a situation is created by the Union of India acting through its important functionaries under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder, by transferring ownership for a sufficiently long time, during which transfers are made by the transferees from the Union of India, the bona fide purchasers for consideration from these transferees cannot be left to suffer."
(3.) In support of his contention, Mr. Behl also relied upon Md. Din V. Mt. Sardar Bibi,1927 AIR(Lah) 666and Shamsher Chand V. Bakhshi Mehr Chand,1947 AIR(Lah) 147;