Sukhdev Singh Kang, J. - (1.) DAULAT Ram, Appellant, has filed this appeal against the judgment, dated the 7th November, 1975, passed by Shri H. L. Randev, Additional District Judge, Barnala, exercising the powers of appellate authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, who has dismissed the application filed by the Appellant under Section 340, Code of Criminal Procedure, for launching prosecution against the Respondents for offences under Sections 193 and 471, Indian Penal Code.
(2.) DAULAT Ram, Appellant. had filed an application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act) against Girdhari Lal, Respondent, for his eviction from House No. 4607, situated at Barnala, which was occupied by Girdhari Lal, tenant -Respondent. The main ground for eviction set up in the petition was that the tenant had not paid the rent. Girdhari Lal, tenant -Respondent put in a written statement and stated therein that he had paid the rent amounting to Rs. 1,980 for the period from 1st of June, 1971 to 30th of May, 1976. In order to support his case, he produced a receipt purported to have been issued by Daulat Ram, Appellant. He examined Bharpur Singh to substantiate his claim. He made his own statement also. The learned Rent Controller did not accept the version set up by Girdhari Lal, Respondent. He came to the conclusion that the receipt produced by Girdhari Lal was a forged and fictitious document and that Girdhari Lal and Bharpur Singh, Respondents had made false statements before him. He allowed the application filed by Daulat Ram, Petitioner -Appellant, and ordered eviction of Girdhari Lal, tenant -Respondent. The appeal filed by the tenant -Respondent was decided by Shri H. L. Randev, the appellate authority, who also upheld the findings of the learned Rent Controller. Regarding the receipt and the evidence of the two witnesses Girdhari Lal and Bharpur Singh, he held that the receipt was a forged document and these witnesses have made false statements. Daulat Ram, Petitioner -Appellant, then moved an application under Section 340, Code of Criminal Procedure, praying that prosecution should be launched against Girdhari Lal and Bharpur Singh, Respondents under Sections 193 and 471, Indian Penal Code. The notice of the application was given to the Respondents, who appeared before the learned Appellate Authority and raised two preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the application. It was argued that the Rent Controller while deciding the ejectment application under Section 13 of the Act was not acting as a Court. It was only a Tribunal constituted under the Act and the same had not been declared to be a Court under the provisions of the Act for the purpose of Section 195(3), Code of Criminal Procedure . The second contention was that if the application was governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter called the Old Code), the application will not be maintainable in view of Section 479 -A (1) of the Old Code, because then the prosecution could be launched against the Respondents only after recording a finding envisaged by the provisions of Section 479 -A of the Old Code at the time of the delivery of the judgment and after giving opportunity to the Respondents of being heard and it had not been done so in the present case . The learned appellate authority accepted both these contentions and dismissed the application. It held that the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority deciding cases under the Act are not Courts. It also held that if the application was treated under the Old Code, even then it was liable to be dismissed as the procedure under Section 497 -A of the Old Code had not been followed.
(3.) AT the outset it may be stated that the case is not governed by the Old Code. The appellate authority decided the ejectment application on 7th June, 1975. The present application has been filed after 1st of April, 1974, when the Code 'of Criminal Procedure, 1973, came into force. In the old Code, the provision for filing the application was contained in Section 476, but in the New Code, the provision for filing such an application has been made under Section 340. Since the application has been filed after the doming into force of the Code of 1973, the application shall be decided in accordance with the procedure prescribed by this Code. Section 195 of the New Code, provides the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings in the Criminal Courts. It is in the following terms: 195. (1) No Court shall take cognizance - - (a) (i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, or (ii) of any abetment of or attempt to commit such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, Sections 193 to 195 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in Sub -clause (i) or Sub -clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under Clause (a) of Sub -section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In Clause (b) of Sub -section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of Clause (b) of Sub -section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the Principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that - - (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate ; (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed. A perusal of Sub -section (3) of Section 195 will show that the term 'Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and it includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. If an offence punishable under Sections 193 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code had been committed in relation to any proceedings in a Court, the Criminal Court could take cognizance only on the complaint in writing made by that Court or the Court to which that Court is subordinate. The learned appellate Court came to the conclusion that the Rent Controller exercising the powers under the Act was a Tribunal constituted by a State Act, but since it had not been declared by the Act to be a Court for the purpose of Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, so, it was not a Court as envisaged by that section. It. was not disputed that the Rent Controller or the Appellate authority have not been declared by the Act to be Courts for the purpose of Section 195. However, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority squarely fall within the term "Civil Court". Whether particular authority is a Tribunal or a Court, has taxed the minds of the Courts for quite some time. In Virinder Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab : AIR 1956 S.C. 153, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have described the essential characteristics of a Court in contra -distinction to a Tribunal exercising quasi -judicial functions in the following terms: It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi -judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi -judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. In many cases before the Supreme Court the question arose as to whether a particular Appellate Authority or Tribunal was a Court.;