D.K. Mahajan, J. - (1.) THIS petition for revision is directed against the decision of the Appellant authority reversing on appeal the decision of the rent Controller rejecting the application of the landlords -Respondents for eviction of the Petitioner -tenant. The eviction was claimed on two grounds; non -payment of rent and that the landlords required the premises for their personal use, as they wanted to shift to Malaut because they were carrying on their business there. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the landlords did not bona fide require the premises for their own use. The arrears of rent were paid at the first hearing. Therefore the claim to eviction on that ground disappeared. In appeal by the landlords, the appellate authority has taken the view that the landlords required the premises for their personal use and therefore, he set aside the decision of the Rent Controller and granted order for eviction of the tenant. The tenant who is dis -satisfied with this decision has come up in revision to this Court. The first contention of Mr. Puran Chand, learned Counsel for the Petitioner -tenant is that the eviction application should have been by all the landlords and not by two out of the landlords and in support of his contention, the learned Counsel has relied upon the decision of the Orissa High Court in Mohammad Asgar Ali v. Narayan Mohapatra and Ors. : A.I.R. 1958 Ori 101 and Bombay High Court in Vagha Jesing v. Manilal Bhogilal Desai and Ors. : A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 262. These decisions do support the contention of the learned Counsel. In fact, if a reference is made to Note 34 of Chitaley's Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) 3rd edition, page 1737, it will be found that the view enunciated by the Orissa High Court is the preponderant view. However, these decisions will not have any application to the facts of the present case. It is not disputed that the original contract of lease was between the father of the present Applicants and the tenant. The rights of the father have devolved on the Applicants by succession. Therefore, there is no contract of lease between the present Applicants and the tenant. In any event, the objection that the sisters of the present Applicants who are heirs to the property along with their brothers should have been joined in the application for eviction, was not raised at the trial. In my opinion, this objection cannot be permitted at the stage of revision, because if this objection had been raised at the trial, the defect could have been remedied by impleading the sisters as co -Applicants.
(2.) I am even doubtful whether this contention would be correct so far as the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, are concerned. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the "landlord" in the following terms: "Landlords" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorized, and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. It will be apparent from this definition that every person who derives title from the landlord is the landlord. The result would be that all the descendants of the original landlord will be landlords individually in their own right and Section 13 under which the application has been made provides that a landlord who wants to evict shall apply to the Controller in that behalf. Therefore, it is obvious that one of the landlords can make application for eviction of the tenant under the Act. What I have said above finds support from the decision by Chief Justice Falshaw in Vir Bhan v. Avtar Singh , I.L.R. 1963 (1) P&H 473 :, 1962 P.L.R. 1185. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the decision of Chief Justice is incorrect in view of the decision of Capoor J., in Hem Raj v. Moti Lal and Ors. 1965 P.L.R.25. In my opinion, there is no conflict between the two decisions. So far as the case decided by Capoor J., is concerned, the petition of all the landlords had been rejected and only some of them wanted to get rid of that order and it was that situation that it was held that final order having been passed against all, some could not get that order vacated. That is not so in the instant case. I would, therefore, reject this contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner.
(3.) SO far as the merits of the case are concerned, the matter is concluded by findings of fact. The learned Counsel's contention was that the Rent Controller had found that the premises were not bona fide needed by the landlord. In fact, it has been found that the landlords were not carrying their business at Malout. However, the appellate authority has come to a contrary conclusion. It has been found that the landlords are carrying their business in Malout and for that purpose they require the premises in dispute because they want to reside at Malout. The decision of the appellate authority is based on evidence because the appellate authority has believed the statement of Kasturi Lal. In this situation, it cannot be said that the decision of the appellate authority is, in any way, erroneous. It is a settled rule that a decision on a question of fact is binding on this Court in revision unless it is not according to law or is otherwise irregular. No such error has been pointed out in the decision.;