R.S. Narula, J. - (1.) THE two questions, hereinafter mentioned, relating to jurisdiction of civil Courts in pre -emption suits have been raised in this case by Shri Jagan Nath Kaushal, learned Counsel for the Defendant -Petitioner, in the following circumstances:
(2.) THE Plaintiff -Respondents, hereinafter called the preemptors, were directed by the trial Court on February 25, 1969, to deposit one -fifth of the pre -emption money amounting to Rs. 17,950 on or before March 25, 1969. This order was passed in exercise of the trial Court's jurisdiction under Section 22(1) of the Punjab Preemption Act (Act 1 of 1913), hereinafter referred to as the Act, which provision reads - - 22(1) In every suit for pre -emption the Court shall at, or at any time before, the settlement of issues, require the Plaintiff to deposit in Court such sum as does not, in the opinion of the Court, exceed one -fifth of the probable value of the land or property, or require the Plaintiff to give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the payment, if required, of a sum not exceeding such probable value within such time as the Court may fix in such order. Not having complied with the order, the preemptors made §n application on March 22, 1969, before the expiry of the time originally allowed by the trial Court, praying for extension of time to make the requisition deposit. The application was allowed and time for depositing the amount in question was extended till April 8, 1969. The deposit was admittedly not made within the extended period. On the day following the expiry of the extended period, that is, on April 9, 1969, the pre -emptors filed an application for further extension of one day. By order, dated April 11, 1969, Shri V.K. Jain, Subordinate Judge, First Class, Sirsa, repelled the objection of the vendee -Petitioner to the effect that Sub -section (4) of Section 22 of the Act does not confer on the Court jurisdiction to extend time for making the requisite deposit on the basis of an application for extension of time which is filed after the expiry of the time fixed by the Court either under Sub -section (1) or under Sub -section (4) of Section 22. After holding that the application of the preemptors, dated April 9, 1969, was not barred by time and extension of deposit could be allowed even on such an application if the Court was satisfied that there was sufficient ground for granting such extension, the learned Subordinate Judge observed and held as follows - - Counsel for the Defendants has not argued on the merits of the application. Accordingly, I am of the view that Plaintiffs under the circumstances should be given extension in the deposit of l/5th pre -emption money as prayed. Application of the Plaintiffs is accordingly allowed. It is the above -quoted order of the learned Subordinate Judge which has been called in question by the vendee in this petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the following two grounds - - (1) that in allowing the application of the preemptors, dated April 9, 1969, the trial Court has exercised jurisdiction which is not vested in it by law inasmuch as an order under Sub -section (4) of Section 22 of the Act granting extension of time for making the deposit required under Sub -section (1) of that section can be made in a fit case only if the application for such further extension is given to the Court concerned before the expiry of the time previously allowed by the Court for that purpose and not on an application moved after the expiry of the previously fixed time; and (2) that the trial Court had acted in the present case illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Sub -section (4) of Section 22 of the Act by granting the application for extension of time without recording any clear finding of its own supported by adequate reasons to the effect that the Court is satisfied that there was, in fact, sufficient ground for granting further extension to the preemptors on the facts of this case. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, I do not have the slightest hesitation in holding that there is great force in the second contention of Shri Kaushal and that he must succeed on that short ground. After observing that the application could be allowed only if the Court was satisfied that there was sufficient ground for giving further extension, the Court below has mentioned only one ground on which it can possibly be argued that it was satisfied about the sufficiency of reasons for extending time for making the deposit. The said solitary ground is that "counsel for the Defendants has not argued on the merits of the application". This was thought by the learned Subordinate Judge to be enough to justify extension of time. Merely saying that under the circumstances of the case extension should be given does not amount to recording any finding about there being some real jurisdiction for time being extended. Whether or not extension or further extension in the time allowed for making the requisite deposit in a pre -emption case should be allowed necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Wherever the jurisdiction of the Court under Sub -section (4) of Section 22 of the Act is invoked by a preemptor for extension of time, it is the duty of the Court concerned to seriously weigh the circumstances of the case, to consider them and then to give its decision, supported by -cogent reasons, extending the time after full justification for the same is available on the record of the given case. Right of pre -emption, though recognised by law and though constitutionally valid, is nevertheless a piratical right. Once a vested right has accrued to a vendee to defeat a claim for pre -emption intended to encroach upon his contractual property rights, Court should not lightly deprive the vendee of the right thus accrued to him merely because an application for extension has been made and the Court has jurisdiction to grant such an application. The Defendants not having argued on the merits of the application, at best, created a situation similar to the one in which a Defendant does not appear to contest an ordinary civil suit despite service and proceedings are taken ex -parte against him. Nevertheless the Court cannot grant a decree in favour of the Plaintiff simply because the Defendant has not appeared and said nothing on merits about the claim of the Plaintiff. Such a decree, if passed, is bound to be set aside in appropriate proceedings. Even an ex -parte decree cannot be passed in any ordinary suit unless the Court is satisfied from the ex -parte evidence led before it about the claim of the Plaintiff being proved. An application for extension of time under Sub -section (4) of Section 22 does not form an exception to the said rule. The manner in which the jurisdiction has been exercised by the trial Court under Sub -section (4) of Section 22 of the Act in this case is illegal and wholly irregular.
(3.) IN spite of my upholding the second contention of Shri Kaushal, I have to decide about the validity of his first argument also, because my decision on that point will lead to the grant of materially different relief. If it is found that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant the application presented after April 8, 1969, the plaint of the suit of the pre -emptors shall have to be rejected under Sub -section (4) of Section 22 of the Act and the Court would have no choice in the matter. If however, the finding of the trial Court on the question of the maintainability of the application is upheld, the matter will have to go back to the trial Court for being re -adjudicated upon in accordance with law. I, therefore, proceed to decide the first point also.;