- (1.) Bhajan Singh and others have filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality of the order of the Superintending Canal Officer, respondent No. 1, dated 20th November, 1968 (copy Annexure 'B' to the petition).
(2.) The main ground urged before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners, is that the impugned order is not a speaking order and as such is liable to be set aside on that short ground. Reliance in support of this contention is placed on the Supreme Court decision in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 1966 AIR(SC) 671 and Bhagat Raja v. Union of India and others, 1967 AIR(SC) 1606 In my view, there is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel. The decision of the Superintending Canal Officer after stating contentions of the then appellant, is in the following terms :- "Both the parties have been heard. It is clear from the plan that the Khal L.N. is unnecessary. As such this part of the Khal is eliminated. The decision was announced to both the parties." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja's case observed thus :- "Let us now examine the question as to whether it was incumbent on the Central Government to give any reasons for its decision on review. It was argued that the very exercise of judicial or quasi judicial powers in the case of a Tribunal entailed upon it an obligation to give reasons for arriving at a decision for or against a party. The decisions of Tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court under Article 136. It goes without saying that both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word 'rejected' or 'dismissed'. In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing, come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appeal. Ordinarily, in a case like this, if the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the application of one party and rejecting that of the others, as it must, and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of the State Government, this Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient for the purpose of upholding the decision. But, when the reasons given in the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this Court, in appeal may have to examine the case de novo without anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government. If the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying those reasons which according to it are sufficient to uphold the order of the State Government, this Court, in appeal may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds which weighed with the Central Government in upholding the order of the State Government. In such circumstances, what is known as a 'speaking order' is called for." In Madhya Pradesh Industries' case, the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court may be read with advantage :- "A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by consideration of policy or expediency; but, an executive officer generally looks at things from the stand-point of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function of from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on Tribunals in the matter of passing orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to give reasons for their orders. Even in the case of appellate Courts invariably reasons are given, except when they dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and that is because the Appellate or Revisional Court agrees with the reasoned judgment of the Subordinate Court or there are no legally permissible grounds to interfere with it. But the same reasoning cannot apply to an Appellate Tribunal, for as often as not the order of the first Tribunal is laconic and does not give any reasons. That apart, when we insist upon reasons, we do not prescribe any particular form or scale of the reasons. The extent and the nature of the reasons depend upon each case. Ordinarily, the appellate or revisional Tribunal shall give its own reason succinctly; but in a case of affirmance where the original Tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate Tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons. What is essential is that reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional Tribunal expressly or by reference to those given by the original Tribunal. The nature and the elaboration of the reasons necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the present case, neither the State Government's nor the Central Government's order discloses the reasons for rejecting the application of the appellant."
(3.) From the reading of the impugned order, no manner of doubt is left in my mind that it does not stand the test as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned two authorities and is a scrappy and laconic order. The learned officer, it seems, has not applied his mind to the controversy and has passed a telegraphic order. It does not give any reasons as to why he arrived at a different view from the one arrived at by the Divisional Canal Officer.;