D.K. Mahajan, J. - (1.) THIS petition is directed against the order of the Appellate Authority, Jullundur, reversing, on appeal, the decision of the Rent Controller, dismissing the application of the landlord for the eviction of the tenant.
(2.) KRISHAN Gopal is the tenant and Lekh Raj is the landlord. Eviction was claimed on a large number of grounds. But the only ground, that survives, is, -that the premises were required bonafide by the landlord for his use and occupation. The Rent Controller proceeded on the basis that even if it was taken for granted that the accommodation with the landlord was insufficient for him and his family, the tenant could not be evicted because the premises were not, in their entirety, residential. The appellate authority held the premises to be residential and reversed the decision of the Rent Controller. The tenant has now come up in revision. It is common ground that in part of the premises, the tenant carries on business. The Rent Controller proceed to hold that the premises were 'non -residential', on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S.K. Bhardwaj : A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 337, and Miss S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand : A. I. R 1968 S.C. 438. Both these cases are under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the provisions of which are not analogous to the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The provisions of the Delhi Act were considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Duss's case; and it will be appropriate to quote that part of the judgment: It is relevant to refer to the material provisions of the Act before dealing with the points raised for the appellant by the learned Solicitor -General in the present appeal. The Act applies to premises which are defined by Section 2(g) as meaning inter alia, any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose. Section 13 (1) provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated. This provision is, now -ever, subject to the exceptions provided under the several clauses of the proviso. We are concerned with two of these. Section 13(1)(e) allows a decree for ejectment to be pulsed if the Court is satisfied that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation. The, explanation to this clause provides that for the purpose of this clause 'residential premises' include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes; and Section 13 (1)(h) provides for ejectment in a case where the Court is satisfied that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act built acquired vacant possession of, or has been allotted, a suitable residence It is with these three provisions that we are concerned in the present appeal. It would be noticed that as soon as it is found that the premises in question have been used by respondent 1 incidentally for professional purposes and it is further established that this use is made with the consent of the landlord then the case goes outside the par -view of Section 13(l)(e) altogether. In the present case it has been found by the appellate Court that right from the commencement of the tenancy a substantial part of the premises is used by respondent 1 for his professional purpose and they have also found that this has been done obviously with the consent of the landlord. It is unnecessary to refer to the evidence on which this finding is based. Even the of trial Court was apparently inclined to take the same view about this evidence but it did not fully appreciate the effect of the explanation; otherwise it would have realized that the professional use of a substantial part of the premieres with the consent of the appellant clearly takes the case outside Section 13(l)(e). In other words, where premises are let for residential purposes and it is shown that they are used by the tenant incidentally for commercial, professional or other purposes with the consent of the landlord the landlord would not be entitled to eject the tenant even if he proves that he needs tie premises bona fide for his personal use because the premises have by their user ceased to be premises let for residential purpose alone. This position cannot be seriously disputed. Faced with this difficulty the learned Solicitor -General attempted to argue that the very finding made by the Courts below about the nature of the tenancy takes the premises outside the purview of Section 2(g) of the Act. The argument is that the premises cannot then be said to have been let for use as a residence or for a commercial use and so they ceased to be premises under the Act. It is suggested that any other use which is specified by Section 2(g) would not include a combination of residence with commercial or professional purposes. The other use there referred to may be use or charity or something of that kind which is different from use as residence or commercial use. In our opinion this argument is not founded. The three kinds of user to which the definition refers are residence, commerce and any other purpose which necessarily must include residence and commerce combined. It may also include other purposes as suggested by the learned Solicitor -General. As soon as it is shown that the premises have been let both for the use of residence and for commercial purposes it does not follow that premises cease to be premises under Section 2(g); they continue to be premises under the last clause of Section 2(g). This position is wholly consistent with the division of the premises made with reference to their user in paragraphs 3. 4 and 5 of the Part A in the Second Schedule to the Act Therefore, in our opinion, the argument urged by the learned Solicitor General on the construction of Section 2 (g) cannot be sustained. It will be recalled that the present suit has been filed by the appellant himself praying for the respondent's ejectment under the provisions of the Act, and so the argument that the Act does not apply to the premises in question can be justly characterized as an argument of desperation. So far as the Punjab Act is concerned, the buildings have been split into three categories, that is, 'non -residential', 'residential' and 'scheduled'. The respective definitions are to be found in section 2(d), (g) and (h); and are reproduced below for facility of reference - 2. (d) ''non -residential building" means a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade : Provided that residence in a building only for the purpose of guarding it shall not be deemed to convert a non -residential building' to a 'residential building. (g) residential building' means any building which is not a non -residential building; (h) 'scheduled building' means a residential building which is being used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in the Schedule to this Act, partly for his business and partly for his residence; On the basis of these definitions, the Full Bench of this Court in Messrs Sant Ram Des Raj v. 'Kafam' Chand, (1962) 64 P. L. R. 758, observed as follows: The authorities below have concurred in their conclusion that the premises are residential building and, as stated, this was not apparently challenged before the learned Single Judge. However, an attempt has been made to question this finding here. The almost established facts are that the property when it was under the possession of Abdul Rashid Butt was being used by him for repairs of motor vehicles of Kalka -Simla Hills Transport Company, of which he was one of the owners, and for the residence of the employees of the Company. Subsequently, probably at the time of the partition of the country, Abdul Rashid Butt was dispossessed of the premises by one Ishar Das, who instead of restoring possession of it. Thereafter of the same to him placed the petitioner -firm in possession of it. Abdul Rashid Butt and the petitioner firm agreed upon a tenancy of the premises on an annual rental of Rs. 450/ -. The petitioner -firm has been tethering cattle in it and keeping fodder in the premises as also marketing grains and having a godown for coal therein. The Rent Controller had discussed at some length that the claim of the petitioner firm that it uses the premises as godown and for marketing grams is not correct. There appears to be substance in this. In an earlier application for license as coal -dealer, the petitioner -firm gave its place of business and that according to the requirement in the form, but not in the applications during the time it, has been in possession of the premises, though such a mention has been made in an application filed after the respondent's application to obtain its eviction. And there is no grain market near the premises so that the allegation in this respect has been rightly found not to be correct. In any case, in view of the evidence, it is clear that the premises have not been solely used for business or trade and the conclusion of the authorities below is correct that the same are residential building. Section 2(g) of the Act says that 'residential building' means any building which is not a non -residential building and clause (d) of this section says that 'non -residential building' means a building being used solely for the purpose of business or, trade. It is thus 'clear' that the conclusion of the authorities below that the premises in question are residential premises is correct. This leaves for consideration the other question. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Smt. Naranjan Kaur v. Dr. Siri Ram, (1968) 70 P.L.R. 973. Therefore, it must be held that the premises in dispute are 'residential' premises; and as the ground of personal requirement has been satisfied, the landlord is entitled to their possession. The learned counsel for the petitioner rightly did not challenge, the finding of the Appellate Authority, that the landlord required the premises for his personal use, as the premises in his possession were insufficient to meet his and his family requirements.
(3.) That being so, this petition fails and is dismissed; but there will be no order as to costs. The learned counsel for the tenant prays that he may be granted some time to vacate the premises. I grant him three month's time. The execution will only take place after expiry of these three months.;