SURJIT SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. NAZIR SINGH
LAWS(P&H)-1969-9-15
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Decided on September 30,1969

Surjit Singh and Others Appellant
VERSUS
NAZIR SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

P.C. Jain, J. - (1.) BRIEFLY the facts of this case are as follows: Nazir Singh Plaintiff brought the present suit out of which this second appeal has arisen for possession of the land in dispute, alleging that be was owner of the land, that about two and a half years prior to the institution of this suit the Defendants forcibly took possession of the same, that the Defendants asserted that they had purchased this land from him and that even if the Defendants had got any sale deed executed from him, must be a fictitious document obtained by them (Defendants) from him during his minority and was liable to be ignored. The suit was contested by the Defendants, inter alia, on the grounds that the Plaintiff had sold the land in dispute to them on 4th June, 1962, that the sale price paid was Rs. 6400/ -, that in addition to the sale price of Rs. 6400/ -, Rs. 1100/ - were spent for execution and registration of the sale deed, and that the Plaintiff was major at the time of the sale and had received full consideration. It was also averred that in case the suit is decreed, the Plaintiff should be made to pay to the Defendants the benefit received by him under the sale. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed: 1. Was Nazir Singh Plaintiff minor at the time sale deed dated 4th June, 1962 was executed, if so, what effect ?
(2.) ARE the Defendants entitled to the refund of sale price, it issue No. 1 is proved ? Relief. The learned Subordinate Judge decided issue No. 1 in favour of the Plaintiff and issue No. 2 in favour of the Defendants and decreed the suit of the Plaintiff for possession of the property in suit on payment of Rs. 6400/ -. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the trial Judge, an appeal was preferred by the Defendants ; but the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jullundur, on 28th January, 1969. The present regular second appeal has been filed by the Plaintiff against the concurrent decision of the Courts below. 2. Mr. Sarhadi learned Counsel for the Appellants raised almost the same contentions as were raised before the learned Additional District Judge. It was contended by the learned Counsel that the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge, jullundur, dated 9th August, 1955 (Exhibit P. 3) by which the guardians of the property and person of the Plaintiff were appointed, was conditional as it provided the execution of security bonds. According to the learned Counsel, the security bonds were not executed and as such the order dated 9th August, 1955, would be deemed to be a nullity or non -existent. In my view there is no force in the contention of the learned Counsel and it was rightly rejected by the Courts below. The order appointing the guardians, is independent of the order demanding security bonds. From the plain reading of the order it cannot be interred that the order appointing the guardians was to be operative only on their having furnished the security bonds. Further, as observed by the learned Additional District Judge, earlier by an order dated 30th April, 1953, guardians of the property and person of the Plaintiff had been appointed and it was only in view of some subsequent development that some other guardian had to be appointed and the order dated 9th August, 1955 (Exhibit P. 3) was passed viewed from any angle, there is no escape for the conclusion that guardians of the property and person of the Plaintiff were appointed by the competent Court before he had attained the age of eighteen years and under Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (hereinafter referred to as the Majority Act, such a minor shall be deemed to have attained majority on completion of twenty one years of age. 3. The next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellants, was that after the enforcement of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Minority Act), a minor becomes major on his attaining the age of 18 years even in a case where Court guardians were appointed for the person and property of the minor. Reference was made to the definition of minor as given in Section 4 (a) and Section 5 (b) of the Minority Act which read as under: 4 (a) "minor" means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years. 5(b) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act. In my view there is no substance in this contention of the learned Counsel either. The Minority Act does not codify the entire law of guardianship applicable to Hindus but amends and codifies only certain parts of the law relating to minority and guardianship among Hindus, Section 2 of the Minority Act which reads thus. "The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not' save as hereinafter expressly provided, in derogation of, the Guardians and Wards Act 8 of 1890", expressly lays down that the provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in derogation of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as the Wards Act). The provisions of the Minority Act are to be read supplemental to the Wards Act. In a Division Bench decision of this Court in Captain Rattan Amol Singh v. Smt. Kamaljit Kaur, (1990) 62 P L R 678, it was observed thus: The Court must construe the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act and of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act together, because they constitute parts of a single scheme or of the same legislative plan; their provisions must, therefore, be harmonised and read together, so that the real and true purpose and equity of the basic principles underlying the subject -matter of the legislative scheme or plan are effectively carried out.
(3.) IN the Minority Act, a minor has been defined to be a person who has not completed the age of 18 years. This definition of the minor is only for the purpose of this Act. Reference to the provisions of the Minority Act would show that it is principally intended to crystallise in statutory form as to who are the persons entitled to act as the natural and testamentary guardians of a Hindu minor and particularly to impose certain limitations on the powers of such guardians in the matter of disposal of and management of the immovable property of the minor. This Act does not deal with the appointment of a Court guardian and for that purpose we have to seek the help of the provisions of Wards Act and for the definition of the minor as given in the Majority Act wherein it is provided that a minor for whose property and person a guardian has been appointed by the Court before his attaining the age of 18 years, shall be deemed to have attained Majority on his completion of 21 years and not before. As earlier observed the purpose of Minority Act is not to supersede the Wards Act but to supplement it. The view I am taking is fully supported by the decision of the Madras High Court in V.N. Swaminathan v. Angawarkanni Ammal : A I R 1964 Mad 11, and the following observations may be read with advantage: But as I read the sections in the two enactments, I am unable to regard Section 4 (a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act as in any way inconsistent with Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act. A persual of the sections of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act shows that its purpose is merely to replace the personal law governing a Hindu in respect of the age of minority. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act itself does not contain provision for appointment of a Court guardian. On the other hand, this Act itself, as I already mentioned, provides that its provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. For purposes of appointment of a Court guardian, one has, therefore, to look to the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the definition of a minor in the Indian Majority Act. Further Section 4(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, also indicates that the definition of a minor made therein is only for purposes of that Act. The purpose of the Act is not to supersede the provisions of the Guardians and Wards act, 1890, but to supplement it. It follows, therefore, that to the extent the first part of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act provides that where a Court Guardian has been appointed for the person of a minor he shall be deemed to be a minor until he shall have completed the age of 21 years, it is not inconsistent with the definition of a minor under Section 4(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. If the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act itself had provided for a complete Code including provisions for appointment of guardians it would have been a different matter. The definition in Section 4(a) will therefore govern only the application of the other provisions of the Act, which do not include appointment of a guardian of a person of a minor. (3) The learned Advocate General who appeared for the petitioner argued that since the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is intended to supersede the personal law of a Hindu minor and section 5(b) gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act, it must be taken that the first part of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act can no longer apply to a Hindu minor. I am unable to accept this contention. The learned Advocate General is right that the purpose of the Act is to replace the Hindu law of Minority. But the effect of Sections 4(a) and 5(b) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is not to override the first part of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act. The overriding effect will come in only in case of inconsistency between the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and any other law in force immediately before that came into force. But as in my view there is no such inconsistency between Section 4(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and the first part of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, the latter provision continues to govern a Hindu minor for whose person a Court guardian has been appointed. Accordingly I hold that the definition of minor as given in the Minority Act does not apply to the cases where a Court guardian of the person and the property of the minor has been appointed under the Wards Act. The finding of the Courts below on issue No. 1, is accordingly affirmed.;


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