A.D.Koshal, J. - (1.) THIS regular second appeal by the defendant has arisen in the following circumstances. The land in suit, which is fully described in the plaint and is situated in the area of village Ferozepur, Sub -Tehsil Dhuri, belonged to one Shariff Hassan who sold the same to Nahar Singh respondent for Rs.4,500/ - by virtue of a registered sale deed dated the 24th of February, 1955. At that time the appellant was occupying the land as a tenant which status he continued to hold under the respondent after the sale. Alleging that the appellant had failed to pay the rent due in respect of his tenancy, the respondent filed an application against him for recovery of arrears of rent before village Panchayat. A compromise between the two contending parties was arrived at before the Panchayat on the 16th of June, 1956, and according to the terms thereof the appellant agreed to relinquish possession of the land while the respondent gave up his claim to all arrears of rent. This compromise was incorporated in a resolution (Exhibit P. 1) passed by the Panchayat on the same day on which the respondent also obtained possession of the land.
(2.) ON the 21st of June, 1955, the appellant made an application (Exhibit D. 11) under section 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Malerkotla, alleging that he had been forcibly dispossessed of the land by the respondent and praying for restoration thereof. This application was dismissed on the 2nd of April, 1959, on the ground that the Sub Divisional Magistrate did not enjoin the powers of a Collector and that the application was not maintainable unless the compromise evidenced by Exhibit P. 1 was set aside by a competent Court. A petition for revision of the order made by the Sub -Divisional Magistrate was dismissed by the Commissioner, Patiala. On the 4th of April 1959, the Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Malerkotla, was invested with powers of a Collector under the Act and on the 19th of January, 1960, the appellant presented to him another application (Exhibit D. 12) with the same allegations and prayer as were contained in application Exhibit D. 11. An objection taken by the respondent to the effect that the Collector had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties was turned down on the 17th of June, 1960, by the Sub -Divisional Magistrate acting as Collector whose order in that behalf (Exhibit D. 4) was upheld by the Commissioner in revision (Exhibit D. 5). The application (Exhibit D. 12) was ultimately decided by the Sub -Divisional Magistrate on the 12th of May, 1962 when holding that the appellant had not entered into the compromise voluntarily but had been forcibly dispossessed by the respondent, he directed that the respondent be ejected from the land (Exhibit P. 1). The appellant actually obtained possession of the land in dispute from the respondent through the Collector on the 25th of May, 1962 (Exhibits P. 3 and P. 4). The respondent took an appeal to the Commissioner Patiala, but the same was dismissed on the 3rd of July, 1962 (Exhibit D. 6). His petition for revision of the order of the Commissioner met a similar fate at the hands of the Financial Commissioner on the 9th of August, 1962. The respondent then knocked door of the High Court with a petition for the issuance of an appropriate writ which was, however, dismissed in limine on the 14th of October, 1962 (Exhibit D. 9). It was then that the respondent filed the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, alleging that the order of the Collector was void, ineffective and without jurisdiction, that the appellant had voluntarily relinquished possession of the land and made the same over to him (the respondent) on the 16th of June, 1955, and that he (the respondent) was entitled to recover possession of the land. The case set up by the appellant was that he had never surrendered possession of the land to the respondent who had forcibly dispossessed him (the appellant) with the help of certain police personal and that the order of the Collector which was impugned. in the suit was correctly made. It was pleaded that the suit was time barred and that the civil courts had no jurisdiction to try it. The parties went to trial on the following issues: (1) Whether the suit is within time? (2) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try this suit? (3) Whether the defendant voluntarily surrendered possession to the plaintiff on 16th June, 1955? If so, its effect? (4) Whether the order of the Collector dated 12th May, 1962 is void, ineffective and without jurisdiction. (5) Relief. Sarimati Harmohinder Kaur, Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Dhuri, decreed the respondent's suit with costs on the 23rd of November, 1964, all the issues having been found in his favour. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial Court, the appellant instituted his first appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Barnala, which was dismissed with costs by Shri Pritam Singh Pattar on the 14th of October, 1965. On a fresh appraisal of the evidence produced by the parties, Shri Pattar affirmed the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 3. He then proceeded to discuss issues Nos. 2 and 4 in respect of which also he affirmed the findings arrived at by the trial Court. Reliance in this connection was placed on Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu : A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 361, Net Ram Surjia Ganeshi and another v. The State A.I.R. 1954 Pepsu 34. Harnani Singh and others v. Dalip Singh, (1963) 65 P.L.R. 1133 and Hardev Bahadur Singh v. The State of Punjab : (1964) 66 P.L.R. 751. The finding on issue No. 1 given by the trial Court was also maintained on the authority of Sadhu Singh v. Chanda Singh and others, A.I.R. 1957 P&H. 108, and Union of India v. Kedareshwar : A.I.R. 1959 HP 32. It is from the appellate decree passed by Shri Pattar that the appellant has come up to this Court in second appeal. 2. Shri H.L. Sarin, learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently contended that the findings arrived at by the two Courts below in respect of issue No 2 were erroneous inasmuch as - (a) Section 47 of the Act provides a complete bar to the entertainment by a civil Court of any matter which the Collector has jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with under the Act and the present dispute between the parties constitutes such a matter in view of the provisions of section 43 of the Act, and (b) the dismissal on the 24th of October, 1962, of the writ petition brought by the respondent against the orders of the revenue authorities operated as res judicata. I shall deal with both this aspects of his contention. 3. Sections 43 and 47 of the Act run as follows: 43. (1) Any person who is in wrongful or unauthorized possession of any land - (a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act or (b) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the provisions of this Act may, after summary enquiry, be ejected by the Collector, who may also impose on such person a penalty not exceeding five hundred rupees (2). The Collector may direct that the whole or any part of the penalty imposed under sub -section (1) shall be paid to the person who has sustained any loss or damage by the wrongful or unauthorized possession of the land. 47. (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any matter which is under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority. (2) No order of the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority made under or in pursuance of this Act shall be called in question in any court. Section 47 clearly enacts a complete bar to the entertainment by a civil Court of any matter which a Collector can settle, decide or deal with under the Act and this proposition is not disputed on behalf of the respondent whose case, however, is that the dispute now before the Court is not a matter covered by section 47, that under section 43 the Collector can eject only a person who is in wrongful or unauthorized possession of land by reason of the existence of facts covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of section 43, that before the Collector can assume jurisdiction the existence of such facts must either be admitted or established in a civil court and that the Collector does not have the jurisdiction under section 43 to adjudicate upon the nature of or title to the possession of land held by a particular individual. It was contended by Shri Sarin, on the other hand, that the Act was a complete Code, in itself, that it provided for a compute machinery for the decision of disputes like the one before me and that section 43 gave to the Collector clear authority to determine the existence of facts which would clothe him with jurisdiction to act there under. Numerous authorities were cited before me by learned counsel for the parties in this connection and after giving them my most careful consideration, I am fully inclined to agree with the proposition enunciated by Shri Sarin.
(3.) IN Rai Brij Raj Krishna and another v. Messrs S. K. Shaw and Brothers : A. I R 1951 S. C. 115, the question was whether the Controller had jurisdiction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, to determine the question of non -payment of rent and whether his finding could be questioned in a civil court. Adverting to various provisions of the Bihar Act, their Lordships expressed the opinion that it had set up a complete machinery for the investigation of those matters upon which the jurisdiction of the Controller to order eviction of a tenant depended, that it expressly made his order final (subject only to the decision of the Commissioner), that it empowered the Controller alone to decide whether or not there was non -payment of rent and that his decision on that question was essential before an order of eviction could be passed by him Their Lordships then referred with approval to the following observations of Lord Esher, MR. in The Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income -tax, (1888) 21 Q B. D 313 at page 319: When an inferior -Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the Legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceed -to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists and if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction But there is another state of things which may exist. The Legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the Legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the Legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction. Their Lordships has no doubt that the case before them fell within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher because the Bihar Act had entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction which included the jurisdiction to determine whether there was non -payment of rent or not as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there was non -payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant, They concluded, therefore, that even if the Controller wrongly decided the question of non -payment of rent, his order could not be questioned in a civil Court.;