C.G.Suri, J. - (1.) THIS order shall dispose of Civil Writs No. 1708 and 2193 of 1966 which have been filed respectively by two real brothers Ranjit Singh and Gurbax Singh sons of Gajjan Singh for quashing of an order, dated May 31, 1966, of the Custodian General of Evacuee Property, India, Respondent No. 1. The questions of fact and law involved in the two cases are almost the same and the minor differences of detail have no bearing on the final result of these petitions. Shri Gajjan Singh, the deceased father of the Petitioners had, in fact, been prosecuting the cases on behalf of his two sons as their, general attorney before the Revenue Officers and the Rehabilitation authorities at certain early stages. In passing the impugned order, dated May 31, 1966, Respondent No. 1, had invoked his powers of revision under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, No. XXXI of 1950 (hereinafter briefly referred to as 'the Act') and had set aside an order, dated May 10, 1952, of the Additional Custodian and had remanded the proceedings to Respondent No. 2, Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab, for deciding afresh, in accordance with law, two applications filed separately by the Petitioners in the year 1948 under Section 5 -A of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947.
(2.) IN order to properly appreciate the points in controversy it would be pertinent at this stage to state briefly the facts of the case. The land in dispute which is situated in villages of Hemo Majra and Lal Pura in Karnal District belonged to Muslim owners before the country was partitioned into the dominions of India arid Pakistan in 1947. The Petitioner in each case claims to have purchased the land described in his respective petition from the Muslim owner (s); but there is a serious dispute as to the genuineness of the transactions set vtp by the Petitioners or the dates on which these transactions had taken place. Ranjit Singh claims to have purchased a 3/8th share in 1939, bighas of land from some of the joint Muslim owners; the remaining -5/8th share continuing to be owned by the other Muslim owners. Gurbax Singh, Petitioner, claims to have purchased sole ownership rights in 620 bighas of land with rights in Shamlat in village Lalpura and in his case there was no complication about the land having become 'composite property' at any stage within the meaning of Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951, No. LXIV of 1951 (hereinafter briefly referred to as 'the Separation Act'). In Gurbax Singh's case there were no proceedings under the Separation Act as in Ranjit Singh's case and the former has thereby been deprived of the plea that Section 18 of this Act had lent finality to the proceedings culminating in the order, dated 10th May, 1952 of the Additional Custodian which has been set aside by the impugned order. Agreements of sale were said to have been entered into with the Muslim owners by Shri Gajjan Singh, the deceased father of the Petitioners on 28th August, 1945 in the case of Ranjit Singh and on 15th April, 1947 in the case of Gurbax Singh. Earnest money of Rs. 1,000 was said to have been paid to the vendor (s) on the said dates and the Petitioners have produced unstamped and un -registered writings purporting to be the agreement of sale. The balance of the sale consideration running into five figures in each case was said to have been paid in June, 1947, though there are no writings to evidence these payments. The sale in either case is said to have been finalized and completed in June, 1947, though orders of mutations in respect of these sales were attested by a Revenue Officer in the last week of September. 1947. The genuineness of these writings purporting to be agreements of sale which are innocently free of the legal formalities like Stamps, registration, drafting by a licensed scribe etc., has been seriously disputed by the Respondents as also the averment of the Petitioners that the Muslim owners were present at the time of the attestation of the mutations of sales or that they had at all received payments of the balance of the sale considerations on the dates alleged or at any other time. Section 5 -A which was first inserted in the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, No. XIV of 1947, by East Punjab Ordinance No. II of 1948, apparently before March, 1948, made it necessary for transferees of evacuee property to seek confirmation of the transfers effected in their favour after 15th August, 1947. Applications for confirmation were to be made on or before 31st March, 1948, or within two months of the date of the transfer, whichever was later. The Petitioners filed separate applications under the said section on the last date of limitation, i.e.; 31st March, 1948 for confirmation of the disputed sales. Different officers in the Custodian Department in Punjab dealt with this case at different stages. The Assistant Custodian, Karnal, who made the inquiry in the first instance had his doubts about the sale price having been paid in June, 1947. The Assistant Custodian, Judicial, was of the opinion that the sales were for consideration but his finding on the point was not accepted as correct in the order, dated November 13, 1948, of the Additional Custodian who asked the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal to hold an enquiry as to the circumstances under which the mutation orders had been passed by a Revenue Officer. The Deputy Commissioner, Karnal, ordered a review of proceedings and further directed that an enquiry should be made into the conduct of the Revenue Officer concerned. The Additional Custodian had also called upon the Petitioners by his order, dated 9th August, 1949 to produce evidence in the shape of statements or affidavits of the vendors to satisfy him regarding the passing of the consideration or the completion of the transfers. The Petitioners sought adjournment after adjournment on one excuse or the other but failed to produce any satisfactory evidence. The Additional Custodian proceeded on leave in the meanwhile and Shri (later Justice) P.D. Sharma Authorised Deputy Custodian, Punjab (as he then was) took over during the Additional Custodian's absence on leave. Without waiting for the evidence which the Petitioners had been called upon to produce, he made a detailed report on May 1, 1952, holding inter -alia that the vendors had received full consideration for the sales and had delivered possession of the land to the vendees before August 14, 1947 and that the sales having been completed before the date specified in Section 5 -A(1) of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, No. XIV of 1947, there was no necessity for the Petitioners to get the sales confirmed and that their applications under the said section were misconceived and merited rejection. He directed the attorney of the Petitioners to appear before the Additional Custodian on 12th May, 1952 but the latter officer was also in a hurry and passed orders on 10th May, 1952, agreeing with the Authorised Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property and directing action accordingly. It is this order, dated 10th May, 1952, of the Additional Custodian which has teen set aside by the order challenged in these writ petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
(3.) THE learned Counsel for the Petitioners Shri Lakhanpal has enumerated more than half a dozen grounds on which he attacks the order of Respondent No. 1 but these grounds can be discussed under two broad heads as regards the legality or propriety of the impugned order. Under the first head, we may examine the objections that Respondent No. 1 was not empowered by law to interfere after so many years and that the proceedings under or the provisions of certain Acts like the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, the Evacuee Property (Separation) Act, 1951, or the Utilization of Lands Act, bar the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1 to interfere. -' Under the second head we could examine the objections or arguments that even if the law empowered Respondent No. 1 to interfere, it was not expedient or proper on his part to do so after more than a decade. The period of limitation, available to Respondent No. 1 for interference in revision with the orders of the subordinate officers or Courts becomes a mixed question of law and fact and may seem to lie on the line of division of these two broad heads. The objection that Respondent No. 1 was barred by time from interfering in revision at this stage could, if upheld, make it unnecessary for us to examine the other grounds and this ground is, therefore, being dealt with first.;