A.D. Koshal, J. - (1.) BY this judgment we shall dispose of five appeals, namely Regular Second Appeals Nos. 628 to 632 of 1967, all of which have been filed by Randhir Singh and his brother Sukhdev Singh against Balbir Singh and his father Pala Singh and in every one of which the answer to the sole question for determination depends on an interpretation of subclause fourthly (hereinafter to be referred to as the sub -clause) of Clause (c) of Sub -section (1) of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre -emption Act (hereinafter called the Act.)
(2.) THE facts in all these appeals are practically identical and undisputed. Balbir Singh and Pala Singh Respondents were in possession of five parcels of land as tenants under the owners thereof who sold the same by five different registered sale deeds to Randhir Singh and Sukhdev Singh Appellants. In May, 1965, the two Respondents brought five suits for possession by pre -emption of the said parcels on the on the ground that they held them as tenants under the tenancy of the vendor. The Appellants denied that the Respondents were such tenants and also put forth other pleas regarding actual payment of the sale price with which we are no longer concerned. All the five suits were dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, Muktsar, on the 21st of November, 1966, with the finding that although the Respondents holding the said parcels as tenants on the dates on which they were respectively sold to the Appellants, they ceased to hold that qualification before the institution of the suits which qualification, under the law of pre -emption, they were bound to fulfil till the date of the decree in the trial Court. 2. In each of the cases the Respondents filed an appeal which was accepted by the Senior Sub -Judge, Ferozepur, on the basis of the interpretation of the sub -clause by P.C. Pandit J. in Sohan Singh v. Udho Ram in which it was held that in view of the language of the subclause the otherwise accepted principle of the law of pre -emption according to which the Plaintiff pre -emptor must continue to hold the qualification which entitles him to pre -empt a sale upto the date of the decree, was not applicable to cases covered by the sub -clause. The learned Senior Sub. Judge decreed each of the five suits on the condition that the price mentioned in the relevant sale deed along with the expenses incurred in purchasing the necessary stamp paper was deposited in the trial Court on or before the 1st of August, 1967, failing which the suit was to be dismissed. It is against the decrees passed by him that the present appeals have been filed. These appeals came up for admission before my learned brother Mahajan, J., who noted that he had interpreted the sub -clause in Chuhar Ram v. Kasmiri Lal R.S.A. 425 of 1964, decided on the 21st of December 1964 in the same manner as P.C. Pandit, J. in Sohan Singh v. Udho Ram and Ors. : (1967) 69 P.L.R. 414 (supra) but that P.D. Sharma, J., had taken a contrary view in Baru Ram v. Manji Ram, (1967) 69 P.L.R. 608, In view of this conflict of opinion Mahajan, J. admitted all the five appeals (or hearing by a Division Fench and that is how they are before us now for disposal.
(3.) BEFORE I take up the contentions raised by Mr. N.L. Dhingra, learned Counsel for the Appellants, in support of the view taken in Baru Ram v. Manji Ram, (1967) 69 P.L.R. 608 (supra), it would facilitate matters if I give a resume of the chain of authorities in which the sub -clause or another similar provision contained in sub clause FOURTHLY of Clause (c) of Sub -section, (1937) 63 P.L.R. 414 of sect ion 15 of the Act came up for discussion. In Chuhar Ram v. Kashmiri LalR.S.A. 425 of 1964 (supra) which appears to be the first case of the type, Mahajan, J. , held that under the sub -clause and and sub clause FOURTHLY of Clause (c) of Sub -section (1) of Section 15 of the Act a Plaintiff pre -emptor was required to prove only that he was a tenant of the property sought to be pre -empted under the vendors on the date of the sale and not at any time thereafter, as he could not, in the very nature of things, remain a tenant under the vendors after the tatter had sold the property and that it was not necessary for him to prove further that he continued to be a tenant under the vendors up to the date of the decree. It was observed by Mahajan, J. The requirement of the statute is that a tenant when he wants to pre -empt the sale has only to show that he is the tenant of the vendor and not that he must continue to be a tenant of the vendee. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel that the Plaintiff did not possess the requisite qualification on the date of the decree is pointless. This view was accepted as correct by P.C. Pandit, J., in Sohan Singh v, Udho Ram and Ors. (supra) wherein also the Plaintiff pre -em -ptor who depended on the qualification covered by the sub -clause had cease to hold the land in question as a tenant before the institution of the suit by him. Pandit, J., decreed the suit with the following observations: The Punjab Pre -emption Act nowhere says that the pre -emptor should retain his qualifications for pre -empting the land till the date of the decree, ft is true that the decisions have laid down that the Plaintiff's preferential right must exist on the three important dates viz., of sale, suit and decree. These rulings were however, given before the legislature gave the right of pre -emption to a tenant of the vendor. It is undisputed that after the sale the tenant cannot hold the land sold under the tenancy of the vendor because the vendor no longer remains the owner of the property and the title in the same passes to the vendee. It is a different matter that after the sale the vendee may still retain him as his own tenant, but even if he becomes the tenant of the vendee that does not afford him a ground for preempting the land, because as already mentioned above, it is only the tenant of the vendor who holds the land sold who has a right of preemption. If the well settled principle of law relied upon by the Courts below were to be applied to the case of a tenant pre -emptor as well, then it would be depriving him of his right of pre -emption given by the statute. The legislature could not have intended this result, because it is supposed to know the well settled principle of law when it amended the Punjab Pre -emption Act and gave the right of pre -emption to the tenant of the vendor. As I have said, it would not have made any difference if at the date of the institution of the suit, the Plaintiff had become the tenant of the vendee instead of the vendor, as perhaps the learned Additional District Judge seemed to think. Similarly, even if the Plaintiff had been forcibly dispossessed from the land, that too would not change the situation, because in that case also it could not be said that he was the tenant of the vendor at the time of the institution of the suit. Thus, the tenant who holds the land sold under the tenancy of the vendor had a right of pre -emption and in order to succeed he has not to retain this qualification on the date of the institution of the suit or at the time of the decree. The reasoning adopted by P.D. Sharma, J. in holding a contrary view in Baru Ram v. Manji Ram (supra) was: The learned Senior Subordinate Judge conceded and rightly too, as held in Ram Lal v. Raja Ram, (1960) 62, P.L.R 291. Surjit Singh v. Gurnam Singh,, (1964) 66, P.L.R.1063 and Ramji Lal v. The Slate of Punjab, (1966) 68, P.L.R. 345, that the right of pre -emption had to subsist in the Plaintiff pre -emptor not only at the time when the sale sought to be pre -empted was effected but up to the date of the decree. He, however, added that this well -settled principle of law could not be made applicable to the case of the present category because in the nature of things a pre -emptor after the sale could not have held the land under the vendor whose title therein after the sale vested in the vendee. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contested the correctness of this finding and in doing so argued that what the law required was that the Plaintiff -pre -emptor in order to succeed should have held the land at the time of (a) sale, (b) institution of the suit and (c) passing of the decrte by the trial Court on the basis of the right which he had acquired as tenant of the vendor. His argument is indeed unexceptionable. What the law contempt ates is that the Plaintiff pre -emptor who has based his right to preempt the sale on the provisions made in Section 15(1)(c) must be holding the land under tenancy of the vendor at the time of the sale and continue to hold it on the basis of the same right up to the date of the decree. The sale alone could not have divested him of his right to hold the land which he had acquired as tenant of the vendor. It was, therefore, not correct for the learned Senior Subordinate Judge to observe that the well -settled principle of the pre -emption law as enunciated in the above three cases could not be made applicable to the present case. Sub -clause fourthly of Clause (c) of Sub -section (1) of Section 15 of the Act came up for interpretation before Gurdev Singh, J. in Gurbachan Singh and Ors. v. Bhagat Singh,, (1968)70 P. L. R. 553. That sub -clause lays down: 15.(1) The right of pre -emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest - (c) Where the sale is of land or property owned jointly and is made by all the co sharers jointly - Fourthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendors or any of them the land or property sold or a part thereof. Gurdev Singh, J., interpreted this sub -clause in confirmity with the view taken by Mahajan, J., and P.C. Pandit, J., and observed: This clause applies to the sale of the joint land or property made by all the co -sharers jointly. Obviously, as a result of such a sale, all co -sharers cease to have any interest in the joint property. Accordingly, the tenant or tenants holding the tenancy under the vendors would cease to be tenants of the vendors from the date of the sale. It, therefore, follows that a tenant of the vendors, who was holding the tenancy under the vendors on the date of the sale, would cease to occupy that status as soon as the sale is completed and the title passes to the vendee. Consequently subsequent to the sale a tenant of the vendors in whom right of pre -emption vests under clause fourthly of Section 15 (i) (c) with which we are concerned, cannot by very nature of things satisfy the condition of being a tenant who holds under tenancy of the vendors or any one of them the land or property sold or part thereof. In other words, it will be impossible for a tenant exercising the right of pre -emption under this clause to satisfy the condition of retaining that qualification of his being a tenant under the vendors or any one of them on the date of the suit and the date of the decree Insistence on his retaining that qualification subsequent to the sale would thus deprive the tenant of the right of pre -emption which the legislature has expressly cenferred on him under clause FOURTHLY of Section 15(1) (c). Such an interpretation would render the provision nugatory and result in depriving the tenants in a joint tenancy of their right to pre -empt which the legislature has given him (them?). All the judgments referred to above were considered in Bhag Singh v. Bhajan Singh , (1968) 70 P.L.R. 1046 by Mahajan, J., who dissented from the view taken by P.D. Sharma, J., in Baru Ram v. Manji Ram, (1966) 70 P.L.R. 1046 (supra). From the judgment of Mahajan, J., in Chuhar Ram v. Kashmiri Lal (supra), the unsuccessful vendee (Kashmiri Lal) preferred Letters patent Appeal No 71 of 1965 which was decided on the 19th of November, 1969, by Mehar Singh, C.J., and B.R. Tuli, J., who considered all the authorities above mentioned and agreed with the view taken by Mahajan, J., Pandit, J., and Gurdev Singh, J., and overruled that of P.D. Sharma, J., in Baru Ram v. Manji Ram (supra).;