- (1.) IN writ petition Uttam Singh v. State of Pepsu- (Civil Misc. No. 83/p of 1955), originally filed in the Pepsu High Court, two questions of law raised before the learned Single Judge and referred by him to us for decision are expressed thus - -. (1) Whether the powers conferred by Section 41 of the Pepsu Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act No. V of 2007 Bk. upon the Government can be exercised by the Government alone or by the authority to whom such power is delegated by Government under section 42 and not by the Revenue Minister?
(2.) WHETHER the Revenue Minister acting under Section 41 of the Act is a tribunal or was exercising powers under Section 41 on the executive side alone? The same two questions arose in a similar petition, Ram Kishan dass v. State of Pepsu and others (Civil Misc. No. 183/p of 1955), which came up before one of us sitting alone, and the questions referred are stated as follows : - (1) Whether the Revenue Minister is the Government within the meaning and scope of Section 41 of Act No. V of 2007 Bk. and can exercise the powers under that section? (2) Whether the powers exercisable by the Government under section 41 of Act No. V of 2007 Bk. are merely executive powers or quasi-judicial or Judicial powers, and even if they are quasi-judicial or judicial powers, can the Revenue Minister, if he is the Government according to the provisions of the constitution and having regard to the provisions in the business Rules, exercise the powers under the said section? similar questions have been raised in Amar Dass v. Kaka etc. (Civil Misc. No. 54/p of 1955 ). Two similar questions also arose in Jagir Singh and another v. The settlement Commissioner, Pepsu, and others (Civil Misc. No. 189/p of 1953), which also came up before one of us sitting alone, but in that case a third question has also been raised and that is -"whether an order made by the Revenue Minister acting as the State government could be subsequently cancelled by the State Government?" 2. The facts in all these cases are not, of course, identical, but it does appear that in each of them the Revenue Minister, Pepsu, for the time being, considered certain matters arising out of consolidation proceedings and made certain orders which are being challenged on the point of jurisdiction. In one of these cases the order made by the Revenue Minister was not given effect to and was soon afterwards recalled by the State Government.
(3.) REGARDING the first two questions the main argument is that whenever the State government exercised its powers under Section 41 of Pepsu Act V of 2007 Bk. , it was exercising a quasi-judicial function, and, therefore, the Minister in charge of the Department of Consolidation was not authorised merely by virtue of the business Rules made under Article 166 of the Constitution to decide such a matter, and his decision did not become the decision of the State Government. This has now been authoritatively answered by the Supreme Court in Gulla Palli Nageswara rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Petn. No. 100 of 1958 d/- 5-11-1958 : (AIR 1959 SC 308 ). The question in that case related to the exercise of certain powers by the State Government under the Motor Vehicles Act. It was contended in that case that the State Government, when considering and disposing of certain objections filed against a scheme, was acting in a quasi- judicial capacity. The Supreme Court agreed. It was on that basis contended that the objections being actually disposed of by the Secretary in charge of the transport Department, his decision was not the decision of the State Government. The Supreme Court went into the Rules of Business which were in essential particulars identical to the Rules of Business framed by the Pepsu Government, and found that those rules framed under Article 166 of the Constitution did authorise the officer named in the Rules to exercise the powers of the State government. The objection taken then was that the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution could govern the transaction of merely executive business of the Government and could not relate to the discharge of quasi-judicial functions. Answering this objection the Supreme Court observed :-- "the Rules the Governor is authorised to make, the argument proceeds are only to regulate the acts of the Governor or his subordinates in discharge of the executive power of the State Government, and therefore will not govern the quasi-judicial functions entrusted to it. There is a fallacy in this argument. The concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial; it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive power. The procedural rules made by the Governor for the convenient transaction of business of the State Government apply also to quasi-judicial acts, provided, those Rules conform to the principles of judicial procedure". It is quite clear from these observations that, if the Rules of Business framed by the Pepsu Government authorised the Revenue Minister to dispose of the entire business connected with his Department -- and it is admitted before us that the rules did so authorise him -- then it cannot matter whether in the transaction of that business the Minister exercised quasi-judicial functions, and his act will remain an act of the State Government. The exercise of power by the Revenue minister therefore under Section 41 of the Pepsu Act would be an exercise of power by the State Government. We arc, therefore, bound to answer the first question by stating that the powers conferred on the State Government by Section 41 of the Pepsu Act V of 2007 Bk. could be exercised by the Revenue Minister so long as the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution authorised the transaction of that business by the Revenue Minister.;