C.S. Tiwana, J. - (1.) MRS . Balbir Kaur Virk, who for some time remained posted as Lecturer in Political Science at Sant Darbara Singh College for Women, Lopon, Respondent No. 3, has filed the present writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of mandamus so as to get herself reinstated in service which was terminated with effect from May 1, 1977. The Petitioner joined her duty on August 1, 1973, and was then confirmed by an order dated August 25, 1975, with effect from August 1, 1975, Both the orders of confirmation and termination of service purport to have been passed by the Managing Committee of the College. However, the order of confirmation, Annexure P2, was conveyed to the Petitioner by the Principal of the College and the order of termination, Annexure P3, was conveyed by the Secretary of the Managing Committee. Respondent No. 3 has been described as Sant Darbara Singh College for Women, Lopon, district Faridkot, through the Secretary of the Managing Committee.
(2.) THE grievance of the Petitioner is that her removal from service did not take place in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of the Punjab Affiliated Colleges (Security of Service of Employees) Act, 1974. Under Section 3 of the said Act no employee can be dismissed or removed except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. It is further provided by Section 4 of that Act that the penalty of dismissal or removal from service shall not be imposed unless the same is approved by the Director of Public Instruction, Punjab. There have admittedly been no regular inquiry and no approval of the Director before the termination of the services of the Petitioner. Respondent No. 2 to this petition is the Director of Public Instruction (Colleges) Punjab and it was averred by the Petitioner that she made a representation on May 30, 1977, to Respondent No. 2. Both the Secretary and the Vice -President of the Managing Committee of Respondent No. 3 had made their appearance before the Director who passed an order dated November 16, 1977, Annexure P4, upholding this contention of the Petitioner that her removal from service vas invalid as no charge was framed against her and there was no inquiry. It was also held by the Director that the removal was defective as his previous approval had not been obtained. On, the facts as were made to appear before him he refused to approve of the termination at that stage. He ultimately gave this finding that the Petitioner continued to be in the service of the College and was entitled to all the pay, allowances and other benefits of the post. Respondent No. 2 was impleaded in the present writ petition primarily for the issue of this writ against him that he should get his own orders enforced. It was, however, not mentioned as to what means were available to Respondent No. 2 to get the Petitioner reinstated when the College Authorities were adamant in not taking her back in service. It has, however, been argued that Respondent No. 2 should be directed to take action by way of withholding the grant which was paid by the Government to the College. Respondent No. 1 in the petition is the Secretary, Education Department, Punjab. It has been prayed in the petition that along with Respondent No. 2 he should also get the order of reinstatement enforced by whatever means available to him. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have not chosen file any written statement as, according to them, there was hardly any case for the issue of a writ of mandamus against them. The main objection raised by Respondent No. 3 in the written statement is that the management of the College is not a public authority and, therefore, no writ could be issued against it. On the merits of the case it was mentioned that the Petitioner was 'indulging in acts of moral turpitude and gross in disciplined'. There was then said to be some such understanding between the Petitioner and the management of the College by which the Petitioner was to join her duty for a day and was then to submit her resignation. It was pleaded that the Petitioner after having reached the above -said agreement never came to join the College.
(3.) RESPONDENT No. 3 has been improperly impleaded. The College itself can never be said to be such a person which can be sued in its own name. It has been urged that the order of termination was passed by the Secretary and that he had, therefore, been correctly impleaded. The Secretary only conveyed the decision of the Managing Committee and from the order of termination it is clear that it was the Managing Committee which had terminated the services of the Petitioner. Thus, to my mind, the Managing Committee of the College was a necessary party against which the relief, if any, could be granted. Of course, the name of the Managing Committee appears in the description of Respondent No. 3 but it cannot be inferred that the Managing Committee is a party to these proceedings. Supposing for a while the description of the Respondent is 'A through its secretary B employed by C Only A could be said to be a party, and not that both B and C had become parties to the litigation. Anyway, the College itself is an inanimate object and is incapable of obeying any order issued by this Court. This matter is itself not free from doubt whether the managing committee of a private college is such a body against which a writ of mandamus can be issued. Writ can only be issued to any person or authority as mentioned in Article 226 of the Constitution. As held in National Seeds Corporation Employees Union and Anr. v. National Seeds Corporation : AIR 1972 Del 292, it is only against bodies having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of the subjects that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 can be invoked. The expression 'any person was being interpreted when this view was expressed. In Sardar Jaswant Singh v. Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal and Ors. AIR 1962 Calcutta, it was laid down that the managing committee or the members thereof of a private school in West Bengal cannot be held to be a 'public body' carrying out public duties. Therefore, a writ in the nature of mandamus could not be issued against the said managing committee or members thereof for infringement of Rule 33 of the Revised School Code. It was mentioned in the body of this authority that although the school was aided by the Government the managing committee of the school was a private body and was not a 'person' or 'authority' within the meaning of the expressions as used in Article 226. This authority may not be made fully applicable to the present case, as it was found; that the Revised School Code was not a statutory provision of law. In the present case, termination of service which has been challenged is governed by a statute. Still this argument is available that the Managing Committee itself is not a body under the Statute. In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors., AIR 1976 S.C. 888 a similar matter came up for consideration. The following quotation from the head note is required to be given: Here a distinction must be made between an institution which is not created by or under a statute but is governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. There have been a number of institutions which though not created by or under any statute have adopted certain statutory provisions, but that by itself is not sufficient to clothe the institution with a statutory, character. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body.;