Surinder Singh, J. - (1.) THE disputes has a chequered career and the facts leading to the launching of the present Civil Writ Petition in this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India may be briefly recapitulated. According to the claim of the petitioner he was a tenant of the disputed land in Village Anian under Jit Singh and Dogar Singh Jit Singh is said to have sold his land to Ralla Singh and Sohan Lal, respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The petitioner, however, claimed that he continued to be in possession of the land as tenant in spite of the sale Dogar Singh who was adoptive father of Surinder Singh respondent No. 3, had filed an application for partition of his own share in the land before the Revenue Authorities and in these proceedings the petitioner was admittedly dispossessed of that share and a report in regard to this fact was made in the roznamcha of the Patwari on November 5, 1959. The petitioner, however, asserts that his dispossession was forcible and illegal. The petitioner then moved an application under section 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Assistant Collector First Grade, Nabha, respondent No. 2, with a prayer that the possession of the disputed land which was now with respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5, may be restored to him. The Assistant Collector after notice to the said respondents, framed the following preliminary issues in the matter: - - (1) Whether this application is maintainable in the present form ? OPP. (2) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this application ? OPR Additional Issue (1) Whether the respondents are liable to be ejected ? The parties led evidence in support of these issues. At the time of arguments, a legal objection was raised that the application filed by the petitioner under section 43 of the Act was barred by limitation and that this matter may be considered in priority. It was contended that the limitation prescribed for such an application is only one year from the date of dispossession. It is apparent that in consequence of a warrant of possession issued by the Assistant Collector First Grade dated November 4, 1969, the petitioner was dispossessed on November 5, 1969. The application under section 43 of the Act was filed on July 29, 1971 i.e. after about one year and nine months of the dispossession. The teamed Assistant Collector placed reliance on Sohla Singh v. Shrimati Bhagwan, 1968 P.L.J. 79, on the point and in the absence of any other authority having been brought to his notice, he dismissed the application as barred by limitation.
(2.) THE petitioner, being dissatisfied with the decision of the Assistant Collector went up in appeal before the Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala, under section 39 of Act. Before the learned Commissioner, only two points were urged on behalf of the petitioner. The first contention was that before denying relief to the petitioner, the Assistant Collector should have framed a specitre issue on the question of limitation. The learned Commissioner, however repelled this argument by observing that the strict application of the Code of Civil Procedure was not necessary in proceedings under section 43 of the Act winch are of a summary nature. The second point which was urged in appeal was that for an application under section 43 of the Act the period of limitation was not one year and in such cases it is Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act which should apply according to which the period of limitation is three years On the other side, the argument was controverted by reference to section 50 of the Punjab Tenancy Act on the analogy of which the period of limitation for purposes of section 43 of the Act was to be reckoned as one year. This submission was supported by reference to Sohla Singh v. Smt. Bhagwan (supra). The appellant petitioner also sought support from some other authorities for his contention that on the basis of Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation should be reckoned as three years. This contention was accepted by the Commissioner who while accepting the appeal, remanded the case to the Assistant Collector to decide the application of the petitioner on merits Copy of the order of Commissioner is Annexure P/2 to the Writ Petition. The matter did not end there. The defeated party, i.e., the respondents filed a Revision Petition under section 39 of the Act before the Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Punjab, against the order of the Commissioner aforesaid. The revision -petitioners (respondents in the present Writ Petition) urged through their counsel that Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable only to applications filed before Courts and not before Revenue Officers and in support of this contention, two decisions of the Supreme Court, i.e., Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, Hubli : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. (1335), and Nityanand M. Joshi and another v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. (209), were cited. On the basis of these authorities, the learned Financial Commissioner drew a distinction between the Revenue Courts and Revenue Officers and found that the proceedings initiated by the petitioner under section 43 of the Act which were of a summary nature were really proceedings before a Revenue Officer and not before a Revenue Court. A large number of other authorities were also considered by the learned Financial Commissioner on the point that the limitation for an application under section 43 of the Act was only one year and could not be extended to three years by resort to Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act. The main contention which prevailed with the learned Financial Commissioner was that section 50 of the Punjab Tenancy Act provides for a regular remedy in case a person is dispossessed which remedy he could challenge only within a period of one year from his dispossession and in the wake of this regular remedy, the period of limitation could in no case be extended for summary proceedings under the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. The argument was advanced further with the contention that once the right of possession of property is extinguished on account of the bar of limitation, it cannot be revived by an application for summary proceedings. Section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, was relied upon in support of this contention In regard to the interpretation of the section, the learned Financial Commissioner referred to Dindayal and another v. Raiaram : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1019, wherein their Lordships held that the principle underlying section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (which are the same as section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963) is of general application and this principle is not confined only to suits and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act.
(3.) ON behalf of the petitioner, the argument advanced before the Financial Commissioner was the same that section 43 of the Act made no reference to section 50 of the Punjab Tenancy Act and the latter statute could not be looked into for the purpose of assessing the period of limitation. Certain authorities in support of these contentions were cited 5 After giving the matter a very detailed consideration in his judgment running into nineteen pages, the learned Financial Commissioner ultimately came to the conclusion that Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply to applications filed before Revenue Officers and for purposes of calculating the period of limitation resort had to be made to see the statute which provides a regular remedy in such matters i.e. section 50 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. Since the period of limitation prescribed for the remedy under the said provision is one year it was concluded that the same period would govern an application under section 43 of the Act. The application filed by the petitioner being admittedly barred by eight months and 24 days, was accordingly dismissed by upholding the verdict of the First Officer who dealt with the matter, i.e., Assistant Collector, First Grade, Nabha, The present Writ Petition has now been filed with a view to challenge the decision of the learned Financial Commissioner aforesaid. With the above background of the controversy before me, it is obvious that the arena is a very limited one. A plethora of case law is not required to go into the solitary question which has been mooted by all the authorities on the revenue side and before this Court in the present Writ Petition. So far as this Court is concerned, if a clear verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is available, that is binding on it and the matter would not brooke any further discussion by straining to view the same in a distorted manner as is the mission of the petitioner The Revenue Authorities which were seized of the matter and particularly the Financial Commissioner noticed the final verdict of the Supreme Court in Dindayal's case (supra). It would be beneficial to reproduce an extract from paragraph 10 of the judgment : It was urged on behalf of the appellants that in view of the principle underlying section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which principle is not confined to suits and applications for which limitation is prescribed under that Act but is of general application, the plaintiff's right to the suit properties must be held to have been extinguished. In other words, the contention was that in view of the aforementioned provisions, the plaintiffs had not merely lost their right to sue for possession of the suit properties, their right in the properties itself had been extinguished. It is well settled that the principle underlying section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (same as section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963) is of general application. It is not confined to suits and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act. ;