M.R.Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS order will also dispose of Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087 and 1427 of 1974.
(2.) THE State of Punjab issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on February 21, 1974, declaring its intention to acquire the land of the petitioners for setting up a new Mandi Township at Goraya. On the same day another notification was issued under section 6 of the Act, in which it was mentioned that since the public purpose for which land was being acquired was of urgent importance it would be open to the authorities concerned to proceed to take possession of the land in dispute under section 17(2) (c) of the Act. The petitioners have challenged the legality of these two notifications inter alia on the ground that the setting up of a new Mandi Township being a long drawn out process, in fact, the purpose of acquisition was not a urgent importance. It has also been averred that the land of the petitioners was very fertile, yielding three crops in a year and that in the vicinity of the said land some other land which was not so productive was also available which could have been more conveniently acquired at less cost to the State exchequer. In the return filed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 it has not been specifically denied that the land belonging to the petitioners was capable of yielding three crops in a year. The following reasons have been given for invoking the urgency provisions: - - The proceedings can be visited with the leading of evidence and a good number of adjournments The Government on the executive sine has no control over the statutory tribunal examining objections under section 5 -A so as to curtail or limit the time of disposal of the case under section 5 -A. The likelihood or say the danger of the case being prolonged so as to defeat the very aim of the Government in achieving a public purpose as a welfare state is not ruled out. Section 17 of the Act does give powers to the Government to take possession immediately if the aim of achieving a public purpose would be throttled otherwise. The uncertainty of the completion of proceedings under section 5 -A in a limited and specified period, there being nothing in the Act to this effect and the haunting danger of the proceedings being prolonged unduly and unnecessarily and the case remaining hanging fire before another superior tribunal and Court, is a very sufficient and a good circumstance for the Government to take a decision far taking an action under Section 17 in this case. By taking possession immediately, temporary arrangement for shaping and figuring the area for a grain market can be made by the Government which area is certainly more spacious to meet the requirement urgently.
(3.) MR . Jasbir Singh Ahluwalia, who has stated these facts on affidavit, deserves to be congratulated for indulging in plain speaking. But I am some what astonished at the stand taken on behalf of the State Government In substance it amounts to denying a statutory Tribunal a right to perform its duty of hearing objections under Section 5 -A of the Act. The Tribunal itself is appointed by the State Government and if the latter at the time of appointing the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal does not take care to appoint such persons who dispose of the cases expeditiously, the citizens cannot be made to suffer. It has been held in a large number of cases that the right of a landowner to raise objections under sections 5.A of the Act about the feasibility of the acquisition is an important right which cannot be set at naught by adopting circuitous means. I could have understood if the plea raised on behalf of the State had been that the instant purpose of acquisition was urgent importance. Unfortunately, the defence put forth relates to a matter of policy, designed to cope with the situation arising out of the lethargic working of the Tribunals. Such a defence is totally extraneous to the scope of section 17 of the Act. In The Printers House Private Ltd. v. Misri Lal and others, I.L.R. 1970 P&H. 76, a Full Bench of this Court had the occasion to deal with such a matter when it observed: - - We think, therefore, that if the question of urgency has been decided on grounds which are non existent or irrelevant or on material on which it would be an impossible conclusion to reach, it could legitimately be inferred that the mind has not been applied at all. Even Mr. Kaushal conceded that the proved mala fides would alter the complexion of the conclusion reached on subjective satisfaction on the question about the existence of urgent importance or urgency. It seems manifest to us that the question must be examined by Court before it could be found that the decision was reasonable. In other words, the question, is not such which could be declared non justiciable outright.;