S.S. Sandhawalia, J. - (1.) This is an appeal by the Union of India against the order of the learned Single Judge passed in proceedings under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act whereby the appellant has been directed to pay the arrears of salary to respondent No. I from 1st of Nov., 1971 to the 10th of Sept., 1974 within a period of three months.
(2.) Swarn Singh respondent No. 1 was employed as a Khalasi in the Railway Workshop at Kalka. He was convicted by the Special Railway Magistrate on the 21st Nov., 1970 and his services were consequently terminated by the appellant. Respondent No. 1, however, preferred an appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala, who whilst affirming the conviction accorded the benefit of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act to him. Thereafter respondent No. 1 filed a civil suit challenging his termination on the ground that he was under no disability to continue in service in view of the relief accorded to him by the appellate Court. This suit was decreed on the 31st of July, 1974 and the Union of India did not prefer any appeal against the said decree which thus became final. Consequently respondent No. 1 was reinstated on the 10th of September, 1974 and an amount of Rs. 2,659 which had been claimed as arrears of pay and had been decreed was duly paid to him. However, as regards the period from the 1st of Nov., 1971 to the 10th of Sept., 1974 the Assistant Works Manager (respondent No. 2) who was the competent authority to decide the issue came to the conclusion that this period has to be treated as one of suspension and it would not be counted as service for the purposes of salary, pension etc. Respondent No. 1, however, by a notice issued of the authorities claimed full salary of the period aforesaid and when this demand was not acceded to he moved the High Court for proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act in which respondent No. 2 Ishar Singh, Assistant Works Manager, Jagadhari Railway Workshop alone was impleaded as the contemner. By the order under appeal the learned Single Judge discharged the rule of contempt against respondent No. 2 but directed that the Union of India through its General Manager should forthwith pay the arrears from the 1st Nov., 1971 to the 10th of Sept., 1974. It is this direction which is primarily sought to be impugned by way of this appeal.
(3.) Mr. P.S. Jain for the appellant appears to have a number of strings to his bow in assailing the order of the learned Single Judge. He first forthrightly contends that the appellant was not even a party to the Contempt proceedings instituted by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2 as such. Therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever to give the direction which in effect amounted to the grant of a decree for arrears of pay for a period of nearly three years and which in effect may be barred clearly by limitation even if respondent No. 1 were to resort to his ordinary remedy by way of a suit. Counsel forcefully contends that in any case the appellant being not a party to the proceedings is not bound by the direction. There is apparent merit in the submission aforesaid. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 1 had not even chosen to implead the appellant as even a proforma respondent in the contempt proceedings from which the present appeal arises. What is significant further is that the rule against the sole respondent in the proceedings was discharged but an ancillary direction placing onerous financial liability on the appellant was imposed by the direction under challenge. I believe that no authority need be cited for the proposition that a person not a party to a proceeding cannot be pre-judicially affected or bound by an order or judgment passed therein. The appellant thus is entitled to succeed on this ground alone.;