- (1.) A petition under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was filed by P.N. Kaul landlord (respondent) for the ejectment of Des Raj (Petitioner) from shop - portion of the premises described as Shop - cum - Flat No. 29 Sector 16 -D, Chandigarh, The landlord claimed the eviction of the petitioner on several grounds. The Rent Controller after considering the matter did not find a case for eviction made out against the petitioner and hence he dismissed the application. The respondent landlord, however, preferred an appeal against the decision of Rent Controller to the Appellate Authority and was rewarded with success. The petitioner was ordered to be evicted from the disputed premises by means of order, dated July 30, 1977, though he was allowed one month's time to put the landlord in possession. The present Revision Petition is directed against the said judgment of the Appellate Authority. At the time of the admission of the Revision Petition, the eviction of the petitioner was stayed.
(2.) Two Authorities under the Act having applied already their mind to the finding of fact, there is no occasion to re-consider these in the present Revision Petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Baldev Kapur has, however, made certain submission which may be scrutined. In the foremost, the learned counsel has placed an argument that even according to the evidence produced by the respondent, the petitioner is shown to be using the disputed premises for residential purposes in the year 1971. i.e., before the coming into force of the Rent Act in Chandigarh. In these circumstances it is sought to be contended that if there was any change of user before the Act was enforced in Chandigarh, the continuance of the changed user would not invite liability for eviction against the tenant. The counsel has recited the provision of 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act which may be noticed for facility of reference :- 13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied :- i) XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Act without the written consent of the landlord. a) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or rented land or any portion thereof or, b) used the building or rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased." The counsel submits that the words used in the aforesaid provision are "after the commencement of this Act" and the use of these words these contemplates a fresh Changed user only after of the endercement of the Act. The argument may be ingenious but is certainly not a true interpretation of the statutory provision. If the contention of the learned counsel is tested by taking the same to its logical end, a tenant of commercial premises can merely shift bag and baggage into the shop a day earlier to the coming into force of the Act and start using it only for residential purposes with impunity. In spite of the laudable object of safe guarding the interest of the laudable object of safe guarding the interest of the tenant, this is certainly not the in petition of the Legislature that no remedy should be available to the landlord against a misuser or change of user which had commenced just before the coming into force of Act. In this behalf, it is material to note that the crucial words in the provision aforesaid are "used the building" and these words clearly include a continued user even though the same may have commenced before the coming into force of the Act. I have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the learned counsel.
(3.) The only other point which is urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that though the Appellate Authority had worked out from the statement of the respondent that the petitioner had discontinued to use the premises for residential purposes with effect from September 1974, there was scope for holding that he may done so even prior to the filling of the ejectment petition. This is nothing but a voyage into speculation. So far as the petitioner is concerned he rest content by merely denying that he had ever used the premises for his residential purposes. It, however, gives credit to the respondent who was able to procure and produce credible evidence in the voters list published on October 5, 1971, and the ration card of the petitioner's family in which the petitioner's residential address was mentioned as the premises in dispute. The learned counsel indeed tried to wriggle out of this situation by submitting that the shop address was given only for purposes of convenience as a Ration Debot was situated near the shop-premises. This, is however not the case but forward by the petitioner, nor is there any basis for the submission. Ration Debots are situated in every locality and there is no reason to have preference for a particular Debot. In any case, even this argument does not offer an explanation as to how the shop address was given in the voters list. The Appellate Authority has considered this matter at length and recorded a finding in this behalf which does not call of for any modification.;