K.C. Puri, J. - (1.) THE petitioner questions the legality of award dated 24.2.1994 passed by respondent No. 2, Annexure P3/A, whereby the termination of services of respondent No. 1 was set aside and order dated 5.8.1998, Annexure P -8, whereby directions have been issued to the petitioner to compute back wages of respondent No. 1 with a further direction to make payment within one month from the date of passing of said order, in this Civil Writ Petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India and seeks quashing of the same.
(2.) THE background facts sans unnecessarily details are as follows: Respondent No. 1 Gopal Chander was called for interview for the post of Security Officer on 27/28 -3 -1989 but was not selected and then on his own request, he was appointed against leave vacancy of Security Supervisor in the scale of Rs. 1400 -2300 from 19.4.1989 to 2.5.1989 on purely contractual basis and later on he continued in service with notional breaks for 259 days. It is further alleged that on a demand notice issued by respondent No. 1, the Central Government vide notification dated 3.6.1991 referred the industrial dispute to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh which decided the matter against the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the award before the Central Administrative Tribunal Chandigarh through Original Application No. 989 -HR -1994. The learned Tribunal after hearing quashed the award passed by the respondent No. 2. During the pendency of the Original Application, respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 33 -C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act). The respondent No. 2 while ignoring the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal passed order under Section 33 -C(2) of the Act against the petitioner on 5.8.1998 and directed the petitioner to compute the back wages of respondent No. 1.
(3.) IT has also been pleaded that the petitioner being Research Institute and deemed University would not be covered under the definition of Industry and the post of Security Supervisor on which the petitioner was appointed does not fall within the definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Act. The case of respondent No. 1 squarely falls within the exception clause of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. The respondent No. 1 was offered employment only against leave vacancy period.;