Hemant Gupta, J. - (1.) THE challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 17.7.2002 (Annexure P.7), whereby the petitioner was reverted to the post of Assistant and the order dated 7.11.2005 (Annexure P.8) affirming the said order in appeal.
(2.) THE petitioner was charge -sheeted under Rule 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the '1987 Rules'), on 1.6.1699. The inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 28.2.2000 and found the charges proved against the petitioner. Further enquiry report was also submitted on 23.11.2000. After the report was furnished, a show cause notice was issued on 1.1.2001. On receipt of the notice, the petitioner submitted detailed reply dated 18.1.2001 to the show cause notice. There was another charge sheet under Rule 7 of 1987 Rules dated 11.6.1999. The Inquiry Officer has given his report on 28.2.2000 on which a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 2.6.2000. Still further, the petitioner was served with another charge sheet on 23.3.2000 under Rule 7 of the 1987 Rules. The Inquiry Officer found the charges proved against the petitioner and a show cause noticed dated 20.12.2001 was issued. After consideration the reply to all the three show causes notices, an order of punishment of reversion was passed on 17.7.2004, which order has been affirmed in the appeal as well. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that in fact, the Chairman of the Board, the competent Disciplinary Authority, has passed an order on 12.4.2001, whereby penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect was imposed and, therefore, the impugned order could not have been passed by the Chairman on 17.7.2002. However, it is admitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 12.4.2001 was never communicated to the petitioner or to any other person or authority and that he has obtained copy of the said order from the respondents by filing an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
(3.) IN Bachhittar Singh v. : AIR1963SC395 , the Revenue Minister wrote on the file that the charges against the delinquent were serious and they were proved, but noted that the dismissal would be harsh and instead of dismissing the delinquent outright, he should be reverted to his original post. However, subsequently on account of merger of the State of Pepsu with the State of Punjab, the file was put up with the successor Minister, who passed the order of dismissal of the delinquent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before, something amounts to an order of the State Government, two things are necessary i.e. the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by Clause (1) of Article 166 of the Constitution and then it has to be communicated. It was held to the following effect: Indeed, it is possible that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion, one which may be completely opposed to the earlier opinion. Which of them can be regarded as the 'order' to the State Government? Therefore, to make the opinion amount to a decision of the Government, it must be communicated to the person concerned. In this connection we may quote the following from the judgment of this Court in the State of Punjab v. : [1961]2SCR371 : Mr. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before the final order was passed the Council of Ministers had decided to accept the respondent's representation and to reinstate him, and that, according to him, the respondent seeks to prove my calling the two original orders. We are unable to understand this argument. Even if the Council of Ministers had provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter and coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a final decision is reached by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of edifice and acted upon by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the respondents. Thus, it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order before the State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the persons affected by it, it would be open to the council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character.;