RANJIT SINGH, J. - (1.) AGGRIEVED against the action of the Rent Controller, Ludhiana to permit amendment of the petition filed under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act for ejectment of the petitioner from a shop, he has filed the present revision petition. The facts, in brief, are that Smt. Vaneeta Rani wife of Sadhu Singh filed the above-noted petition for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of non-payment of rent w.e.f. 1.8.1990 and on the ground that the shop in dispute was required for use and occupation by her husband. The petitioner filed reply to this petition and later on filed an amended reply also. During the pendency of this petition, Sadhu Singh husband of the petitioner, died on 8.1.2005. Smt. Vaneeta Rani accordingly filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of the petition on the ground that during the life time of her husband, the shop was required for use and occupation of the husband, whereas due to his unfortunate death, his son would be needing the same, who has now attained the age of twenty and wants to start his independent business on completion of his study. As per averment in the application, the son of Vaneeta Rani wanted to start a Karyana business in the shop for which he had sufficient experience. The petitioner filed reply to this application. Unfortunately Smt. Vaneeta Rani also died on 27.8.2007 and now the ejectment petition is being prosecuted by respondent Nos. 1 to 4, who have been brought on record as her legal representatives. The learned Rent Controller, Ludhiana has allowed this application. It is observed that the ground that the death of Sadhu Singh, husband of Vaneeta Rani, would not change the basic character of the present rent petition as earlier the husband wanted this property for his personal necessity, which is now needed for his son for the same purpose. This order is impugned in the present revision petition.
(2.) MR . Gurcharan Dass, the learned counsel for the petitioner by relying on some observations made in the case of Prem Chand v. Chetan Dass, 2006(1) RCR(Civil) 164 : 2006(2) Civil Court Cases 41 has urged that parties should not be allowed to substitute one cause of action or the nature of claim for another as claimed originally or should also not be allowed to change the subject matter or the controversy in the suit. This court in case of Prem Chand (supra) while going into principle which stands established on account of various judicial decisions regarding amendment, observed as under :- (a) The parties should not be allowed to substitute one cause of action or the nature of the claim for another as claimed originally or should also not be allowed to change the subject-matter or the controversy in the suit; (b) The parties should not be allowed to introduce by amendment an inconsistent or contrary plea to negate the facts originally admitted through a party may be allowed inconsistent plea on admitted facts by way of amendment; (c) The amendment should not cause prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by way of costs; (d) The parties should not be allowed amendment of a claim or relief which is barred by law of limitation when amendment is sought to be made as it defeats a legal right which has accrued in favour of a party. However, this may be allowed only in very exceptional circumstances which the facts of the case so warrant." It is on the basis of observation noted in para (a) above that the counsel has based his entire submission. Prem Chand's case (supra) was a case where suit for mandatory injunction was filed. By way of amendment, suit was sought to be converted to a suit for possession. In this background, it was found that amendment will completely change the nature of suit from mandatory injunction to that of a possession. Finding that this will cause prejudice to the right of defendants, application for amendment was dismissed. How the ratio of law laid down in this background in the case of Prem Chand (supra) would apply to the facts of the present case is really not understandable. The facts in the present case are peculiar and of its own kind. Unfortunate events in this case are quite evident. Not only Vaneeta Rani, who has sought ejectment of the shop is dead, but the husband, who needed this shop for his own use is also dead. It cannot be denied that on the death of Vaneeta Rani her legal heirs would be entitled to prosecute this petition. In fact somewhat similar consideration arose before this court in the case of Ram Singh v. Parkash Ram represented through L.Rs., 1989(1) RCR(Rent) 656 : 1989(1) Rent Law Reporter 506. This was a case where widow of the deceased, specified landlord wanted to continue with the ejectment petition after his death. While considering the right of the widow to prosecute the petition filed for eviction by a specified landlord, this court observed as under :- "7. Apart from the above, during the pendency of this revision petition, the landlord died and his sons and daughter and his widow, were brought on the record and they moved the application, noticed in the earlier part of this judgment, for amendment of the ejectment application as to convert the same to the one under Section 13-A of the aforementioned Act. Though, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the applicants are entitled to seek the necessary amendment, yet as the eviction order is being maintained on the other ground, the necessity of the amendment does not arise. However, the Rent Controller had found that the requirement of the landlord was not bona fide because according to him, it could not be accepted that the landlord would shift from Phillaur where he had established his business in the name of his wife, to Machhiwara, where he did not hold any means of livelihood. Since the landlord had died during the pendency of the petition, his legal representatives are entitled to maintain the petition under Section 13-A of the aforesaid Act, being specified landlords and their need is bona fide to evict the tenant." In Panna Lal's case (supra), this Court opined as under :- "The proviso gives the right to the widow of a specified landlord to be brought on the record of the case provided she was dependent upon such specified landlord at the time of his death. It is not conceivable that a specified landlord has a right to recover possession but his widow as legal heir would not have the right to recover possession. All the legal representatives, in general law, are entitled to fight on the same cause of action having the same rights which vested in a person who has come to the Court of law. If the landlord had the right, his widow would certainly have the right to recover possession. If the interpretation as has been put by the petitioner's counsel is accepted, the proviso to Section 13-A, of the Act would become redundant. Moreover, no such rider has been put to the proviso that if the landlord dies after the filing of the application within the prescribed time, his widow was debarred from continuing with the application. If the legislature was wanting to debar the widow of a landlord, there was nothing in the way of the legislature to create such a bar in the statute itself. The very fact that a right has been given to the widow of the specified landlord to be brought on the record of the case means that the legislature wanted that the right to recover possession vested in a specified landlord can be exercised by his widow. To put any other interpretation to the statute, the same would be doing violence to the wording and the spirit of the proviso. Moreover, the proviso has to be interpreted liberally giving the rights to the heirs of a person who has unfortunately died but who has filed the application claiming benefit of Section 13-A of the Act within time."
(3.) THE real controversy in this case relates to the fact whether the shop was needed for personal purpose by the husband of Vaneeta Rani or not. It is indeed noticeable that Vaneeta Rani being a lady was seeking ejectment of the petitioner from the shop for use by her husband, who unfortunately died. The need for use of a shop by son of Vaneeta Rani, thus, would continue. This would also not be a substitution by a cause. It would also not change the nature of a claim as was originally made. It also did not change the subject matter or the controversy in the suit. On death of Vaneeta Rani, the son, who needed this shop stands substituted as one of the legal heir and thus it has now become a case of personal use by one of the respondents, who earlier was coming in picture as a son of Vaneeta Rani requiring the shop for his personal use. There is no inconsistency in the plea raised in the amendment application. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel could not dispute this fact that respondents were entitled to file a suit for ejectment on the ground on which the amendment has been allowed. In Panna Lal v. Smt. Kamla Devi, 1990(1) RCR(Rent) 418 : 1990(1) RLR 84, it is observed that all the legal representatives, in general law, are entitled to fight on the same cause of action having the same right vested in a person, who has come to the court of law. In this view of the matter, no interference in the impugned order is called for and the same is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed.;