KULWINDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB
LAWS(P&H)-2007-8-49
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Decided on August 08,2007

KULWINDER SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB Respondents

JUDGEMENT

VIJENDER JAIN,J - (1.) IN Dharambir v. State of Haryana, , the majority view propounded the proposition that there is neither any provision of law nor does the Constitution of India confer any power upon the High Court to either quash the prosecution or allow the compounding of the offences which are not declared compoundable by the Legislature and that the only exception which can be carved out pertains to the offences arising out of marital disputes.
(2.) PITTED against the aforesaid view was the minority view expressed by V.K. Bali, J., who professed that while exercising its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., as also under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has the power to quash the proceedings in order to secure the ends of justice in all such eventualities in which it may be desirable to do so and not necessarily confined to matrimonial disputes alone. From the turbulence of thoughts and conflict of opinion expressed in the aforesaid case, has emerged the following reference by Surya Kant, J., which is as follows :- "The prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No.92 dated 28.6.2005, under sections 452, 427, 148, 149, registered at Police Station, Ghuman, District Gurdaspur. The aforesaid relief has been sought primarily on the plea that both the parties have resolved their dispute and in terms thereof a compromise deed dated 29.11.2006, Annexure P-2, has been executed. Acting upon the said compromise, the complainant is stated to have sworn an affidavit, Annexure P-3, in support of the prayer made in this petition. The minute reading of the FIR reveals that the lis has originated out of a property dispute. Whether the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. are wide enough and can be invoked to strike down the criminal proceedings arising out of a civil dispute which has been amicably resolved by the parties, and/ or exercise of such power is confined qua matrimonial disputes only, more so when there appears to be no reasonable classification between two sets of case, is a question of paramount public importance and requires consideration by a larger Bench. In general parlance, "compounding" is known as "compromise." The expression is used to condone any felony in exchange for reparation received by the victim-complainant from the felon. "Compounding" of an offence in terms of its power under Section 320(6) Cr.P.C. by the High Court as an Appellate or Revisional Court has, thus, no similarity or relevance with its inherent and plenary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which cannot be limited or affected by any other provision contained in the Code. Suffice to say that the inherent jurisdiction includes the High Court's power to whittle down and also quash ongoing criminal prosecution provided that a case "to prevent abuse of the process of law" or "to advance the ends of justice" etc. is made out in unequivocal terms. The scope of these two sets of powers enjoyed upon by the High Court may shrink or expand depending upon pre/post conviction eventualities, especially if in pre-conviction case(s), the High Court, as a matter of fact, is satisfied that continuation of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility; their fate-accompli is known; and further pendency thereof would be an undesirable burden on the trial Courts, who are already struggling hard to manage their unmanageable dockets. In addition, the question as to whether Section 320(9) Cr.P.C. which prohibits "compounding" of the offences not falling within the ambit of sub- sections (1) and (2) of section 320 of the Code, can barge into the constitutional powers conferred upon a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, also deserves to be dealt with elaborately. In this regard, the conclusions drawn in paras 12 and 14 of the judgment rendered by the Full Bench of this Court (majority view) in the case of Dharambir v. State of Haryana, 2005(2) Apex Criminal 424 : 2005(3) RCR(Crl.) 426 : 2005(3) RCR(Crl.) 426, also needs to be reconciled. From para 12 of the report in Dharambir's case (supra), the majority view to the effect that "for preventing the abuse of process of law and advancing the ends of justice" and/or "in the interest of justice", the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution can quash the criminal proceedings, is quite discernible. However, the aforesaid conclusion is apparently in conflict with the majority's later conclusion drawn in para 14 of the report where it has been held that there is neither any provisions of law nor does the Constitution of India confer any power in the High Court to either quash the prosecution or allow the compounding of the offences, which are not declared compoundable by the Legislature or that the only exception which can be carved out, pertains to offences arising out of marital disputes.
(3.) LET notice of motion be issued to the Advocates General of the States of Punjab and Haryana for 26.7.2007. Let the paper book of this case be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders. Meanwhile, the proceedings before the learned trial court, in the case in hand, shall remained stayed.";


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