M.M. Kumar, J. - (1.) IN this appeal filed by the assessee under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for brevity, "the Act"), challenge is to the order dated December 29, 1998, passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, Amritsar (for brevity, "the Tribunal"), in I.T.A. No. 671(ASR)/1991, in respect of the assessment year 1986 -87. The Assessing Officer has imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000 on the assessee -appellant by exercising powers under Section 271B of the Act on account of failure to obtain the report of audit of accounts as per the requirement of Section 44AB of the Act. The appeal was admitted by a Division Bench of this Court on the following substantive question of law: Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the penalty levied under Section 271B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not barred by limitation under Section 275 of the Act? The brief facts may first be noticed: The assessee -appellant was required to get its accounts audited and -obtain the report before July 31, 1986, which is the specified date as per Explanation to Section 44AB of the Act for the assessment year 1986 -87. The assessee -appellant gave its books of account for audit on July 25,1986. On July 30, 1986, it filed an application for extension of time for filing return of income under Section 139 of the Act before the Assessing Officer seeking extension of time up to August 31, 1986, by citing the reason that accounts were under audit, which was claimed to be a reasonable cause. The application was filed in Form No. 6 as prescribed by Rule 13 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (for brevity, "the Rules"). The reason for delay in giving the account books for audit on July 25, 1986, as pleaded before the Assessing Officer, was that there was a difference in the balance -sheet. The assessee -appellant filed the return of income on August 28, 1986, along with the audit report declaring a loss of Rs. 6,66,787. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment on March 31, 1989, and the assessment was framed on a total income of Rs. 4,50,745. The Assessing Officer initiated penalty proceedings under Section 273(2)(b) for filing untrue estimate of advance tax by declaring its income "nil" and also under Section 271(1)(a) for late filing of return. He also proceeded against the assessee -appellant under Section 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Assessing Officer did not record any finding that the delay of about 28 days in getting the accounts audited and obtaining the audit report was without a reasonable cause and consequently no proceedings for levying any penalty under Section 271B of the Act for not getting the accounts audited and obtaining the audit report were initiated. The assessee -appellant challenged the order of assessment in appeal. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Jalandhar, vide his order dated February 21,1991, granted it relief by deleting the additions of about Rs. 14,00,000 and reversed the order passed by the Assessing Officer by holding that the penalty was chargeable if there was failure to obtain audit report and not for delay in furnishing the same. It was further held that failure to submit the said report along with the return of income under Section 139(1) of the Act can be justified by showing a reasonable cause as per the amendment made with effect from April 1,1989. According to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), once a reasonable cause has been shown, then extension is required to be given and no penalty was leviable. 3. However, on March 15,1990, a notice under Section 271B of the Act was served upon the assessee to show cause why penalty be not imposed upon it as there was failure in getting the accounts audited and obtaining of audit report as per the requirement of Section 44AB of the Act. The Assessing Officer on August 8, 1990, after considering the reply, came to the conclusion that penalty to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000 was leviable and, accordingly, imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000. The Assessing Officer rejected the submission made by counsel for the assessee -appellant that once an application for extension of time was filed under Section 139 read with Rule 13 of the Rules, then in the absence of any order to the contrary, the application was deemed to have been accepted. With regard to another argument that no proceedings under Section 271B were initiated during the assessment proceedings, it has been observed by the Assessing Officer that failure to initiate such proceedings would not result into taking the case of the assessee -appellant out of the purview of Section 271B of the Act. 4. On further appeal filed by the Revenue, the Tribunal restored the order of the Assessing Officer dated August 8, 1990, and set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) passed on February 21, 1991. 5. Mr. Sanjay Bansal, learned Counsel for the assessee -appellant, has argued. that the initiation of proceedings under Section 271B on March 15, 1990, is barred by period of limitation as prescribed under Section 275 of the Act. According to learned Counsel, Section 275(b) of the Act provides for limitation for imposition of penalties and that no penalty could be imposed by passing an order after the expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which the proceedings in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed. According to learned Counsel, Section 275 has been amended with effect from April 1, 1989. It has now been provided by Clause (c) of Section 275 that no order imposing penalty is to be passed after the expiry of financial year in which proceedings in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed or 6 months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever expires later, and the same is not applicable to the present case. Learned Counsel has submitted that in the instant case, in the course of framing assessment order, no action for imposition of penalty was initiated. He has referred to the date of completion of the assessment which was completed on March 23, 1989, and the penalty proceedings could have been completed only during the financial year commencing from April 1,1988, to March 31,1989, and April 1,1989, to March 31,1990. He has emphasised that the period of two years having expired, no order could have been passed on August 8, 1990. In support of this submission, he has placed reliance on the well known judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.M. Manasvi v. : [1972]86ITR557(SC) and a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. : [1980]125ITR756(Delhi) . Learned Counsel has further emphasized that in any case after the expiry of the financial year, i.e., 1988 -89 or 6 months thereafter, no order imposing penalty could have been passed as per the amendment made with effect from April 1,1989. He has maintained that as a result of the amendment in Section 271B, penalty could be levied in any of the following three situations: (1) where the assessee failed to get his accounts audited by a specified date ; (2) where he failed to obtain report of such audit by a specified date ; and (3) where he fails to furnish audit report along with the return of income filed under Section 139(1) or Section 142(1). 6. Alternatively, learned Counsel submitted that an application for extension of time for filing the return under Section 139(1) of the Act was filed with the Assessing Officer on July 30, 1986, on the ground that the accounts were under audit and the same was never rejected by him. Impliedly, the date for filing the return stood extended, up to August 31, 1986, and consequently, the date for getting the accounts audited also stood extended. He claimed that the substantial question of law arises in this regard as this point was also specifically raised before the authorities below. 7. Mr. Sanjiv Bansal, learned Counsel for the Revenue, has submitted that Section 275 does not bar imposition of penalties even if no such proceedings have been initiated in the course of assessment. He has pointed out that if a period of two years is applied, as envisaged by Section 275(b) of the Act, then the order passed by the Assessing Officer is within the period of limitation because the order was passed on August 8, 1990, after issuance of show -cause notice on March 15,1990. According to learned Counsel, the period of two years is to commence from the end of the financial year in which the assessment proceedings are completed. In the present case, proceedings were completed on March 23, 1989, and the period of two years would allow the Assessing Officer to pass penalty order under Section 271B up to March, 1991, whereas the notice was issued on March 15, 1990, and the order was passed on August 8, 1990. ;s f He next urged that the Assessing Officer had not extended the date for filing the return and consequentially the date of getting the accounts audited up to July 31,1986, was mandatory and the same having not being done, the assessee had been rightly held liable for penalty. 8. We have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record with their able assistance. It would be apposite to read Section 44AB of the Act, which is as under: 44AB. Every person, - (a) carrying on business shall, if his total sales, turnover or gross receipts, as the case may be, in business exceed or exceeds forty lakh rupees in any previous year or years relevant to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1985, or any subsequent assessment year ; or (b) carrying on profession shall, if his gross receipts in profession exceed ten lakh rupees in any previous year or years relevant to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1985, or any subsequent assessment year, get his accounts of such previous year or years audited by an accountant before the specified date and obtain before that date the report of such audit in the prescribed form duly signed and verified by such accountant and setting forth such particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that in a case where such person is required by or under any other law to get his accounts audited by an accountant, it shall be sufficient compliance with the provisions of this section if such person gets the accounts of such business or profession audited under such law before the specified date and obtains before that date the report of the audit as required under such other law and a further report in the form prescribed under this section. 9. A bare perusal of Section 44AB of the Act would show that every person carrying on business as specified therein is required to get his accounts of previous year relevant to the assessment year audited by an accountant before the specified date and obtain before the specified date the report of such audit in the prescribed form duly signed and verified by such accountant. Explanation (ii) defines the expression, "specified date" as the date of the expiry of 4 months from the end of the previous year or 30th June of the assessment year. The specified date in the present case indisputably is July 31, 1986. 10. Section 271B of the Act reads thus: 271B. If any person fails, without reasonable cause, to get his accounts audited in respect of any previous year or years relevant to an assessment year or obtain a report of such audit as required under Section 44AB, the Income Tax Officer may direct that such person shall pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to one -half per cent, of the total sales, turnover or gross receipts, as the case may be, in business, or of the gross receipts in profession, in such previous year or years or a sum of one hundred thousand rupees, whichever is less. 11. Section 271B of the Act provides that if any person fails to get its accounts audited in respect of any previous year or years relevant to an assessment year or obtain a report of such audit as per the requirement of Section 44AB then the Assessing Officer may impose penalty being a sum equal to half per cent, of the total sales, turnover or gross receipts in business or of the gross receipts in profession in such previous year or years or a sum of Rs. 1,00,000, whichever is less. 12. Section 275 has prescribed a period of limitation for passing order imposing a penalty contemplated by any provision of the Act. It may be useful to read Section 275 as it stood in 1986 and the same is as under: 275. No order imposing a penalty under this Chapter shall be passed - (a)in a case where the relevant assessment or other order is the subject -matter of an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 246 or an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Sub -section (2) of Section 253, after the expiration of a period of - (i) two years from the end of the financial year in which the proceedings, in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or (ii) six months from the end of the month in which the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Appellate Tribunal is received by the Commissioner, whichever period expires later ; (b)in any other case, after the expiration of two years from the end of the financial year in which the proceedings, in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed. 13. Chapter XXI of the 1961 Act deals with penalty. In Chapter XXI, all penalties under Sections 271(1) and 273(1) are required to be initiated during the course of any proceedings in view of the phrase "in the course of any proceedings" used in these Sections. All other penalties in Chapter XXI can be initiated independently of any other proceedings. 14. In so far as Section 271B is concerned, it does not require that the initiation can only be during the course of some proceedings as no such phraseology is used therein. Even on the strength of the provisions of Section 275, it cannot be said that necessarily initiation of proceedings for penalty under Section 271B has to commence only during some proceedings as nothing can be added in Section 271B by implication. The judgments relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant in D.M. Manasvi : [1972]86ITR557(SC) and Rajinder Kumar Somani's case : [1980]125ITR756(Delhi) do not advance his case inasmuch as those cases were dealing with penalties under Sections 271(1) and 273(1) of the Act. Once it is held that it need not be that the penalty proceedings under Section 271B are required to be initiated during the course of any proceedings then the same stands initiated by issue of notice for penalty in terms of Section 274(1) of the Act. In the present case, the proceedings under Section 271B of the Act stood validly initiated on March 15, 1990, as nothing could be shown that debarred the Assessing Officer from initiating the proceedings for penalty under Section 271B on that date. Now, the crucial issue for adjudication in the present appeal that arises is as to up to what date the Assessing Officer could pass an order under Section 271B levying penalty on the assessee for its failure to get its account audited under Section 44AB of the Act. 15. A perusal of Clause (a) of Section 275 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, makes it evident that no order imposing a penalty could be passed after the expiry of a period of two years from the end of the financial year in which proceedings in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed. The aforementioned period of two years is to apply in a case where the relevant assessment is the subject -matter of an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner (Appeals), under Section 246 or an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Sub -section (2) of Section 253. Clause (ii) further provides that an order imposing a penalty cannot be passed if the period of six months from the end of the month in which the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal is received by the Commissioner. It has been clarified that the period of two years or six months would apply, whichever period expires later. Clause (b) of Section 275 has provided that in any other case limitation period of two years is to apply and no order could be passed after the expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which proceedings have been completed in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated. Incidentally, Clause (c) had been incorporated in Section 275, with effect from April 1, 1989, and has, therefore, no applicability for the purposes of the present adjudication. 16. The law provides that where no time limit has been prescribed in the relevant statute for imposition of penalty, then nothing can be read into the statute or a provision or a limitation which the Legislature has not provided for. Therefore, on strict interpretation, all cases where the penalty proceedings are not required to and have not been initiated during the course of any proceedings, there is no limitation prescribed under Section 275 of the Act (prior to its amendment with effect from April 1, 1989) for passing penalty order. The order imposing penalty on August 8,1990, thus, cannot be held to be barred by limitation. 17. Even otherwise, a perusal of the provision of Section 275(b) would show that it laid down bar of limitation whereby the order of penalty was to be passed within two years from the expiry of the financial year in which proceedings in the course of which penalty proceedings were initiated were completed. In other words, the financial year would be the year of completion of assessment proceedings and the period of two years may be reckoned from the end of the financial year of the date of the assessment order. It is undisputed that the assessment proceedings were completed in the instant case on March 23,1989, and accordingly the end of the financial year for the purposes of Clause (b) of Section 275 of the Act would be March 31, 1989, and two years would expire on March 31, 1991. Therefore, it has to be held that an order imposing penalty could have been passed on or before March 31, 1991, whereas in the present case the order imposing penalty has been passed on August 8, 1990, which is within time. Viewed from any angle, the contention of learned Counsel for the assessee carries no weight and is, thus, rejected and the question of law as posed at the beginning is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 18. Now, we advert to the alternative argument raised by learned Counsel for the assessee. It may be noticed that under the proviso to Sub -section (4) of Section 260A, the High Court is empowered to frame any substantial question of law that may arise at the final hearing of the appeal. The assessee has canvassed before the authorities below regarding the alternative plea but the same was not accepted. From a perusal of the orders of the authorities below, the substantial question of law in the following term does arise and accordingly, we had allowed the parties to argue the same. The following substantial question of law arises for consideration of this court: Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the period for getting its accounts audited by the assessee -appellant within the stipulated period as envisaged under the Act stood condoned when the application for extension of time for filing of return on the ground that accounts were under audit had not been rejected by the Assessing Officer? 19. We find considerable merit in the argument raised by learned Counsel for the assessee -appellant, based on Section 139, which reads as under: 139. (1) Every person, if his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to Income Tax, shall furnish a return of his income or the income of such other person during the previous year in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed - (a) in the case of every person whose total income, or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act, includes any income from business or profession, before the expiry of four months from the end of the previous year or where there is more than one previous year, from the end of the previous year which expired last before the commencement of the assessment year, or before the 30th day of June of the assessment year, whichever is later ; (b) in the case of every other person, before the 30th day of June of the assessment year: Provided that, on an application made in the prescribed manner, the Income Tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the date for furnishing the return, and, notwithstanding that the date is so extended, interest shall be chargeable in accordance with the provisions of Sub -section (8). 20. A perusal of the proviso to Section 139 would show that on an application made in the prescribed form, the Income Tax Officer has been vested with the discretion to extend the date for furnishing the return. It obviously means that a return, after the extension of time would be filed after the specified date, i.e., July 31, 1986. Further, the extension of time would not adversely affect interest chargeable under Sub -section (8) of Section 139. 21. In the present case, there is a delay of 28 days and the application by the 23 assessee -appellant under Section 139 in the prescribed Form No. 6 under Rule 13 was filed on July 30,1986, in which the prayer was made for extension of time up to August 31, 1986, citing reason that, the accounts were under audit. It is also undisputed that no reply to the application was given by the Income Tax Officer which led to the legal consequence of constructive acceptance of the application. We find that there is ample support available to the aforementioned proposition. In that regard, reliance may be placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of CIT v. , which has been approved by the apex court in CIT v. : [1995]215ITR114(SC) . The Division Bench has placed reliance on the observation made in the case of Harmanjit Trust v. , wherein the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (T. Venkata Krishnaiah and Co. v. : [1974]93ITR297(AP) ) taking a contrary view was not followed. The observation of this Court in the case of Harmanjit Trust , as quoted by the Division Bench reads as under (page 218): Duty was cast on the Income Tax Officer to intimate to the asses -see whether its request for extension of time for furnishing the return had been granted or refused. Thus, the predominant view in various High Courts is that the assessee can well presume that his request for extension of time for furnishing the return had been granted, unless the Income Tax Officer well in time communicates to the assessee his refusal. And it is precisely for this reason that Form I.T.N.S (Annexure 'F' with the statement) has been provided for use of the Income Tax Officer to convey grant or refusal of extension of time. The lone voice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Venkata Krishnaiah and Co. v. : [1974]93ITR297(AP) , holding the contrary view that the Income Tax Officer was not bound under the provisions of any Act or the Rules made thereunder to pass any order on the application for extension of time, received after the expiry of the date given in the notice under Sub -section (2) to Section 139, to our mind, with due respect to the hon'ble judges of that court, is not sound and in line with the predominant and appropriate view taken by the majority of the High Courts and especially by this court. The aforesaid view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court alone was the axis on which the appellate decision of the Tribunal revolved, and to our view not rightly. 22. For the aforementioned reasons, we find that once the period for filing of return of income has been extended beyond the specified date by fiction of law on the ground that the accounts were under audit, then impliedly, the delay in getting the accounts audited also stood condoned and no proceedings for imposition of penalty in the present case could have been validly initiated against the assessee -appellant. 23. For the reasons mentioned above, the additional substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee -appellant and against the Revenue. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and imposition of penalty under Section 271B of the Act is quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.;