M.M.PUNCHHI, J. - (1.) THE petitioner is accused of an offence under section 25 of the Arms Act for allegedly he was found in possession of a country made pistol. Section 6 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, has been employed in the case, as concededly there is a notification by the Haryana State Government making all the provisions of the Arms Act applicable to the territories of Haryana under the said provision. It would be useful to reproduce section 6 herein :- "ENHANCED PENALTIES : 6(1) If any person contravenes in any area notified in this behalf by a State Government, any such provision of, or any such rule made under, the Arms Act, 1959, the Explosives Act 1864, the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 or the Inflammable Substance Act, 1952 as may be notified in this behalf by the Central Government or by a State Government, he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any of the aforesaid Acts or the rules made thereunder be punishable with imprisonment for a terms which may extend to ten years or if his intention is to aid any terrorist or disruptionist with death or imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to term of life, and shall also be liable to fine. (2) For the purposes of this section, any person who attempts to contravene or abets or attempts to abet or does any act preparatory to the contravention of any provision of law rule or order shall be deemed to have contravened that provision." It is obvious that enhanced penalties which may extend to 10 years and in certain circumstances even to life are now to be imposed by the designated courts and not be ordinary Magistrates who are only empowered to empowered to impose a maximum sentence of three years. To say that enhanced penalties could be imposed by Magistrates with equal efficacy is to run away from the hard realities of the time for which measures like the aforesaid Act have been brought on the book. It is the designated Courts establishment under section 7 of the said Act, exercising jurisdiction under section 9, who can try offences which attract punishment under any provision of the Act. And, section 6 is one such provision, the non obstante text therein, afore empahsised, making explicit.
(2.) IN the matter of bail, under the Act, a heavy burden has been cast by the legislature to be shouldered proportionately by the Public Prosecutor and the Court. This is evident from the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 17. It reads as follows :- "(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless :- (a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (b) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail." It is plain from the provision that despite the offence against an offender be triable by a designated Court, bail can still be granted to him, but in considering for it, the Public Prosecutor has been cast a duty to weigh the pros and cons of the release of the offender on bail. If he chooses not to oppose the application for bail, he in that way shares a heavier burden, writ a grave sense of responsibility, and thereby absolves the Court from recording satisfaction that while on bail the offender was not likely to commit at offence. Such satisfication the Court has only to record where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail and yet chooses to grant bail this does not mean that where bail is conceded by the Public Prosecutor. The Court need always to allow it. The Court can still not grant bail even if conceded by the Public Prosecutor. But conversely, when bail I conceded by the Public Prosecutor the Court is absolved of the burden an is not required to record satisfaction that the offender while on bail was no likely to commit an offence. Now, in the instant case, the learned Advocate-General had not opposed the prayer for bail to the petitioner while it was being granted an interim measure on December 19, 1985. Today also, the learned Advocate-General does not oppose bail. In this situation, without any elaborate consideration of the case, I order remaining of the petitioner on bail in it terms of the interim order. Disposed of accordingly.;