D.V.Sehgal, J. - (1.) This regular first appeal is directed against the judgment dated 2-8-1977 of the learned Sub-Judge Ist Class, Ludhiana, who allowed an objection petition filed by the respondent judgment debtor under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and set aside the award dated 15-10-1974 made by the Arbitrator in favour ol the decree-holder-appellant and against the respondent. The award which was made by the Arbitrator is under the provisions of Sections 55 and 56 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). Admittedly this award was appealable under Section 68 of the Act and a revision was also maintainable under Section 69 thereof. However, no such remedy was availed of by the respondent. When an execution application was filed by the appellant in the Court below to execute the award and recover the amount from the respondent, the latter filed an objection petition under Section 47, Code of civil Procedure. It was alleged that the award was illegal, wrong, mala fide, capricious and without jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed. It was contended that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself and the proceedings. He did not serve any notice on the respondent nor did he notify the venue ot the hearing. The award was not in the prescribed form as provided by law and the Arbitrator had no power to assess consolidated costs. The award does not contain any reason for fastening liability on the respondent for payment of the amount in question.
(2.) The learned Executing Court held that it could go into the question of validity of the award and since it was in the nature of a quasi-judicial decision but was not supported by reasons it was nullity and had thus become inexacutable. It has been further mentioned that lumpsum costs of Rs. 6,261,40 had been awarded without giving any break-up for the same and were not based on actuals. Reliance had been placed for this view on Nirmal Singh v. The State of Punjab and others, [1976 P. L. J. 41].
(3.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. No doubt, the award does not contain reasons in its support. However, a grievance in this regard could be made by the respondent only before the forums available to it under the Act or by iavoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Such an award is not a nullity per se. It is no doubt voidable and could be quashed if a grievance was made in this regard. But the Executing Court certainly could not go behind the award and hold that it is inexecutable or a nullity since it is not supported by reasons. I, therefore, hold that the view taken by the learned Executing Court is against the well established law.;