I.S. Tiwana, J. - (1.) THE undisputed facts are that Respondent No. 2 who was elected as a Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Bassi Bajia, Tehsil and District Hoshiarpur, on September 22, 1983, stood convicted by the judicial Court under Sections 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act and 9 of the Opium Act and was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50/ - on August 27, 1980, and on that account his election was set aside by the Prescribed Authority under Section 13 -0 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act (for short, the Act) vide order dated December 17, 1984, Annexure P.1. The judgment has, however, been set aside by the Appellate Authority vide the impugned order dated June 13, 1985, Annexure P. 2. The controversy which needs to be resolved in this petition is as to whether Sat Paul Respondent can be said to have "been convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude....". It is the conceded position that the term 'moral turpitude' has neither been defined anywhere nor is it possible to define it in a concise manner. The answer is essentially dependent on facts in a given case. It is generally the accepted principle that anything done contrary to justice, honesty and principle of good morals may be said to fall within the connotation of moral turpitude. What has weighed with the lower Appellate Authority, while setting aside the conclusion of the Prescribed Authority, vide Annexure P.1 is that neither the quantity of the excisable articles recovered from the Respondent, i.e., 50 grams of opium and 20 grams of Charas nor the sentence of fine of Rs. 50/ - awarded by the criminal Court was that high that Respondent could be held guilty of any offence involving moral turpitude. For this conclusion, the said Authority has relied upon two earlier judgments of this Court in Risal Singh v. Chandgi Ram : A. I. R. 1966 P&H 393 and Malha Ram v. The Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak, 1973 P. L. L 116. It is through this process of reasoning that his election has been upheld by the Appellate Authority vide order Annexure P.2.
(2.) WHAT is being seriously urged by Mr. Sarjit Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, is that the Appellate Authority completely misdirected itself in recording the above -noted conclusions in the light of the judgments referred to above. The judgments, as a matter of fact, according to the learned Counsel, do not apply to the facts of the instant case. It deserves to be highlighted here that the plea of the Respondent -Sarpanch during the course of the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority, has constantly been that he had never been convicted of any offence under the Excise Act or the Opium Act and, therefore, he was not disqualified to be a candidate for the election in terms of Clause (d) of Section 6(5) of the Act In Risal Singh's case (supra), Respondent Chandgi Ram was convicted under Section 9(f) of the Indian Arms Act on November 15, 1954. On appeal while his conviction was maintained, his sentence was reduced to three months rigorous imprisonment. In revision this Court further reduced the sentence to a period of imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 100/ -. He was elected Pardhan of the Gram Panchayat Pritampur on December 8, 1963, i.e., sometimes eight years after the date of Chandgi Ram's conviction for possession of the unlicensed revolver. When the impugned orders of the authorities under the Act dismissing the election petition against Chandgi Ram were challenged through a writ petition by Risal Singh Petitioner, the learned Single Judge held that the possession of an unlicenced revolver could not in the circumstances of this case amount to moral turpitude (emphasis added). On further appeal, the Letters Patent Bench upholding the decision of the learned Single Judge, observed as follows: On the facts of the case before us we are unable to find any error in the view of the learned Single Judge that the offence for which Chandgi Ram Respondent was convicted implied no such depravity and wickedness of character or disposition which would involve any moral turpitude. As observed by the learned Single Judge, people keep fire arms for their personal safety and sometimes they resort to keeping arms without a licence when they feel that their status in society is not such as would enable them to get a licence from the authorities. No doubt they commit a contravention of the law, but it cannot necessarily be postulated that this contravention involved moral depravity and illness of character. In Malha Ram's case (supra), the Petitioner had been convicted under the Excise Act for being in possession of one Tola (12 grams) of Charas. During the trial of the election petition by the prescribed authority, the plea of the Petitioner was "that he had purchased the drug for an old relative on medical advice from a licencee at Delhi. When the stuff was recovered on a search of his person, he had informed the Investigating Officer about all these facts." It is in the light of these facts that this Court recorded the conclusion: In the case now before me the possession of about a tola of Charas would not shock the moral conscience of our society in general and there is nothing on record to suggest that the Petitioner had been led to commit the offence out of any baser motives.... Yet another case on which from reliance his been placed by the learned Counsel for the Respondents to sustain the impugned order of the appellate authority under the Act is Narain Singh v. Shri N. S. Cheema, (1978) 80 P. L. R. 149. In this case the Petitioner had been found guilty of possessing 21/2 bottles of illicit liquor and while convicting him under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act the trial Court had released him on probation. The learned Judges of the Division Bench observing that "it is a matter of common knowledge that in most of the rural areas in the Punjab people do take liquor. So far as there is no prohibition imposed under any law against, taking liquor, it may be an offence against the Revenue, but no morals are involved in such an offence. It cannot be said that such a conviction could shock the moral conscience in general. The society in which Petitioner lives is generally of agriculturists and labour engaged in the agricultural persuits. Such people generally take liquor in that society" concluded that the Petitioner could not be held guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude. It is thus apparent that all the three cases referred to above were decided on the facts available in those cases Here in the instant case, as already observed, the facts are different. Firstly, the Petitioner has offered no explanation qua the facts which led to his conviction. Secondly, I am of the opinion that the quantum of op um recovered from him and that too at a place distant from his normal abode does indicate that the opium was not meant for his personal consumption. It is the undisputed fact that the Petitioner lives in village Bassi Bajid, Tehsil and District Hoshiarpur, and the offending articles were found in his possession within the jurisdiction of Police Station Samrala, District Ludhiana. In the instant case, it has to be taken to have been established that the opium was meant for sale or trade which undoubtedly indicates the deprivation of character and baser considerations. The further argument of Shri Tulsi, however, is that while convicting the Respondent, the trial Court had not taken into account any such considerations and on that account it cannot be held that the Respondent was guilty of any offence which involved moral turpitude. The morality of this Respondent was not under consideration or in judgment during the course of his trial under the Opium Act. It is only during the course of these proceedings that this aspect of the matter had to be gone into by the Subordinate authorities and it was for the Respondent to establish facts and circumstances which could absolve him from the charge that his conviction was not against morality. As already pointed out, he has offered no explanation whatsoever. In the light of the discussion above, I find it difficult to sustain the impugned order of the Appellate Authority. The same is thus set aside. As a natural consequence of this, the order of the Prescribed Authority stands and the election of Respondent Sat Paul is set aside. I, however, pass no order as to costs.;