- (1.) On the last date of hearing i.e. February 4, 1986, an objection was raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that this petition had been filed on behalf of the Municipal Committee without any legal or valid authorisation for filing the same. It was specifically pointed out by the learned counsel that though the petition had been filed on May 5, 1985, yet, the resolution authorising the filing of this petition was passed by the Municipal Committee on November 11, 1985. Even in this resolution, the earlier filing of the petition was not rectified.
(2.) Mr. Doabia, learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Committee concedes the above noted factual position, but seeks to contend that at least with effect from November 11, 1985. This petition should be taken to have been filed on due authorisation or in other words, this petition should be taken to have been filed on November 11, 1985. This contention of Mr. Doabia is refuted by the learned counsel for the respondents in the light of two earlier judgments of this Court in The Municipal Committee, Ludhiana v. Surinder Kumar,1970 CurLJ 631 and Municipal Committee, Karnal v. Shri Mehlo Ram,1976 PunLR 453. Having perused these judgments, I find that the Material issue involved in those cases was as to whether the appeals filed on behalf of the respective Municipal Committee were competent in the sense that they were filed after due authorisation. This Court having come to the conclusion that the filing of the appeals was not duly authorised and subsequent passing of the resolution or rectification of the earlier filing of the appeals could not sustain the appeals as by that time the appeals had become barred by limitation. No such situation arises in the instant case as no question of limitation is involved. Mr. Battas, the learned counsel for respondent No. 3, however, contends that in case this petition is taken to have been filed on November 11, 1985, i.e. the date on which the Municipal Committee had passed the resolution authorising the filing of this petition, then the petition should be dismissed on grounds of laches. I, however, find that no such right to get the petition dismissed on the ground of laches is available to the respondent in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such matters, consideration of laches is in the discretion of the Court. In the light of that, I find no merit in the objection taken on behalf of respondent No. 3.
(3.) The learned counsel for the parties concede that so far as the merits o this case are concerned, the same are completely covered by an earlier judgment of mine in Municipal Committee, Bhatinda v. The Director, Local Govt. Punjab and others,1986 RRR 259, Civil Writ Petition No. 1362 of 1985, decided on February 4, 1986, and in view of that the impugned order of respondent No. 1 dated December 13, 1984, deserves to be set aside. I order accordingly and send the case back to him with the directions as contained in that order of mine. At this stage, Mr. Battas points out that the property of respondent No. 3 is out-side the Municipal limits inasmuch as the same had not been extended in accordance with law and thus no property tax could be imposed on him. I do not feel the necessity of going into this aspect of the matter as in my earlier order dated February 4, 1986, referred to above, I have already directed that all the objections which the respondents want to take on merits have to be raised before respondent No. 1. Thus, the net result is that the case is sent back to respondent No. 1 and the parties through their counsel are directed to appear before him on March 17, 1986. Order set aside.;