Iqbal Singh Tiwana, J. - (1.) While determining the surplus area of Diwan Singh, father of the present Petitioners, the Special Collector, Punjab, vide his order dated August 29, 1960 (Annexure P. 1) after noticing that Diwan Singh had died on January 5, 1960, i.e., prior to the date of passing of this order and had been succeeded to by three heirs, i.e., Smt. Ram Devi, his daughter and Smt. Indra Wati and Rizka Devi his daughter -in -law on the basis of a will held that he had no surplus land on the crucial date, i.e., April 15, 1953, under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (for short, the 1953 Act). Some time later the Collector, Rohtak, on a report from the Naib Tehsildar, Agrarian, made a move for the review of the above noted order (Annexure P. 1) on the ground that while passing the said order no notice of the land in the hands of the heirs of Diwan Singh was taken by him and that the will on the basis of which the above noted three heirs had succeeded to him was bogus. On the receipt of a communication to this effect from the Collector, the Commissioner vide his impugned order dated April 29, 1977 (Annexure P. 3), granted the requisite permission to review the order Annexure P. 1. This order, Annexure P. 3, was later challenged by the Petitioners before the Financial Commissioner primarily on the ground that surplus area in the hands of late Diwan Singh having been determined once vide order Annexure P. 1, no proceedings could be initiated for the review of the said order as the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (for short, the Ceiling Act) which had come into force with effect from December 23, 1972, did not provide for any such review of the order passed by the authorities under the Act. In a nut shell the contention raised before the Financial Commissioner was that though the 1953 Act vide Sec. 24 had provided for review of orders in terms of Sec. 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, yet the said provision stood repealed with the coming into force of the Ceiling Act. This contention of the Petitioners was repelled by the Financial Commissioner with the observation that Clause (ii) of Sub -section (2) of Sec. 33 of the latter mentioned Act saved the proceedings which were pending at the commencement of this Act and those proceedings had to be decided in the light of the provisions of the earlier Act, i.e., Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act. Another contention raised before the Financial Commissioner was that prior to the grant of permission by the Commissioner to review the earlier order of the Collector, Annexure P. 1, the Petitioner should have been given an opportunity of hearing. However, this submission too was repelled by the Financial Commissioner. It is this order of the Financial Commissioner which is now impugned. Having hoard the learned Counsel for the parties at some length, I find no merit in this petition
(2.) So far as the first contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that Sec. 33 of the Ceiling Act in any way repealed Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act is concerned, it is totally unfounded. Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act reads as follows: 24. Appeal, review and revision. -The provision in regard to appeal, review and revision under this Act shall, so far may be, be the same as provided in Ss. 80, 82, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (Act XVI of 1887). Sub -section (3) of Sec. 18 of the Ceiling Act dealing with appeal, review and revision, prior to its omission vide Haryana Act No. 40 of 1976, was in pari materia with the above noted Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act. The repealing Sec. 33 of this Act says, "the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 ...........which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed." It is thus patent that only those provisions of the earlier statute, i.e., the 1953 Act which were inconsistent or were in a conflict with any of the provisions of this Act, stood repealed with the enforcement of the latter Act. As has already been pointed out above, Sub -section (3) of Sec. 1 8 of the Utter mentioned Act as it stood prior to its omission vide Haryana Act No. 40 of 1976, provided for exactly a similar situation, and thus there was no conflict in the two provisions. Similarly with the omission of this Sub -section (3) no conflict between the provisions of two Acts, so far as these relate to the power to review was generated or came into being. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that on account of this omission of Sub -section (3), it has to be taken that the Legislature wanted to take away the power of review under the Act and to that extent the provisions of this Act should be taken to be in conflict or inconsistent with the earlier Act, i.e., Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act, has no merit. Sub -section (3) of Sec. 18 of the Ceiling Act was merely a surplus age in the light of Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act By virtue of the omission of this Sub -section no conflict, to my mind, came into being between the language of the provisions of this Actor Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act. Thus the contention of the learned Counsel that Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act in any way stood repealed with the enforcement of the Ceiling Act, deserves to be rejected and; I order accordingly. Similar opinion has already been expressed by this Court in Chanan Mal Newar and Ors. v/s. State of Haryana : (1977) 79 P. L. R. 92, wherein it has been observed that Sec. 24 of the 1953 Act which gives power of review is not repealed by virtue of Sec. 33(1) of the Ceiling Act.
(3.) The only other submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that prior to the grant of permission to review vide Annexure P. 3, the Commissioner should have afforded an opportunity of hearing; to the Petitioners and that having not been done, the said order stands vitiated and its affordance in revision by the Financial Commissioner vide Annexure P. 4 does not improve the matters. I again see no merit in this contention of the learned Counsel. No precedent has been brought to my notice in support of his contention that prior to the grant of permission to review, the superior authority is required to afford an opportunity of hearing to the person in whose favour the order sought to be reviewed had been passed. Such a hearing is envisaged only at the time of actually reviewing the order.;