D.V. Sehgal, J. - (1.) BALRAJ Krishan Plaintiff -Appellant filed a suit for possession of part of a property denoted as evacuee unit No. B -I -172 situated at Dasuya, alleging that it was purchased by one Kidar Nath in a public auction from the Central Government, who sold it to Lal Chand son of Hukam Chand vide registered sale deed dated 28th May, 1965. Lal Chand further transferred it to the Plaintiff. It was alleged that the property was lying vacant at the time it was auctioned on 14th March, 1950 and its possession was delivered to the auction purchaser vide letter dated 11th November, 1960, by the Rehabilitation Department. The possession was claimed from the Defendant -Respondents who, according to the Plaintiff, had no connection with the suit property and had illegally occupied the same as trespassers. It was further alleged that the Defendants did not vacate their unlawful possession of the property in spite of demand. The Defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement. A preliminary objection was taken that the property in dispute which bears No. B. I. 172 -A situated within the municipal limits. It was an evacuee property and Defendant No. 1 Hart Singh was in its possession as a tenant under the Custodian for 20 years and had been regularly paying rent to the Custodian. The allegation that the Defendants were trespassers in the suit property was denied. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court inter alia, framed the following issues: - 1. Whether the Plaintiff is owner of the suit property ? OPP.
(2.) WHETHER the Defendants are tenants on the suit property by operation of law ? OPP The learned Sub Judge IT Class, Dasuya, vide judgment and decree dated 25th November, 1974, held issue No. 1 in favour of the Plaintiff Appellant and decided issue No. 2 in favour of the Defendant -Respondents holding that Defendant No. 1 is a tenant on the suit property. Since the property is situated within the municipal limits of Dasuya and there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, it was concluded that the Plaintiff -Appellant was not entitled to a decree for possession of the same. The suit was consequently dismissed. The appeal filed by the Plaintiff -Appellant also met the same fate and was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, vide judgment and decree dated 24th September, 1977. He, therefore, filed the present appeal in this Court. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at some length. Findings of the courts below on issue No. 1 was not challenged before me by the learned Counsel for the Respondents. As to the finding on issue No. 2 the learned Counsel for the Appellant firstly contended that the Courts below have wrongly concluded that the property in dispute is the same as the property which according to the evidence produced by the Respondents was in possession of Respondent No. 1 as tenant under the Custodian. Reference has been made to the receipts issued by the Custodian which have been adduced in evidence by them wherein the house in their occupation is described as bearing Unit No. B.l .172 -A. According to the learned Counsel, the property which was sold in auction to Kidar Nath as evidenced by the certificate of sale Exhibit P -2, bore No. B.l.172. On going through the evidence on record, however, I find that property No. B.l. 172 was a larger unit, a part of which i.e. the house in dispute was sold by the Rehabilitation Department to Kidar Nath vide Exhibit P -2 and of which the Appellant later became the owner. The position has been explained in detail by Sohan Singh DW -3, a former Clerk of the Rehabilitation Department, who has fully described the boundaries of the house in dispute and has mentioned that it bears No. B.l. 172 -A. Both the Courts below have recorded a finding of fact that the house in dispute being part of larger Unit No. B.l .172 in fact bears property No. B.l. 172 -A and on evaluating the evidence I affirm this finding. The learned Counsel for the Appellant then contended that reliance placed by the learned Additional District Judge on Kesar Dass v. Jaisa Ram, (1967) 69 P. L. R. 490 is not correct. He submitted that Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is to be read alongwith notification No. SRO -2 19 issued by the Central Government under Sub -section (2) thereof, according to which an allottee could avail of the protection of Section 29 in case he paid the arrears of rent due from him within two months from the date of transfer of property by the Rehabilitation Department to the purchaser. In the present case, thus proceeded the argument, there is no evidence that the Respondents paid the arrears of rent within the period so stipulated by the notification. In support of this, the learned Counsel placed reliance on Gurcharan Singh v. Devki Nandan, (1970) 72 P. L. R. 651, Dhana Ram v. Kishan Chand, (1978) (2) R. L.R.341 and Smt. Shakuntla v. Shri B. D. Bansal, 1983 (2) R. L. R. 508.
(3.) IN my view, the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is of no avail. The dispute between the parties has to be adjudicated as laid down within the confines of the pleadings. The Appellant's allegation was that the Respondents were trespassers in the property in dispute. On the other hand, the Respondents contended that Hari Singh, Respondent No. 1 was a tenant under the Custodian. So as to prove his defence, Hari Singh not only produced the rent receipts but also called into the witness box the officials of the Rehabilitation Department along with Rent Collection Register. The statements of DW 3 Sohan Singh and DW 4 Gurbax Rai along with rent receipts exhibits D. 1 to D. 44, were duly considered by the Courts below and a firm finding of fact has been returned that Hari Singh Defendant Respondent was a tenant under the Custodian and is as such to be treated as a tenant in the property in dispute under the Appellant. In view of this finding, it is not at all necessary to speculate whether Hari Singh was an allottee of the property in dispute and whether he was required to attorn in favour of the Appellant and pay arrears of rent to the purchaser from the Rehabilitation Department. It is not necessary to deliberate on the question of applicability of Section 29 of the Act read with notification issued by the Central Government under Sub -section (2) thereof. For this view, I am fortified by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Bhagwan Singh v. Bachhittar Singh, 1981 (1) R. C. J. 390.;