MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI, J. - (1.) THIS petition for habeas corpus is by a convict undergoing life imprisonment.
(2.) LIFE imprisonment was awarded to the convict by the Sessions Judge, Hissar, on 16.3.1966. On appeal to this court by the State, the sentence of life imprisonment was converted to death on 3.9.1968. Eight days later, i.e. on 11.9.1968, the convict escaped from jail. He was rearrested as late as on 4.4.1979, approximately after a period of 10 1/2 years. In the meantime, the convict's appeal to the Supreme Court was partially accepted in setting aside the death sentence and restoring that of life imprisonment. On rearrest in the year 1979, the convict was tried for offence under section 224, Indian Penal Code, and was awarded one year's rigorous imprisonment. On 4.11.1985. For the Jail offence the Inspector General of prisons, in exercise of his powers conferred on him by para 633-A of the Punjab Jail Manual cancelled jail remissions earned by the convict to the extent of 35 months and 17 days. This step obviously brought the petitioner to a disadvantage for computing the period on which his case for premature release could be initiated. The order of cancellation of jail remissions was passed on 14.1.1986 and was sent for judicial appraisal to the learned Sessions Judge, Hissar, who accorded approval thereto on 11.2.1986. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that cancellation of remissions is violative of the principle hereafter extracted, laid down by the Supreme Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration AIR 1980 S.C. 1570 :- "No solitary or punitive cell, no hard labour on dietary change as painful additive, no other punishment or denial of privileges and amenities, no transfer to other persons with penal consequences, shall be imposed without judicial appraisal of the Sessions Judge and where such intimation, on account of emergency, is difficult, such information shall be given within two days of the action."
(3.) THE claim of the convict is baseless on that ground. The punishments of the kind thought by the Supreme Court sometimes would have be carried out immediately. Their lordships took the view that punishments ordinarily shall not be effective without judicial appraisal of the Sessions Judge but where they have, on account of an urgency, to be put to operation, then such information shall be given to the Sessions Judge within two days of the action for the purpose of ex post facto approval. This principle of seeking judicial appraisal within two days of the punishment does not apply here. The punishment imposed on the convict did not visit on him any adverse tangible consequences. The remissions earned by him were on record and were ordered to be wiped out therefrom, appraisal of which was done by the Sessions Judge and approval accorded. It is only at a later stage that the consequences of such order visited the petitioner at the time of consideration of his case for premature release. In these circumstances, the afore-extracted principle from Sunil Batra's case (supra) was of no avail to the convict. But for this ground, not other ground has been put forward by the learned counsel except to suggest the cancelled period remission should have been less than one ordered by the Inspector General of prisons. This court can be of help to the convict in that regard, for, the discretion in that matter is that of the Inspector General of prisons and not of this Court.;