JUDGEMENT
J.V. Gupta. J. -
(1.) This is landlady's revision petition in whose favour the eviction order was passed by the Rent Controller, but was set aside in appeal by the Appellate Authority.
(2.) The landlady sought the ejectment of her tenant Prithi Chand from the demised premises. The ejectment was sought primarily on the ground that she required the premises for her use and occupation as well as for the bona fide requirement of his married son Bharat Bhushan. She also maintained that she was not in occupation of any other residential building, nor she had vacated any such building without sufficient cause. She was living with her husband in a small joint house which was jointly owned by her husband and his sisters in equal shares and that the same was too small for the use of their growing family. In the written statement, the tenant controverted the said plea. Ultimately, the Rent Controller vide order dated May, 30, 1981, dismissed the ejectment application. On appeal, the learned Appellate Authority remanded the case to the learned Rent Controller after allowing amendment of the ejectment application vide order dated Dec. 20, 1982. The tenant was never aggrieved against the said order and did not file any revision against the same in this Court. The learned Rent Controller, on remand of the case, after recording further evidence, vide order dated March 15, 1983, came to the conclusion that the landlady bona fide required the premises for her own use and occupation and for the use of her married son. Dissatisfied with the same the tenant filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. In appeal, the learned Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the earlier order of remand passed by the Appellate Authority dated Dec. 20, 1982, was illegal and, therefore, the subsequent order passed by the Rent Controller was also not maintainable. This approach of the Appellate Authority was wholly wrong, illegal and misconceived. It could not sit over the judgment of its predecessor, more particularly when the tenant was never aggrieved against the said order of the Appellate Authority and had taken part in the proceedings before the Rent Controller. Surprisingly enough, the learned Appellate Authority instead of deciding the appeal filed by the tenant against the order of the Rent Controller dated March 15, 1983, treated the appeal to be against the order of the Rent Controller dated May 30, 1981, filed by the landlord and dismissed the same vide order dated Jan. 10, 1985. Dissatisfied with the same, she has filed this revision petition in this Court. Instead of remanding the case back to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal filed by the tenant against the order of the Rent Controller dated March 15, 1983, I would prefer to decide this revision petition as the ground of ejectment is the personal necessity of the landlady and was pending since 1973.
(3.) The learned Rent Controller vide order dated March 15, 1983, came to the conclusion that from the evidence led by the landlady, it was proved that she required the premises for her personal use and occupation and for the personal use and occupation of her family members and that she did not own any other house except the house in dispute, nor she has vacated any. In appeal, the Appellate Authority did come to the conclusion :
"So taking the case from that angle, it appears that the claim of the landlady is on sound footing, because a landlady/ landlord cannot be compelled to live in an insufficient accommodation and dismiss the application of the landlady for ejectment of the tenant." But at the same time, it was further observed by the Appellate Authority that in the statement dated Nov. 22, 1984, made by the landlady before it, she had admitted that she had got accommodation vacated from one Shangara Singh and in view of that, it was held by it that now her need could not be said to be bona fide so as to claim the ejectment of the tenant. This finding of the learned Appellate Authority is wholly misconceived and illegal. The premises got vacated by her from Shangara Singh along with one Hari Kishan did not belong to her exclusively. Therefore, on that ground, she could not be non-suited. Apart from the above, it has come into evidence and an affidavit of Des Raj, the husband of the landlady, has also been filed in this Court that on March 11, 1986, his second son Brij Bhushan had also been married instead of in Jan., 1985. Thus, the requirement of the landlady for her second son married in March, 1986, has arisen during the pendency of this revision petition. Apart from the above, it has also been stated in the above-said affidavit that Pirthi Chand, respondent, had constructed a house in Prahlad Nagar, Hoshiarpur, in the name of his wife which has been so admitted by him in his cross-examination on Nov. 22, 1984. He also admitted therein that his wife resided in that house and also comes to him, His daughter-in-law and daughter gave him meals in the house, in dispute, from the house owned by his wife. Thus, from the evidence on the record as well as from the subsequent events, it is amply proved that the landlady bona fide required the premises for her own use and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of her two married sons. Besides. the tenant has constructed a house, though in the name of his wife and his wife is residing therein.;