S.S.DEWAN, J. - (1.) IN this revision, the petitioner has sought quashing of the preliminary order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Narnaul (Copy Annexure P. 2) vide which the proceedings against the petitioner were initiated Under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short, the Code) and the property in dispute was attached under Section 146(1) of the Code vide his order dated November 10, 1984 (Copy Annexture P. 3).
(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition are in a very narrow compass. The petitioner claims to be the owner in possession of the dispute land at Narnaul. He submitted an application for sanction of a plan for the construction of a house on the said land but the same was rejected on 29th June, 1984 by the Administrator of the Municipal Committee on the ground that he had failed to satisfy him about his (petitioner's) title or ownership of the property in question. It is alleged in the petition that respondent No. 3 got a report submitted through the Inspector Samunder Singh to the effect that there was apprehension of breach of peace between the petitioner and one Ram Avtar and thereupon the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code were initiated and on the same day, the land in dispute was attached by respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 has filed reply and he has denied having moved any police authority to initiate proceedings under Section 145 of the Code against the petitioner. He has rather asserted that the petitioner himself initiated the proceedings under Section 145 against Ram Avtar (respondent No. 2). Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now challenged the impugned order in this revision. The learned counsel for the petitioner has at the outset, made a valiant effort to canvass that the Sub Divisional Magistrate has omitted to record his satisfaction and the grounds of his being so satisfied with regard to the existence of the dispute likely to cause a breach of peace in the preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the Code and hence the whole proceedings are vitiated. A similar point arose before a Division Bench of this Court in Narinder Singh and another v. State of Haryana and others 1981 C.C. Cases 67 (P&H) and it was held that unless a grave prejudice can be shown by the aggrieved party, the proceedings would not be vitiated by a mere defect in form of preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the Code. Applying this principle, the impugned order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate in the present case and the proceedings consequent thereto are unassailable. It may be mentioned here that even an attempt was not made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show any prejudice far from establishing it.
(3.) IT is next contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order of attachment cannot be sustained even on merits inasmuch as the material placed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate does not make out a case of emergency and at any rate, the learned Magistrate has not expressly stated so. It is true that the learned Magistrate has not used the word 'emergency' while directioning the attachment of the property in question but it is quite explicit from what he has said that he considered the instant case to be one of emergency. The learned Magistrate has spelled out the circumstances which weighed with him while making an order of attachment under Section 146(1) of the Code. So, the mere omission on his part to use the word 'emergency' can hardly be of any consequence. It is well settled that where materials on record satisfy the Court that an emergency regarding the property in dispute did exist which would justify the passing of an order of attachment, it would not be appropriate or even legitimate for this Court to interfere with the order merely because the order itself does not say in so many words that it is a case of emergency. Hence, I find no substance in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.;