Harbans Lal, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision petition under Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 (hereinafter to be called the Act) directed against the decision of the Appellate Authority, Ambala dated March 21, 1975, by which the appeal of the landlord Respondent was accepted and the order of the Rent Controller, dismissing the ejectment application was set aside.
(2.) BRIEFLY , the facts are that Jai Singh, Respondent, the owner of the house (the premises in dispute) gave the same on lease except one kitchen, to Shangara Singh (hereinafter to be called the Petitioner) on a monthly rent of Rs. 5/0 -. The Respondent was a Government servant and retired from service in the year 1966. Application for ejectment of the Petitioner (out of which the present revision petition has arisen) was filed on February 10, 19 2. on the ground that the Petitioner was in arrears of rent from August 1, 1971 to January 31, 1972, and that the Respondent required the premises, in dispute, for his own use and occupation as he had retired from service. The Petitioner paid the arrears of rent which were received by the Respondent. The plea of the landlord that he required the premises for his use and occupation bona fide was controverted Inter alia it was contended that the Respondent though had retired from service in the year 1966, entered into an agreement on June 19, 1971(sic) with one Kishan Chand Sharma for the sale of the premises in dispute for Rs. 15,500/ - and according to its terms the sale deed was to be executed on or before November 15 1971. As the landlord Respondent, failed to execute the sale deed, a notice was issued on behalf of said Kishan Chand Sharma to the landlord on November 8, 1971 for getting the sale deed executed. To this reply was sent be the Respondent through an Advocate Mr. M L. Anand, on November 11, 1971, which is Exhibit R. 1. This reply is admitted by the landlord. According to the same the execution of the agreement to sale and the condition to execute the sale deed by November 15, 1971, was admitted, but it was denied that there was any condition to get the premises in dispute vacated before executing the sale deed. However, it was stated in this reply that efforts would be made to get the premises vacated in accordance with law. According to the averments of the Petitioners, as Shri Kishan Chand Sharma, the intending vendee, refused to purchase the premises in dispute unless the same had been got vacated, the Respondent filed this rejectment application on February 10, 1972, that is, within three months of the reply, Exhibit R.1. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: 1. Whether the tender made by the Respondent on the first date of hearing was short and inadequate ? 2. Whether the Respondent is liable to ejectment from the premises in dispute on the ground mentioned in para (paragraph ?) 2 (b) of the application ? Whether the tenancy of the Respondent stands validly terminated ? 3 A. Whether the applicant is not occupying any other premises in Yamuna Nagar ? 3. B Whether the applicant has not vacated any building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 ?
(3.) RELIEF After recording evidence and hearing arguments, the Rent Controller dismissed the electment application and held that the landlord bad not been able to prove that he required the premises in dispute for his own use and occupation. Appeal against that order was accepted by the learned Appellate Authority and the order of ejectment was passed. While accepting the appeal of the landlord: the learned Appellate Authority observed as follows: Assuming that Jai Singh had once decided to sell the demised house that would not mean that sub sequent there to he had given up his desire to occupy the demised house for his own use and occupation What appears is that feeling thoroughly disgusted and frustrated that Shangara Singh was no vacating the house and further that he had even turned out his aged father Bishan Singh from a small room of the demised house, Jai Singh had once thought of s(sic) in away he same. Therefore, the needs of Jai Singh to occupy the dismissed house for his own use and occupation cannot be said to be mala fide for the reason that he had once desired to sell the same. I am afraid, I cannot agree with this conclusion of the learned Appellate Authority. Though a landlord is a judge of his own needs and normally and generally the statement of a landlord that he requires the premises for his own use and occupation has to be accepted on its face value, but the undisputed circumstances of this case lead to the inescapable conclusion that the statement of the landlord regarding his alleged need to live in the premises in dispute has to be judged in the light of his conduct in remaining silent for about six years and not filing any ejectment application, entering into an agreement to sell the premises in dispute for Rs. 15,500/ - and executing the sale deed on or before November 15, 1971 and filing the present ejectment application just after receiving notice from the intending vendee, Shri Krishan Chand Sharma, on November 11, 1971, All these circumstances clearly indicate that the ejectment application was prompted by his anxiety to get the premises in dispute vacated in order to sell the same because the intending vendee was not prepared to purchase the same at a price satisfactory to the landlord unless the premises in dispute had been vacated The conclusion of the learned Appellate Authority that the landlord was not debarred from changing bis decision to sell the property and deciding to live in the premises himself is based on absolutely unwarranted conjecture which is not justified by the conduct of the landlord himself. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent has contended that the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Appellate Authority regarding the bona fide need of the Respondent could not be disturbed in revision. It is an established principle of law that the scope of interference in revision under Section 15 of the Act is much wide than the scope of interference in revision under Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure. In my considered opinion, the decision of the learned Appellate Authority in setting aside the order of the Rent Controller and passing the ejectment order, is based on unwarranted conjectures and surmises.;