- (1.) VINOD Kumar appeared in the B. A. examination (Part III) held by the kurukshetra University in April, 1975. The examination centre was S. A. Jain college, Ambala City of which Vinod Kumar was the student. Examination of english Paper A was held on 4th April, 1975. Vinod Kumar received notice (Annexure P-l) on 23rd June, 1975, from the University accusing him of use of unfair means and misconduct by making deliberate previous arrangement to cheat in the examination by smuggling in another answer-book. As directed by the University, Vinod Kumac sent explanation on the following 25th. On 27th June, 1975, he appeared before the Unfair Means Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee ). Vinod Kumar was given opportunity and heard by the Committee. Thereafter on 28th July, 1975, the Committee gave its decision (Annexure P-11) finding Vinod Kumar guilty of resorting to unfair means and debarring him from passing the above mentioned examination. The decision was notified by the University vide Annexure P-10.
(2.) FEELING aggrieved Vinod Kumar filed Civil Writ Petition No. 5004 of 1975. The learned Single Judge allowed it and quashed the aforesaid decision (Annexure p-11) and the notification (Annexure P-10 ). The University then filed the present Letters Patent Appeal. It was heard by a Bench of this Court. The learned Judges expressed the view that the learned Single Judge whilst allowing the writ petition did not conclude that the findings arrived at by the Committee were not supported by any evidence at all. Instead he himself adverted to the relevant evidence, including examination of answer-books and the writing of vinod Kumar made on the dictation of the Committee. The learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the issue from the angle whether the conclusion arrived at by the Committee from the evidence before it, was warranted and justifiable and also opined that the Committee had not recorded specific findings on certain issues of fact. With these observations the learned Judges have made this reference to a larger Bench for clearly defining the scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution with the order of a domestic Tribunal like the Committee.
(3.) THE leading authority on the subject, mentioned in the order of reference, is board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. Allahabad v. Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875. In paragraph 12 of the report at page 878 their Lordships ruled :- "in dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the Universities or appellant No. 1 (Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. Allahabad)set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic Tribunals to decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter of the adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, Courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Article 226, the high Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision in question; its. jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the tribunals must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all conside- rations which govern criminal trials in ordinary Courts of law. Jn the present case, no animus is suggested and no mala fides have been pleaded. The enquiry has been fair and the respondent has had an opportunity of making his defence. That being so, we think the high Court was not justified in interfering with the order passed against the respondent. ";