S.S. Sandhawalia, J. - (1.) WHETHER the decision of their Lordships in Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, 1973 S.C. 855, impliedly overrules or dissents from their earlier view expressed in Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, 1970 S.C. 1244, is the salient issue which has necessitated this reference to the Full Bench.
(2.) IN order to examine the aforesaid preliminary legal question one need not get enmeshed in the details of the facts at the outset. It suffices to mention at this stage that the Respondent, Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board (hereinafter called" the Board") is a statutory body constituted under Section 3(1) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. It is not in serious dispute that this Board may well come within the ambit of the term 'other authority' as used in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The writ Petitioner claims to be a permanent employee of the Board. Apart from other reliefs, he claims a declaration that notwithstanding the impugned order of removal or termination of his services by the Board, he still continues to hold the post of the Secretary, Market Committee, and prays that the Respondent -Board should treat him accordingly. In the argument before us, this claim has been rested on the ground that the Board by a resolution had adopted the Punjab Civil Service Rules as being applicable to its employees. By virtue of Rule 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15 contained in Volume I, Part I of the aforesaid Service Rules, the Petitioner claims that his lien on the permanent post held by him under the Board continues despite the impugned orders of the Board to the contrary. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Chairman of the Board, objections have been taken to the effect that the Petitioner does not enjoy any statutory status as regards his employment with the Board. It is the case that the relations between the writ Petitioner and the Respondent Board are contractual, being those of a master and a servant and hence a writ claiming a declaration that he continues to be in the service of the Board is not maintainable. It is the Respondent's case that the removal or termination of the Petitioner's services can at the highest be deemed wrongful for which the only legal relief is a suit for damages. It is contended that even on the assumption that the Punjab Civil Service Rules are in terms applicable to the case of the Petitioner and further that there has been violation thereof, nevertheless, the relief of a declaration that the Petitioner continues to be in service of the Board cannot be granted.
(3.) IT is perhaps unnecessary and burdensome to advert to the precedents prior to the succinct statement of the law made by Vaidialingam, J. speaking for the Bench in the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation's case (supra). The Appellant Corporation therein was created under the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporations Act, 1956. Section 54 of the said Act gave power to the Warehousing Corporation to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder. In exercise of that power the Corporation had framed the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation Regulations, 1961. Regulation 16 thereof provided for the imposition of penalties against an employee of the Corporation but Sub -clause (3) thereof in terms laid down that no punishment shall be imposed on an employee without giving him an opportunity for tendering an explanation in writing and cross -examining the witnesses against him, if any, and of producing evidence in defence. A dismissed employee of the Corporation had instituted a suit wherein, apart from other reliefs, he had claimed a declaration that his dismissal was null and void and he was, therefore, entitled to reinstatement with full pay and other emoluments. The suit was decreed in his favour, and upheld by the hierarchy of the appellate Courts above. The Warehousing Corporation appealed to the Supreme Court and in a very considered judgment, their Lordships laid down the law that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted but mentioned three well -recognized exceptions to this rule, namely; (1) A public servant who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute. However, whilst holding clearly that the dismissal of the employee in this case was in patent violation of Regulation 16(3) framed by the Corporation, it was observed as follows: As pointed put by us, the regulations are made under the power reserved to the Corporation, under Section 54 of the Act. No doubt they lay down the terms and conditions of relationship between the Corporation and its employees. An order made in breach of the regulations would be contrary to such terms and conditions, but would not be in breach of any statutory obligation, as was the position which this Court had to deal with in the Life Insurance Corporation's case (1964) 5 S.C.R 528 : ( : AIR 1964 S.C 847). In the instant case, a breach has been committed by the Appellant of Regulation 16(3) when passing the said order of dismissal, inasmuch as the procedure indicated therein has not been followed. The Act does not guarantee any statutory status to the Respondent, nor does it impose any obligation on the Appellant in such matters. As to whether the rules framed under Section 52 deal with any such matters, does not arise for consideration in this case as the Respondent has not placed any reliance on the rules and he has rested his case only on Regulation 16(3). It is not in dispute that, in this case, the authority who can pass an order of dismissal has passed the same. Under those circumstances, a violation of Regulation 16(3) as alleged and established in this case, can only result in the order of dismissal being held to be wrongful and, in consequence, making the Appellant liable for damages. But the said order cannot be held to be one which has not terminated the service, albeit wrongfully or which entitles the Respondent to ignore it and ask for being treated as still in service. We are not concerned with the question of damages, because no such claim has been made by the Respondent in these proceeding.;