- (1.) This order shall dispose of CR Nos.1651 of 2011 and 2009 of 2012, as the facts involved are the same in both these petitions. Both these petitions have been filed by the petitioners against the concurrent orders of eviction of the petitioners on the ground of personal necessity. The premises in dispute was House No.136, Model Town, Jalandhar, half of which was on rent with petitioner-Naveen Chander, and other half with petitioner-Chander Mohan, who are both stated to be cousins.
(2.) The case of the respondent was that he had been living in the house of his brother who had since retired and had been pressing him to vacate that house, and that his own son was of marriageable age and consequently, he required the premises in dispute for his own use. For this purpose, he filed two independent rent petitions against both the petitioners. In both the petitions, the portions in possession of the petitioners were separately described as 136L(Left) and 136R(Right) and to describe the portion in possession of each of the petitioners, reference was made to the possession of the other petitioner that is to say that in the petition filed by petitioner-Naveen Chander it was 136R and towards the north portion it was mentioned as Chander Mohan House No.136L. On the other hand, the petitioners alleged that actually the respondent was the owner of the house alleged to be in the ownership of his brother. Petitioner-Naveen Chander averred in his written statement that since the landlord had alleged that he had broken open into some other portion (which had never been rented out to him), in respect of that room he was a trespasser and, therefore, only a civil suit would lie.
(3.) In support of the claim that the premises where the respondent was staying was owned by his brother, the said brother appeared in evidence and testified that he was the owner. He has also placed on record a document which, as per learned counsel for the petitioners, was not at-all admissible in evidence. However, no evidence was led by the petitioners to the effect that the house was actually owned by the respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that once the brother of the respondent did not produce any document of title, the assertion that he was the owner could not have been held to be established. As per him, on the previous date also when he appeared as a witness, he had been asked to produce the original title deed and having not been produced the same, an adverse inference had been drawn against him. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has argued that on the subsequent date, the said brother had testified that the original conveyance deed (dated 12.3.1955) was not traceable. As per him, what had been placed on record was a certified copy of the conveyance deed. However, as per learned counsel for the petitioners, the copy had not been certified by the authority issuing it but was a photocopy which had been only certified by a Notary Public. As per him, even if the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the non-admissibility of this document has to be accepted, yet it would not advance the case of the petitioners. He has argued that while it was the positive case of the respondent that the property was owned by his brother, it was the positive case of the petitioners that it was owned by the respondent. As regards this plea, he has produced the owner who had testified that it was his house and had withstood the cross-examination, whereas no evidence was at-all produced by the petitioners that it was owned by the respondent and in these circumstances there was no error in the finding of the Courts below that the preponderance of probability lay on the side of the respondent. I find myself in agreement of the arguments raised by learned counsel for the respondent. It cannot be lost sight of that even if the evidence of ownership of the respondent was weak, there was no other evidence led to oppose this and the preponderance of probability would lie on the side of the respondent. Resultantly, the first argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that the house where the respondent was staying was owned by him cannot be accepted.;