Jitendra Chauhan, J. - (1.) This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed for quashing of FIR No.60 dated 19.3.2016, registered under Sections 353, 186, 332, 506 and 148 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Punjab Instruments (Control and Noises) Act, 1956, at Police Station Fatehgarh Sahib, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.
(2.) Vide order dated 24.08.2016, the parties were directed to appear before the learned trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate, for getting their statements recorded. In compliance thereof, report of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Fatehgarh Sahib, dated 07.09.2016, has been received, wherein, it has been noticed that "Thus, report is accordingly submitted to the effect that the parties have voluntarily entered into compromise and the same is genuine one."
(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court passed in CRM-M- 31765-2012 titled as 'Vinod @ Boda and others v. State of Haryana and another' and judgment of this Court passed in 2013(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 236 : CRM-M-31858-2012 titled as 'Ranjit Singh and another v. State of Punjab and another' . The relevant paras of Vinod's case (supra) read as under:- "Vinod @ Boda etc. have preferred petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short - the Cr.P.C.) for quashing FIR No. 13 dated 13.10.2010 registered under Sections 148, 149, 332, 353, 186 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (in short - the IPC) Police Station Titram District Kaithal (Annexure P-1) on the basis of compromise Annexure P-2. 2. Report of the trial Court has been received that parties have arrived at a compromise. 3. Learned counsel for the parties have arrived at a compromise and this Court (Jitendra Chaudhan, J.) vide order dated 8.11.2012 passed in Criminal Misc. No. M-31858 of 2012 titled as Ranjit Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr. allowed the compromise in respect of offences under Sections 353, 186, 341, 332, 427 and 34 of the IPC. Counsel for the petitioners also relied upon authority in C.W.P. No. 4964 of 2013 titled as Court on its own motion v. U.T., Chandigarh and others and allowed the compromised. 4. Learned State counsel has submitted that compromise cannot be allowed for offence under Sections 353 and 186 of the IPC, as these offences are against the State. 5. I have considered the submissions made by both the sides and have gone through the records of this case. 6. So far as the reliance of petitioners on C.W.P. No. 4964 of 2013 titled as Court on its own motion v. U.T. Chandigarh and others' case (supra) is concerned in that writ petition there was a dispute between the version given by the Head Constable on one side and Shri Rupinder Singh Khosla, Advocate on the other side and the Division Bench of this court entrusted the matter to the Registrar, Vigilance to carry out a fact finding inquiry. 7. As per report both the sides in the larger interest of the society and for maintaining harmony and strengthening the machinery of administration of justice have mutually decided not to refer the matter to the Court of law and the case was decided accordingly. It was observed in that judgment that there was no likelihood of any success and this exercise would prove to be in futility. The FIR was quashed at the threshold. 14. The doubt has been expressed by the learned Single Judge whether in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise entered between the parties where the offence is against the public servant can be quashed or not by the High Court is the issue before us. 15. The magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court with a view to prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice, is wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation to a non-compoundable offences including the ones involved in the present case notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 CrPC. Such a power, in our considered view, is exercisable by the High Court in all those circumstances where the conclusion of trial would ultimately result into futility.";