MAHESH GROVER,J - (1.) THE petitioner has impugned order dated 24.5.2006 by which its application for adjourning the appeal directed against order dated 30.7.2005 passed by Rent Controller, Faridabad, sine die, was declined by the Appellate Authority, Faridabad.
(2.) BRIEFLY stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner alleged that it was in possession of industrial plot No. 172, Sector 25, Faridabad and was carrying on its business activities from there. The case of the petitioner was that it was put in possession of the suit property pursuant to an agreement to sell of the said plot executed between it and the respondent for a total sale consideration of Rs. 20,80,000/-. A sum of Rs. 80,000/- was said to have been paid vide cheque No. 2948903 dated 19.12.1989 drawn on Canara Bank, Main Branch, Faridabad. Annexure P1 was the agreement to sell on the basis of which the possession was said to have been given to the petitioner which is borne out from Annexure P3. The plot in question was alleged to have been mortgaged with the Canara Bank and it was contended that the sale deed was to be executed after the mortgage had been redeemed from the bank by the respondent. Since the possession of the suit property had been delivered, a rent agreement was executed between the petitioner and the respondent primarily to address the insecurities of the latter as it was parting with the possession of the suit property. The rent agreement was executed on 1.2.1990 according to which the petitioner was to pay a sum of Rs. 6000/- per month to the respondent. It was, later on, enhanced to Rs. 7500/- per month in 1993. The Haryana Urban Development Authority (for short, 'the H.U.D.A.') authorities resumed the plot in question and according to the petitioner, it paid a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the H.U.D.A. to save the plot from resumption. Subsequently, the respondent did not redeem the mortgage with the bank and the liability of Rs. 34,05,034.80 stood against the said plot and the property was slated for auction on 16.7.1998 pursuant to the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The petitioner paid this amount and satisfied the claim of the bank. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a suit for specific performance seeking to enforce agreement dated 19.12.1989 and pleaded that it had been put in possession of the suit property pursuant to this agreement and, therefore, it was entitled to the enforcement of the same and was also entitled to protect its possession under the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The respondent, in the meanwhile, filed a petition under the provisions of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short, 'the 1973 Act') seeking eviction of the petitioner from the suit property on the ground of non-payment of rent and personal necessity. The Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the petitioner on both the counts and an appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the order of the Rent Controller, which is still pending. During the course of these proceedings, the petitioner moved an application before the Appellate Authority with a prayer that the appeal be adjourned sine die till its rights are determined in the suit for specific performance which it has filed for enforcement of the agreement to sell dated 19.12.1989. The Appellate Authority, vide the impugned order, has refused to grant this prayer of the petitioner which has resulted in the present petition.
(3.) SHRI P.K. Mutneja, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that an agreement to sell had been executed on 19.12.1989 and on the basis of this agreement, the petitioner was put in possession which is borne out from Annexure P3, a letter written to the respondent on 14.11.1990. He further contended that the petitioner had been put in possession of the suit property pursuant to this agreement to sell on 15.1.1990 and thereafter, it retrieved the suit property from the clutches of resumption by paying the amount due to the H.U.D.A. and subsequently, it also satisfied the decree in favour of the bank by paying an amount of more than Rs. 34,00,000/-. Shri Mutneja submitted that in view of the above, the agreement to sell had been performed in part and the petitioner had been put in possession of the suit property. He also submitted that the petitioner had paid more than the amount of sale consideration. Learned counsel contended that in the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the petitioner had denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant since the agreement to sell had been executed and had been duly acted upon and, therefore, it was entitled to the protection of Section 53-A of the Act. Shri Mutneja argued that the proceedings under the 1973 Act were misconceived and, therefore, the appeal itself should have been adjourned sine die so as to await the outcome of the suit for specific performance which is likely to determine the status of the petitioner as it had paid the amount more than the sale consideration by satisfying the bank decree and also because it had been put in possession pursuant to the agreement to sell. In support of his arguments, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments reported as R. Kanthimathi and another v. Beatrice Xavier (Mrs.), (2000)9 SCC 339; Manoj Kumar v. Bihari Lal (dead) by Lrs., 2001(1) RCR(Rent) 567 : (2001)4 SCC 655; Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by Lrs. and others, 2002(1) RCR(Rent) 302 : (2002)3 SCC 676; Ashish Kumar Das and another v. Rekha Mukherjee, 2005(3) SCC 442 and Huvappa Irappa Ballari v. Basava and another, (2005)12 SCC 164.;