MAHESH GROVER,J - (1.) IN the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a challenge has been made to the acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondent-State by invoking the urgency provisions as contained in Section 17(2)(c) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (for short, 'the Act').
(2.) A notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 5.12.2005 and a huge chunk of land measuring 8129 kanals and 3 marlas (1016 acres, 1 kanal and 3 marlas) was sought to be acquired for a public purpose, namely, "Industrial, recreational, and other public utility services and to develop an integrated Industrial Complex in a planned manner and for extension of Industrial Development Centre, Bawal, by Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited in Jaliawas, Asalwas, Suthani, Karnawas, Suthana, Chirhara, Banipur, Bawal, Fatuhera, Tehsil Bawal, District Rewari. The above notification was followed by another notification dated 13.3.2006 issued under Section 6 of the Act. The petitioners, who claim to be the owner in possession of some of the acquired land, have challenged the aforementioned notifications on the ground that they are having shops in the area owned by them which are depicted from the photographs on record and that the notifications do not disclose any such urgency which would warrant the dispensing of hearing of objections under Section 5-A of the Act.
(3.) SHRI Arun Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the very fact that notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 5.12.2005 and the notification under Section 6 of the Act had been issued on 13.3.2006, i.e. after more than three months shows no urgency which is also borne out from the purpose of the acquisition. Shri Jain urged that the inordinate delay in between the issuance of two notifications should be taken as a reflection of the fact that there is no urgency to acquire the land in question and that the provisions of Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act have been invoked in a mala fide manner. He contended that the right to file objections is akin to a fundamental right and cannot be taken away and interfered with lightly. Learned counsel submitted that since the action of the State has resulted in depriving the petitioners of an opportunity to file objections, the impugned notifications may be quashed. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as 2004(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 178 - wherein it was held as under :- "27. In Om Parkash and another v. State of U.P. and others, 1998(6) S.C.C. 1 referring to State of Punjab v. Gurdiyal Singh (supra), this court in para 21 has observed that 'according to the said decision, inquiry under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has a flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution though right to property has no longer remained a fundamental right, at least observations regarding Article 14 vis-a-vis Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act would remain apposite.' In the present appeals, the appellants have not been able to show before the High Court any relevant material available to the State authorities at the time when they issued the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and dispensed with Section 5-A inquiry taking aid of Section 17(4) of the Act. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Narain Govind Gavate and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1977(1) S.C.C. 133 has expressed that Section 17(4) cannot be read in isolation from Sections 4(1) and 5-A of the Act and has expressed that having regard to the possible objections that may be taken by the land owners challenging the public purpose, normally there will be little difficulty in completing inquiries under Section 5-A of the Act very expeditiously. In the same judgment, it is also stated that 'that mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5-A which has to be considered." ;