P.S. Patwalia, J. - (1.) The present revision petition has been filed against the order passed by the learned District Judge, Karnal whereby the appeal filed by the unsuccessful defendants was dismissed on the ground of delay of 132 days.
(2.) A civil suit was filed by the respondent-Bank against the petitioners for recovery of Rs. 3,71,149/- along with interest. The suit was decreed by the trial Court on 14.6.2004. The petitioners contend that out of the petitioners, petitioner No. 1 was the one who was actually prosecuting the suit and was also to file the appeal. However, he fell ill. As a result of this he could not apply for certified copy of the judgment and decree. The certified copy was applied on 9.10.2004. It was prepared of 13.10.2004 and the appeal ways filed on 24.12.2004. On account of this, the delay of 132 days has occurred in filing the appeal. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioner had remained under treatment and hence could not file the appeal in time. As against this, the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondent-Bank is that a perusal of the application would show that the same is devoid of material particulars. He further contends that after 14.6.2004 petitioner defendants have not given any explanation as to why certified copy was not applied for. Still further it was contended that even if the limitation is calculated from the date the certified copy was obtained, still the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation. It is therefore contended that in this case there is no justification to condone the delay. Though a perusal of the facts would show that the petitioners have not explained every single day's delay in filing the appeal, however, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353, that the Courts should be liberal in condoning the delay. Each day's delay is not necessary to be explained. Endeavour should be made by the Courts to see that the matters are decided on merits and that relief to a party is not to be refused on technical grounds. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as hereunder: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that : 1.Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected nor on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal...."
(3.) In the present case, the suit for recovery has been filed by the respondent-Bank. Therefore, I am of the opinion that it would serve the interest of justice if the petitioners are granted opportunity to contest their appeal on merits. I therefore set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge dated 14.3.2005 dismissing the appeal of the petitioners on the ground of delay. The delay is condoned. Let the appeal now be heard and decided on merits.;