H.S.BHALLA,J - (1.) THIS is a petition under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short, 'the Act') for setting aside the orders passed by the Rent Controller, Ropar and the appellate authority.
(2.) THE other facts required to be noticed for the disposal of this petition are that Bimla Devi (hereinafter referred to as 'the landlady') filed an ejectment petition against Rattan Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'the tenant') in the Court of Rent Controller, Ropar. After framing necessary issues and assessment of the evidence on record, the Rent Controller dismissed the petition on 29.1.1981 in respect of the plot in question on the ground of non-payment of rent and change of user. Aggrieved against this order, landlady tried her luck before the appellate authority, Ropar but she could not succeed and her appeal was dismissed on 9.2.1982. She had no other option but to knock the door of this Court. I have heard learned counsel on either side and have gone through the record. Before dealing with the arguments of the learned counsel, I deem it appropriate to observe at this stage that it is well settled that this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act would not interfere in the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below unless the findings are sought to be perverse or it is concluded that a reasonable person on the basis of the evidence available would not record such a finding. In this regard reliance can be placed on Amar Nath Sugan Chand v. Lal Chand Bansal, 1994(1) RCR(Rent) 638 : 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 369, wherein it has been held that revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act could be exercised if this Court is not satisfied with the legality and propriety of the order challenged in the revision petition. If the case of the landlord is not found to be genuine, real, honest and sincere in that case alone, such a finding could be interfered with. In this regard reliance could be placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2003(1) RCR(Rent) 42 : (2003-1) 133 P.L.R. 371 (S.C.). In the aforementioned judgment, the Supreme Court has followed the earlier judgments in the cases of Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, 1988(1) RCR(Rent) 625 : (1988-2)94 P.L.R. 478 (S.C.); Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra, 1991(2) RCR(Rent) 453 : 1991(3) S.C.C. 483; Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmad Khan, 1979(1) S.C.C. 27 and Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999(2) RCR(Rent) 141 : 1996(6) S.C.C. 222. The view of the Supreme Court on the provisions of Section 15(5) of the Act as expressed in Atma S. Berar's case (supra), are discernible from paras 13 and 14 which read as under : "13. Simply because a different Judge of Court of facts could have been persuaded to change opinion and draw a different inference from set of facts is not the (sic) Section 15 of the Act, is to enable it satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of an order made by the Controller or the proceedings before him. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1998-2)94 P.L.R. 478 (S.C.) (supra), it was held that nature and scope of revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court shall have to be determined on the language of the statute investing the jurisdiction. In Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishan, 1996(5) S.C.C. 353, a three-Judge Bench held that the revisional power referable to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is not as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the C.P.C. and it is also not so wide as an appellate power. Having kept the legal principles in view and on an objective determination and on a proper appreciation of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances a conclusion as to the need of the demised premises for user by the landlord and his bona fides shall not be liable to be interfered with in exercise of revision power. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1996(6) S.C.C. 222 (supra). This Court made a comparative study of the provisions contained in Section 115 C.P.C. in juxtaposition with Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Act and held that the High Court cannot appreciate or reappreciate evidence dictated by its mere inclination to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. A conclusion arrived at which is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as betray a lack of reason an/or objectivity would render the finding "not according to law" calling for an interference under Section 25-B(8) proviso by the High Court. Modigonda Chanda Mouli Sastry v. Bhimanepalli Bikshaklu, (1999)7 S.C.C. 66 and Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal, 2001(1) RCR(Rent) 168 : (2001-2) 28 P.L.R. 426 (S.C.) : (2001)1 S.C.C. 762 take the same view. The Scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act is similar, that is confined to testing the legality or propriety of order or proceedings of the Controller."
(3.) IN view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court, the question which requires determination is whether the findings recorded by the Courts below are legal and proper as this Court has to satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of such findings within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act. Now, at this stage, I would like to peep through the record of the lower Courts and I find that the landlady has not pleaded specifically in the eviction application, the purpose for which the land in question was rented out to the tenant nor the rent dated 18.1.1965 was proved by her. The respondent has categorically admitted during the course of the cross- examination that he had taken this site on rent for running "tall" for fuel wood but this fact is of no help to the landlady when she has failed to prove her case with regard to change of user of the land in question by the tenant. I find that the landlady sought to prove that this land was let out to the respondent for sale of fuel wood whereas tenant has constructed therein rooms and set up his residence therein and in order to prove this fact she has examined Sh. Ajit Singh Mavi, Advocate, Local Commissioner and Ashok Kumar, AW-4 apart from giving her own statement whereas respondent has led evidence to the fact that for the last 24 years, he is running "tall" in the land in question. The respondent has categorically denied that he has not set up residence on the plot in question and in fact residing in House No. 2847, Nehru Nagar Mohalla. Learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority after assessing the evidence on record and applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case concluded that the land in question is being used by the tenant for the commercial purposes and that he has not been using the same for a purpose other than for which it was let out to him. It is settled law that the Court cannot reappraise the evidence to reverse finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court and moreover the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act does not act a Regular Third Appellate Court and can interfere only within the scope of the Sub-Section. The High Court cannot re-examine the evidence on record to reverse the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts. In Parveen Kumar and others v. Suresh Chand and others, 2001 AIR SCW 4779, the Supreme Court has observed that in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere only if the trial Court is shown to have committed any jurisdictional error or it is shown that its jurisdiction would have resulted into manifest injustice. After going through the records, I find that the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are supportable on the evidence on record and they are based on proper acquisition of evidence and cannot be interfered by this Court.;