R.S.Narula, M.L.Verma, J. - (1.) IN this appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the appellants writ petition on the short ground that no manifest injustice has resulted to him by the impugned order, a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Harbans Singh Gujral, the Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, that the appeal is barred by time and should be dismissed as such The judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced on February 21, 1969. This appeal when filed on March 26, 1969, complete in all respects except that it was not accompanied by three spare copies of the paper -book was admittedly within time. It was returned by the Deputy Registrar to the counsel for the appellant on April, 1969, for being refiled within a week alongwith three sets of the entire paper -book. It was then refiled by the appellant on May 15, 1969, alongwith the requisite three sets of paper book. The appeal was again returned on June 1, 1969 for being refiled within a week after explaining the delay for refiling the case. It was then resubmitted on June 21, 1969, with the endorsement of the counsel for the appellant, dated June 12, 1969, to the effect that his client could not be contented, and, therefore, the delay may be condoned. The office did not press the objection any further and laid the case before the Motion Bench (Harbans Singh, C.J., as he than was, and Sandhawalia, J.) on July 28, 1969, when the appeal was admitted. The objection of Mr. Gujral is based on the Full Bench judgment of this Court, dated September, 1, 1972, in Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Mahant Lachhman Dass Mahant, Amritsar v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Punjab, Chandigarh and others,, 1974 P.L.R. 451, wherein it has been held that an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent which is not accompanied by three typed copies of the paper -book required under rules 2 and 3 of Chapter 2 C of Volume V of the High Court Rules and Orders is no appeal in the eye of law, and should be deemed to have been filed for the first time on the date on which the requirement of filing three spare paper -books is complied with. It is further emphasised by the counsel that the maximum extension of time for refiling the papers which are incomplete in any respect that could be allowed by the Deputy Registrar was 40 days, and inasmuch as the appellant did not refile the appeal within 40 days from April 1, 1969, that is by May 1, 1969, but actually refiled it on May 15, 1969, the Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and the same should be deemed never to have been filed. Mr. Harnam Singh Wasu, the Learned Counsel for the appellant, has on the ether hand relied on the later Full Bench judgment of this Court in Amar Rath etc v. Mul Raj etc., Letters Patent Appeal No. 397 of 1971, decided on January 27, 1975, wherein the following question has been answered by the Full Bench in the affirmative : - - Whether the mere fact that according to the particular practice prevailing in the High Court before the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Mahant Bikrem Dass Chela Mahant Lachhman Dass Mahant, Amritsar (supra), Letters Patent Appeals were entertained by the office contrary to the requirements of rule 3 of Chapter 2 -C of Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the High Court without being accompanied by three sets of spare paper -books and time was allowed to file the same, and on filing the copies even beyond the expiry of the period of limitation the appeals were entertained and admitted, does or does not in law constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the Letter Patent Appeals which were filed before the judgment of the Full Bench. Since this appeal was filed prior to the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Mahant Lachhman Dass Mahant, Amritsar, and counsel for the appellant says that he was misled by the practice which was prevalent in 1969 in this respect, this case appears to fall within the dictum of the later Full Bench in Amar Nath's case (supra). We, therefore, condone the delay in refiling of the appeal and proceed to decide the same on merits.
(2.) THE solitary question which called for decision in the writ petition of the appellant on its merits was whether the order of Shri Prem Kumar, Director Rehabilitation (Rural, dated January 27. 1955 (Annexure 'B' to the writ petition), directing reallotment of the whole village (Nahianwala, District Bhatinda) was within his inherent jurisdiction or not. The claim of the appellant is that sub -rule (6) of rule 14 of the Administration of the Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950 (as amended by the Central Government on July 22, 1952, and February 13, 1953) absolutely barred the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act, 1930, to cancel the quasi -permanent allotment which had been made in favour of the appellant in 1950. In fact the petition of the appellant for revision of the order of Shri Prem Kumar had been allowed on June 7, 1956, on this short ground by the order of Shri Tara Chand Aggarwal, Deputy Custodian General (Annexure 'C'). Since, however, the property had passed out of the evacuee pool to the compensation pool by operation of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, before Shri Tara Chand Aggarwal decided the matter, the order of Shri Aggarwal was held to be without jurisdiction, and was quashed by the order of a learned Single Judge of the Court (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Kirpal Singh v. The Deputy Custodian General, etc., Civil Writ 325 of 1956, on April 21, 1961 (Annexure 'D') and the present appellants L.P.A. 133 of 1961 against the order of Shamsher Bahadur, J. was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court (G.D. Khosla and A.N. Grover, JJ.) on August 10, 1961 (Annexure 'E' to the writ petition) and the present appellant's S.C.A. 9 of 1961, and his petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also dismissed by this Court, and by the Supreme Court on March 2, 1965, and April 16, 1965, respectively, appellant was left with no option but to file writ petition Civil Writ 1180 of 1965) on April 29, 1965, from the dismissal of which the present appeal has arisen. Before the learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition a preliminary objection was taken to the effect that the appellant's petition should be dismissed on the short ground that no manifest injustice had been done to him without going into the merits of the controversy. For holding that no manifest injustice had been done to the appellant, the learned Single Judge has relied on the observations of Prem Kumar in the impugned order Annexure 'B' and subsequent observations of Shamsher Bahadur, J. and the L.P.A. Bench based on and derived from the impugned order of Prem Kumar. If Prem Kumar lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass the impugned order (Annexure 'B') on January 27, 1955, the said order has to be treated as non est and nothing stated therein can be read or relied upon for any purpose so as to affect the rights of the present appellant. In the view of the matter it appears to us that the learned Single Judge should have first decided the purely legal question as to whether the order (Annexure 'B') was or was not wholly without jurisdiction. If the learned Judge came to that conclusion, it could not in view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the judgments of this Court herein below referred to, be held that no manifest injustice has been done to the appellant as the deprivation of a person of his property contrary to law must necessarily result in manifest injustice : - - (i) Joginder Singh and others v. The Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property and others,, 1961 P.L.R. 735, read with the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court, dated March 26, 1952, in the same appeal ; (ii) S)ed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, : AIR, 1964 SC 477 ; (iii) S. Gurdial Singh v. Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Ferozepore and others,, 1973 P.L.J. 659 ; and (iv) Messrs Naunihal Thakar Dass v. Appellate Officer and others, Letters Patent Appeal 392 of 1963, decided on September 6, 1966, by Mehar Singh, C.J. and Mahajan, J.
(3.) IN Joginder Singh's case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed his appeal on May, 1961, on the short ground that the Custodian of Evacuee Property in the State of Punjab or the Custodian General hearing the appeal from an order made by the Custodian after July 22, 1952, has no power to cancel an allotment of rural evacuee property on a quasi -permanent basis except on the grounds set out in rule 14 (6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950, as amended on July 22, 1952 (that is the precise question which has been raised by the appellant in his present litigation before this Court). After the decision of the Supreme Court an application was made by some of the respondents in that appeal for a review of the order of their Lordships. The first ground urged was that the writ jurisdiction should not be exercised unless there has been manifest injustice, and it was sought to be shown that on the facts of that case no injustice had been done to Joginder Singh and others. That argument was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following words: - - As regards the fist point, it raises a general question. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is wide and the High Court and a fortiori this Court, while hearing an appeal from the High Court's decision, is entitled to exercise it where it finds that an inferior tribunal has acted beyond its jurisdiction. Where an inferior tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction its action necessarily results in injustice to the party against whom action has been taken. For, justice has to be done according to law.;