R.S. Narula, C.J. - (1.) THOUGH the facts leading to the filing of this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court allowing the writ petition of the present Appellants and granting them substantial relief are rather complicated, the ultimate question that calls for decision in this appeal is simple. The facts may first be surveyed. The Appellants are the employees of the Bhakra Management Board Respondent No. 2 (hereinafter called the Board). An order of retrenchment of the Appellants was passed by the Board in January 18, 1968 The workers objected to the order on the ground that it had been passed without taking permission requisite under Section 33(sic) of the Industrial Disputes Act as certain disputes between the workers of the Board were pending before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. As soon as that objection was taken, the Board cancelled the order, dated January 18, 1968, and applied to the appropriate authority for permission to retrench the Appellants. A sitting was held by the Assistant Labour Commission on March 18 1968, in that connection and some discussion also took place, but no decision was given. At that stage on April 10, 1968, a fresh order of retrenchment of the Appellants was passed by the Board. On April 11, 1968. the workers union of the Appellants complained to the Assistant Labour Commissioner against the order of retrenchment. On April 22, 1968, that officer issued notices of hearing of the objections to both the sides that is to the Secretary of the Appellants' workers' union as well as to the Board for April 30, 1968. Whereas notice was served on the Board well within time, the notice issued to the workers' union was served on its Secretary on May 1, 1968, that is a day after that fixed for hearing the objections. In spite of the fact that notice of hearing on April 30, 1968, had not been served on the Secretary of the Appellants' union within time, the Assistant Labour Commissioner proceeded to decide the matter ex -parts against the workers on April 30, l968. He granted permission to the Management to retrench the Appellants. Having obtained the ex -parte permission, the Board issued notices of retrenchment to the Appellants effective from May 1, 1968. which would have resulted in their actual retrenchment on May 31, 1968 that is after one month of the service of the notice. Before the expiry of the period of the notices of retrenchment and before their actual retrenchment, the Appellants on May 28, 1968, filed Civil Writ Petition 1810 of 1968, challenging the ex -parte order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner granting to the Board permission to retrench them. At the time of admitting the writ petition on July 29, 1968, the Motion Bench of this Court did not grant any order staving operation of this retrenchment notices relief in that respect had been asked for. Ultimately by judgment, dated October 8, 1969, the learned Single Judge of this Court allowed Civil Writ Petition 180(sic) of 1968, quashing the order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, dated April 30, 1968, and directing the said officer to hear and redecide the matter. In pursuance of the order of remand passed by the High Court, the Assistant Labour Commissioner passed a fresh order on March 17, 1970. This time he held that no permission was necessary to be taken by the Board for retrenching the Appellants. It was to impugned and quash the above -said order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, dated March 17, 1970, that the petition from which this appeal has arisen (that is Civil Writ Petition 2974 of 1970) was filed by the Appellants on September 16, 1970. The writ petition was contested by the State as well as by the Board. During the tendency of the writ petition on October 3, 1972, the Appellants filed Civil Miscellaneous 7326 of 1972 for leave to amend the writ petition so as to take up an additional ground in support of their claim. The additional ground which was sought to be taken up was that th order of retrenchment passed by the Board was in any case illegal as the said order had been passed without complying with the mandatory requirement of Section 25 -F of the Industrial Disputes Act, that is without paying to the Appellants retrenchment compensation to which they were entitled under the law.
(2.) NOTICE of the application, dated October 3, 1972, was ordered by the learned Single Judge on October 4, 1972, to issue to the counsel for the Board as well as to the Advocate General for the State of Punjab for October 9, 1972. Ultimately by order, dated October 13, 1972, the amendment prayed for by the Appellants was allowed. In pursuance of the permission granted by the Court, the amended petition taking up the additional ground was filed by the Appellants on October 18, 1972. After the filing of the amended petition and before the final hearing of the petition, the Board took back Appellant No. 3 into its service on Appellant No. 3 agreeing not to claim back wages. This is so stated in paragraph 2 of the affidavit of the Executive Engineer of the Board, dated November 10, 1972. On the other hand Harbhajan Singh Appellant No. 1 accepted the retrenchment compensation which was due to him and was offered to him. There is nothing to show that retrenchment compensation was ever offered to Kartar Chand Appellant No. 2 but it is stated in the same affidavit of the Executive Engineer of the Board that he was offered re -employment on his producing the discharge certificate, but that he could not be actually reemployed as he failed to produce the requisite certificate The writ petition was ultimately disposed of on November 25, 1972, by Tuli, J. It was conceded before him that the order retrenching the Appellants from service was illegal on account of non -compliance with the requirement of Section 25 -F in view of the authoritative pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay v. The Hospital Majdoor Sabha : A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 610, and Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. Outgoing Management of Subong Tea Estate : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 420. The learned Judge, therefore, allowed the petition, set aside the order of retrenchment of the Appellants and directed their reinstatement with continuity of service, benefits of seniority and in remnant , but without any liability to pay back wages from June 1, 1968, to the date on which each of them actually joined the duty No decision was given by the learned Judge on the initial question of validity of the order dated March 17, 1970 whereby the Assistant Labour Commissioner had held that his permission was not necessary for retrenching the Appellants. The first argument that was advanced before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the Board for disallowing back -wages was that the only ground on which the writ petition was being allowed had not been taken up by the Appellants in their earlier petition, i.e , Civil Writ 1810 of 1968, and this barred the Appellants from claiming the said relief on the principles of constructive res judicata No decision was, however, recorded on that plea of the Board. The claims for back wages was disallowed in the following words: - It is further submitted that if this plea had been then taken (plea under Section 25 -F of the Industrial Disputes Act), Respondent No. 2 the (the Board) would have immediately taken back the Petitioners into service without any further ado, and in this matter they would not have become liable to pay back -wages, to the Petitioners without getting any work from them. I find considerable force in this submission.
(3.) THE Petitioners have prayed for reinstatement with continuity of service. They have not specifically asked for back wages. Besides the above -mentioned two grounds which appears to have appealed to the learned Single Judge, his decision also appears to have been influenced by the offer made by the Board at the stage of the final hearing of the writ petition to reinstate the Appellants with continuity of service and to give them their seniority and increments but not the back wages from the date of retrenchment to the date of reinstatement. It is this part of the judgment denying back wages to the Appellants that has been appealed against by them before us. , It is not worthy that the offer that had been made by the Board before the learned Single Judge was addressed to the Court and not to the Appellants, and that it is nobody's case that the Appellants ever accepted such an offer or that the order of the learned Single Judge was based on any express or implied agreement or understanding.;