R.S. Narula, J. - (1.) THE facts giving rise to this petition for revision of the order of Mr. B.S. Yadav. Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 49) (hereinafter called the Act). Karnal, dated October 15, 170, are brief and are not in dispute. The application made by the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the landlords) for the eviction of Des Raj (now represented in the present proceedings by his legal representatives) under section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was allowed by the order of the Rent Controller, dated August 2, 1965, on the basis of a compromise. The consent decree passed by the Rent Controller was in the following terms: - - In view of the statement of parties, respondent is directed to hand over the possession of the premises in dispute to the applicant by 31st August, 1965, and the applicant shall within three months and on 31st December 1965, band over the possession to the respondent after reconstructing. If the respondent does not deliver the possession on 31 August, 1965, then an order of ejectment shall be deemed to have been passed against the respondent. If the applicants do not deliver possession on or before 1st December, 1965 as agreed, then respondent will be entitled to take possession through court. The application is decided accordingly. Des Raj (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) handed over possession of the shop in question within the stipulated period, that is before August 31, 1956. The landlords reconstructed the shop, but did not hand over possession of the same to the tenant, and thus backed out of the agreement arrived at by them with the tenant on which the approval and said of the Rent Controller had been affixed. The tenant there upon made an application for restoration of possession of the newly construed I shop in pursuance of the agreement incorporated in the consent decree passed by the Rent Controller. He labeled that application as being under sub -section (4) of section 13 of the Act. The relevant part of sub -section (4) of section 13 is in the following words: - - Where a landlord who has obtained possession of a building Under sub -paragraph (iii) of the aforesaid paragraph (a) puts that building to any use or lets it out to any tenant other than the tenant evicted from it, the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of such building or rented land and the Controller shall make an order accordingly.
(2.) THE application of the tenant was allowed by the order of Shri V.K. Jain. Rent Controller, Kaithal, dated April 30, 1970. The landlords appeal against that order was, however accepted by the order of the learned Appellate Authority already referred to on the short ground that in view of the earlier judgments of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Nathu Ram v. Ram Partap, A.I.R. 1951 (P&H) 432 and in Nanki Devi v. Ram Kishan Das : A.I.R. 1953 P&H 51, the Rent Controller could not allow the application of the tenant under section 13(4) of the Act as that part of the Rent Controller's order which directed restoration of possession to the tenant after the reconstruction of the shop was without jurisdiction. The tenant died during the pendency of this revision petition. On an application made by his legal representatives for being brought on the record of this petition, objection was raised by Mr. Jain to the effect that the alleged right of the tenant -petitioner to obtain back possession of the premises in dispute from his client had died with him (with the tenant) as the tenancy of the premises was not heritable, but was merely statutory one. By my order of date, however, I allowed that application in the following terms: - - The application is allowed without prejudice to the objection of the landlord -respondents. The legal representatives of the tenant -petitioner are brought on record only for the purpose of prosecuting this petition for revision without implying in any manner as to whether the original tenancy of their predecessor -in -interest was or was not heritable, and if so, what would have been its effect ? The costs of this application shall abide the result of the revision petition.
(3.) AT the hearing of the main petition Mr. Manmohan lal Sarin, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the solitary ground on which the Appellate Authority accepted the appeal of the landlords does not hold the field in view of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court (D. Falshaw and S.S. Dulat JJ., as they then were) in Mst Parbati v. Jagmandar Dass and another, I.L.R. 1961 (2) P&H 146. The learned Judges of the Division Bench expressly over -ruled the view taken by J.L. Kapur J. in Nathu Ram's case (supra) and in Nanki Devi's case (supra) and held that the words "puts that building to any use or lets it out to any tenant Other than the tenant evicted from it" in sub section (4) of section 13 of the Act would apply equally to a case where a landlord does or does not carry not the proposed reconstruction on account of which the consent of the tenant to vacate the premises was obtained. It was laid down on that basis that a compromise between the landlord and the tenant to the effect that the landlord would reconstruct the shop to be vacated by the tenant within a specified period, and restore possession of the rebuilt shop to the tenant is enforceable in execution of the decree passed on the basis of that compromise. The order was allowed to be executed in that case also an application which had been made and labelled by the tenant as the one under sub section (4) of section 13 of the Act. The only reply which Mr. Jain, Learned Counsel for the landlords, has been able to give to this argument of Mr. Sarin is that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mst. Parbati's case (supra) is not correct and needs reconsideration. I do not agree with the Learned Counsel on that point Not only am I bound by the judgment of the Division Bench in Mst. Parbati's case but I am firmly of the view that it lays down the correct law. To hold otherwise would be to lay a trap for the tenant. No Court of law or equity would allow a landlord to take undue advantage of one part of a compromise by backing out of the other which confers some benefit on the opposite party, unless there is a statutory provision compelling a Court to adopt such course. There is no such provision in this case. Even if it could be held that the language of sub section (4) of section 13 does not strictly cover a case of the present type (which was also the situation in Mst. Parbati's case as well as in the earlier two cases decided by a Single Judge) the application would be maintainable under sections 144 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restore the tenant to the status quo ante from which he was made to move to his disadvantage on a representation made by the landlords which formed the subject matter of a binding decree. From whatever angle, therefore, the matter is considered, I think there is no escape from allowing this petition and setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority, and restoring therefor the decision and direction of the Kent Controller. I order accordingly.;