JUDGEMENT
S.S.Sidhu, J. -
(1.) RAM Sarup was convicted under section 354, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo one year's rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 101/ -, or in default of payment of fine to further undergo two months' rigorous imprisonment by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jind (Shri B.P. Jindal) vide his judgment dared December 29, 1972. An appeal preferred against that judgment by Ram Sarup was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jind (Shri V.P. Aggarwal) vide his judgment dated March 24, 1973. Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgments of the Courts below, Ram Sarup has come up in revision to this Court.
The facts of the case may, briefly, be stated as follows : - -
Shrimati Sunehn (P.W. 1) was married with Om Parkasn Harijan of village Rajana. She came to her parents village Pauli as her husband was in Military service and her father in -law and mother -in -law had already died Her father had also died and, therefore, she had come to village Dauli to see her mother who was residing in the house of Harphul, the brother of her husband.
On January 26, 1971, Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. ) went to the house of Ram Sarup petitioner forgetting Lassi. At that time, the wife of Ram Sarup told her that as she was to go to her parents' house on that day and that on the following day, she should come there and clean her house (as she was a sweepers ) and remove the cow dung etc., lying there, on that day. As arranged. Shrimati Sunehri went to the house of the petitioner on January 27, 1971. She had already removed one Bathal of cow dung when Ram Sarup petition came there and sent away Sat Pal (P.W. 4) brother of Shrimati Sunehri aged 9 years, who had come along with her, on the pretext that he should bring Bidi for him from the shop of Jiwan. After the departure of Sat Pal, he shut the door of his house, caught hold of Shrimati Sunehri by the arm, dragged her with the intention of outraging her modesty, felled her down on the ground forcibly, broke the Nara of the Salwar of Shrimati Sunehri and attempted to commit rape on her. She gave a tooth -bite on the hand of the petitioner in order to escape from the clutches of Ram Sarup and also raised an alarm Hukmi (P.W. 2), on hearing the alarm was attracted to the place of occurrence. He gave a push to the door of the house of the petitioner and entered that house. At that time, he found that Ram Sirup petitioner had thrown Shrimati Sunehri on the ground and was trying to molest her. On seeing Hukmi coming Ram Sarup runaway . Immediately thereafter, Sat Pal (P.W. 4) also came there. Shrimati Sunehri was weeping at that time. She was taken to her aunt Shrimati Mangti (P.W. 3) by Hukmi (P.W. 2). Shnmati Sunehri told Shrimati Mangti (P.W. 3) about the whole incident. On that date Harphul, husband of Shrimati Mangti, was away from the village and, therefore, the report was lodged with the police on the next day by Shrimati Sunehri, after Harphui had returned home.
After the close of the prosecution evidence, when Ram Sarup petitioner was examined under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, he, in his said statement, denied the prosecution allegations and pleaded that a false case was made out against him and that the prosecution -witnesses were deposing falsely against him because of their enmity with him and their interestedness in the prosecutrix Shrimati Sunchri. Ram Sarup petitioner then produced Sahi Ram Panch (P.W. 1) in his defence Conviction and sentence were imposed on Ram Sarup petitioner on the basis of the evidence of the prosecutrix Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. 1) her cousin brother Hukmi (P.W. 2), her real brother Sat Pal, aged 9 years, (P.W. 4), and her aunt Shrimati Mangti (P.W. 3). The same were maintained by the appellate Court also, as it was of the view that the evidence of the aforesaid prosecution -witnesses, excepting that of Hukmi (P.W. 2), who was a Waj -Takkar, witness, was sufficient to sustain them.
It has been vehemently argued by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that even the evidence of Shrimati Sunehri, Sat Pal and Shrimati Mangti (P. Ws) suffers from certain infirmities and, therefore, the same is hardly sufficient to sustain the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. I find a good deal of force in that argument.
Shrimati Sunshri prosecutrix (P.W. 1) in her examination -in -chief supported the prosecution story, as has been stated above, while giving the facts of the case. However, her cross -examination was deferred as the defence counsel was not available, at that time. But before she could be cross -examined and re -examined, she died with the result that her statement remained incomplete. The question which has to be determined is whether the statement of Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. ) as contained only in her examination -in -chief, is admissible in evidence or not, when no opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross -examine her, or to the prosecution to re -examine her With regard to this question, the trial court gave the answer in the affirmative. In this connection, that Court relied upon, A.I.R. 1947 Pat 384 and observed as under : - -
In the said ruling it was held that where the witness dies after examination -in -chief and before cross -examination, his evidence is admissible but the degree of weight to be attached to it depends on the circumstances of the case.
In view of that ruling, the trial Court found that - -
No doubt that the statement of the prosecutrix cannot be given that weight, which should have been given to it, if she had gone through the ordeal of cross -examination. But the question to be seen is as to whether from the circumstance surrounding the prosecution story, and besides the statement of Sunehri, sufficient reliable evidence is on the file to bring home guilt to the accused.
Thus, relying upon an incomplete statement of Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. 1), and evidence of Hukmi, Sat Pal and Shrimati Mangti (P.Ws), the trial Court found the petitioner guilty. Accordingly, it convicted and sentenced him as already stated above. The appellate Court also relied upon that very ruling and holding that an incomplete statement of Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. ) was admissible in evidence, found that the same, which got corroboration from the statements of prosecution -witnesses, Shrimati Mangti and Sat Pal, was sufficient to bring the charge home to the petitioner. However, with regard to Hukmi (P.W. ), the appellate Court observed that no reliance could be placed on his statement as he was a Waj -Takkar witness and was cousin brother of Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. ) In my opinion, both the courts below made a wrong approach while appreciating the evidence of the aforesaid production -witnesses and took erroneous view of the same. I have made efforts to locate the ruling cited as, A.I.R. 1947 Pat 384, in the judgments of both the Courts he below, but I have not been able to lay hands upon any such ruling which to my mind, is not in existence at all.
It is really surprising that wrong citation of that ruling, made by the trial Court did not one to the notice even of the appellate Court. On the other hand that Court also relied upon that very ruling Thus, both the Courts below commuted mistake by making use of wrong cited ruling I may further point oat that in, A.I.R. 1947 Pat, there is, only one ruling under section 32(3), Indian Evidence Act, which is at page 90, and the same was given in Achhay Lal Singh and others versus Emperor : A.I.R. 1947 Pat 90. In fact, that ruling, too, is not applicable in the present case. 1 hope that in future the Courts below shall be very careful while citing rulings in their judgments.
The only provision of law, on the basis of which an incomplete statement of Shrimati Sunehri prosecutrix (P.W. 1) can be held to be admissible in evidence or not, is contained in section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to this section, evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding is relevant for the purpose of proving in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding the truth of the facts which it states when the witness is dead, provided that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross -examine, and that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding. Before an incomplete statement of Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. ) can be said to be admissible in evidence, it has to satisfy all the requirements of section 33, Indian Evidence Act, as mentioned above. One of those requirements is that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross examine the witness. Now, in this case, excepting for that requirement, all other requirements of section 3, Indian Evidence Act, stand fulfilled as for as incomplete statement of Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. 1) is concerned. Accordingly, the statement of Shrimati (P.W) which has been relied and acted upon by the Courts below is not admissible in evidence. This view of mine finds support from S.C. Mitter versus The State : A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 435 : A.I.R. (37) 1950. Cal 435. In that case, a prosecution witness died before his cross -examination was completed. In those circumstances, it was held in that case as under: - -
I may also point out in this case that the second requirement of the proviso to the section which requires that an adverse party has had the right and opportunity to cross examine the witness has also not been fulfilled. Alter charge had been framed, the accused had certainly the right to cross -examine the witness. He had partial opportunity to exercise the right, but not full opportunity as the witness ceased to be available before cross -examination could be concluded.
In my opinion, what this proviso requires is that the accused must have a full opportunity of cross -examining the witness.
It was further held instant case as follows : - -
My conclusion, therefore, is that Sripati's evidence, as recorded is not admissible under section 33, Evidence Act, and must be excluded from consideration.
I, in respectful agreement with the view taken up by G.N. Das and Das Gupta JJ. in S.C. Miner's case (supra), hold that an incomplete statement of Shrimati Sunehri prosecutrix (P.W. ) is inadmissible in evidence and therefore, has to be excluded from consideration In view of this finding, the evidence of Shrimati Mangti (P.W. 3) and Sat Pal (P.W. 4) has also to be ruled out of consideration, because they have stated about those facts which, in fact, were dismissed to them by Shrimati Sunehri (P.W. 1). Hence, the evidence of 11 these three prosecution -witnesses, which formed basis for recording conviction of the petitioner by the Courts below, has no evidential value for proving the charge against the petitioner, for which he has been found guilty.
It has been submitted by the Learned Counsel for he State that, at least, evidence of Hukmi (P.W. 2) is there to prove the charge against the petitioner and, therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner are sustainable on the basis the statement of Hukmi (P.W. 2), I find no merit in the above argument. Sahi Ram (D.W. 1) has stated that he is a member panchayat and if one goes from the school of his village Pauli to the houses of Harjans, including the house of Hukmi (P.W. 2), the house of Ram Sarup petitioner does nor fall on the way. He has further added that if case goes to the house of Hukmi from the village school, by passing in front of the house of Ram Sarup, then that is a circuitous way. Even Hukmi (P.W. 2) has admitted in his cross -examination that she shortest way to his house from the school is which passes in frame of the home of Chatru etc., but he adds that he always goes to his house from the school by following the way on which the Nohra of the petitioner is situated though it is a longer route. Ordinarily Hukmi (P.W 2) was not expected to follow that longer route, which runs in front of the house of Ram Sirup petitioner, for going to his house from the school, when he was allegedly attracted to the scene of occurrence. It is also very doubtful if he had actually gone to the school to sweep the same on January 27, 1971, which happened to be a closed day or the school, on account of holiday. According to him he is nor employed as a Government servant in the school and that he had gone to sweep the verandah of the school on the asking of the people of the village, because Education Minister was to come to the school on that day. Admittedly, he is the cousin brother of Shrimati (sic) prosecutrix (P. W.). It is a matter of chance that he happened to pass in front of the house of the petitioner at the moment when Shakati Sunehri had allegedly raised an alarm on being caught by the petitioner inside his house. I, therefore, am in full agreement with the observation made by the appellate Court that much reliance could not be placed on the statement of Hukmi (P.W. ), who appeared to be a Waj -Takkar witness. Accordingly, no weight can be attached to his evidence either.
For the reasons given above, I find that the prosecution evidence produced in this case is hardly sufficient to rove the charge against the petitioner. I, therefore, set aside the finding given to the contrary on the basis of that evidence by the Courts below.
In the result, I allow this revision -petition and, setting aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, acquit him. Fine paid by the petitioner, if any, shall be refunded to him.;