Muni Lal Verma, J. - (1.) THIS revision petition is by the tenant and arose out of eviction proceedings under the circumstances, stated as under: Originally Om Parkash was owner of the property including the demised premises, hereinafter called the premises, described in para 1 of the eviction application, situate within the limits of Sonepat. He had let the premises to the Petitioner at monthly rental of Rs. 8.33 paise. He sold the aforesaid property including the premises to the Respondents on August 28, 1968. So, the Respondents became landlords of the Petitioner respecting the premises by operation of law. They (the Respondents) claimed, by making eviction application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the Court of Rent Controller, Sonepat, eviction of the Petitioner from the premises on four grounds; firstly, that he had fallen in arrears of rent with effect from August 28, 1968 and had not paid the same; secondly, that the premises had been let out for residence and the Petitioner had converted it into shop -cum -residence; thirdly, that they (the Respondents) required the premises bona fide for their residence; and fourthly, that the Petitioner had made material alterations by removing the frame of the door of the shop and fixed the same just on the roadside and thereby included the verandah into the shop. The Petitioner contested the application. He controverted the material allegations of the Respondents. He, however, paid the arrears of rent and costs therein assessed by the Rent Controller on the first date of hearing. Hence, the eviction application was tried on the following issues; (1) Whether the Respondent is liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises on the grounds alleged in the petition Opp. (2) Whether the tenancy of the Respondent has been validly terminated ? If not, its effect. Opp. (3) Whether the Petitioners are the owners of the suit premises ? Opp. (4) Relief. The ground of non -payment of rent was not pressed by the Respondents because the Petitioner had paid the arrears of rent etc., on the first date of hearing. The Rent Controller found issues No. 2 and 3 in the affirmative. He held under issue No. 1 that the Respondents failed to prove by cogent evidence that the Petitioner had been guilty of change of user or effecting material alterations by including verandah into the shop. He, however, found under issue No. 1, that the Respondents required bona fide the premises for their occupation and as a result of that finding he allowed the application and directed eviction of the Petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner carried appeal. In the appeal the ground of change of user was not pressed by the Respondents. The Appellate Authority doubted that the requirement of the premises by the Respondents for their occupation was bona fide and, therefore, vacated the finding which had been recorded by the Rent Controller on that matter in their favour. But the Appellate Authority disagreed with the Rent Controller that the Petitioner had not effected material alterations and found under issue No. 1 that the Petitioner had made such material alterations in the premises which had impaired its utility and maintained eviction order, though on a different ground. Dissatisfied with the said result, the Petitioner came to this Court in revision.
(2.) MR . S. P. Jain, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, assailed the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that he (the Petitioner) had made material alterations in the premises which had the effect of impairing its utility and contended (a) that it could not be held on the evidence present on record that the Petitioner had removed the frame of the door from its original position and had then fixed the same in the wall erected just on the side of the road and had thereby included the verandah into the shop; (b) that the Respondents did not state in the eviction application that the construction raised by the Petitioner had impaired the utility of the premises; and (c) that the said construction including the verandah into the shop could not be considered to be material alteration and the same might be taken as improvement of the premises, but could not be said to impair the utility of the premises. I have not been able to agree with him. The statements of Bishan Lal, P.W. 1, Om Parkash, P.W. 2, Ram Niwas, P.W. 3 and Hari Singh, P.W. 4, when read together, point out unmistakably that there were two shops adjoining each other and there was a common verandah in front of the said two shops when the same were sold by Om Parkash in favour of the Respondents, and it was after the said sale that the portion of the verandah lying in front of one shop which was a Part of the premises was included into that shop by the Petitioner. Their statements receive ample confirmation from the documentary evidence. In the sale deed Exhibit P. 1, by means of which the property including the premises had been sold by Om Parkash to the Respondents on August 28, 1968, the shop of the premises was described to have three spans (khans) of the roof. Plan Exhibit R.W. 9/1 filed by the Petitioner indicates that the shop of the premises had four spans. No explanation as to how the said shop, when it had three spans at the time of sale had subsequently acquired the fourth span, could be furnished. So, the circumstances that there were three spans of the shop of the premises at the time of purchase of the property including the premises by the Respondents from Om Parkash, and thereafter its spans had increased to four, undoubtedly read consistent with the conclusion that the fourth span is of the portion of the verandah which was lying in front of the shop of the premises and had been included by the Petitioner into it (the shop). Therefore, I unhesitatingly find that the Appellate Authority was right in concluding on the evidence and material present on record that the Petitioner had divided the verandah which was existing in front of the two shops by raising a wall in its middle, and then included half of the said verandah into the premises by removing the frame of the door which existed in the wall of the shop and then fixing the same in the wall which was erected by him on the outer side of the verandah adjoining the road.
(3.) THE relevant provision which allows eviction of the tenant from the premises for impairing the utility of the same is contained in Clause (iii) of Sub -section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, and reads thus, ...If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied, that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building may direct his eviction. In sub -para (b) of paragraph 2 of the eviction application the Respondents stated that the Petitioner had made material alterations in the property in dispute and converted the verandah and turned into a shop. He removed the door of the previous existing shop and fixed the same just on the road side after converting the verandah into the shop. The Petitioner further bifurcated the common verandah thus separating the shop of the Respondents from the shop under his tenancy. That means that the Respondents did allege in the application that the Petitioner had made material alterations in the premises. They, however, did not state specifically therein that the said aerations made by him in the premises were likely to impair its utility materially. But that, by itself, cannot, in my opinion for reasons to be presently recorded, have the effect of dislodging the Respondents in their claim. The expression "are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building" denotes that it would be a matter of opinion or deduction to be drawn from the nature of the alteration or construction that the same would or would not impair the value or utility of the premises. That means that it would be the Court who would ultimately come to that finding on consideration of the material and evidence brought on record. As such, mere non -mention in the eviction application that the material alterations made by the Petitioner were likely to impair the value 01 utility of the premises would not be a ground, much less valid, to dismiss the case of the Respondents. Then, it is common knowledge that pleadings in mufassil are not in experienced hands and, there -fore, the same are to be liberally construed. The averments made in paragraph 2 of the application do give an impression that the Respondents claimed eviction of the Petitioner also on the ground of making material alterations in the premises which were likely to impair materially its utility. The record shows, and it is clear from paragraphs 4 and 6 of the judgment of the Rent Controller, and sub -para (b) of paragraph 2 of the judgment of the Appellate Authority that the parties were fully alive of the matter that the eviction of the Petitioner had been claimed on the ground of material alterations, that is, inclusion of the verandah into the shop, which impaired materially the utility of the premises. They had led evidence in proof and disproof of the said ground for eviction and also advanced serious arguments in support of their respective stand in the Courts below. It is incontrovertible proposition that rules of procedure are meant for advancing justice and not to defeat it and technicalities would not be allowed to overcome the ends' of justice or to operate as means of circuitry of litigation. A decision, if it is correct on merits and is within the jurisdiction of the Court passing it, would not be upset merely for technical or immaterial defects. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the omission on the part of the Respondents to state specifically in the eviction application that the alterations made by the Petitioner by including the verandha into the shop had materially impaired its utility is of no consequence, for the reason that the said omission did not cause any prejudice to the Petitioner and had not affected merits of the case, especially when it is clear that the Petitioner had fought the case with a clear understanding that his eviction had been sought from the premises also on the ground of committing the act of including the verandah into the shop which had impaired materially the utility of the premises.;