BHUPINDER SINGH DHILLON, J. - (1.) THIS First Appeal from Order is directed against the unanimous order dated February 23, 1965, passed by the Sikh Gurdware Tribunal, Punjab, Chandigarh, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), non-suiting the appellant on a finding that the appellant has no locus standi to bring the petition under Section 8 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). This appeal was listed for hearing before a Division Bench and the two learned Judges constituting the Bench having taken different views while deciding the appeal, the appeal was referred by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice to R. S. Narula, J. (now Hon'ble Chief Justice), for decision under Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause 26 of the Letters Patent of this Court. However, the learned Judge felt embarrassed to hear and re-decide the appeal on a difference of opinion between the two Judges as one of the learned Judges of the Division Bench doubted the correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Lachhman. Das Chela Mahant Ishar Dass v. State of Punjab, ILR (1968) 2 Punj & Har 499 (FB) because the learned Judge, R. S. Narula, J. (as he then was) himself was the author. In these circumstances, the learned Judge directed that the papers of the case may be placed before the then Hon'ble Chief Justice for hearing the appeal either himself or nominating some other learned Judge to hear the same. Thereupon, Harbans Singh, Chief Justice (as he then was) decided to hear the appeal himself. The appeal could not be heard for some time and was ultimately adjourned to await the decision of the Supreme Court in the appeal against the judgment of the Full Bench in Mahant Lachhman Dass's case (supra) which was pending before the Supreme Court.
(2.) THE Supreme Court in Dharam Dass v. State of Punjab, (1975) 1 SCC 343 = (AIR 1975 SC 1069) on January 14, 1975, dismissed the appeal against the Full Bench judgment, referred to above. It may be pointed out that in Lachhman Dass's case ILR (1968) 2 Punj and Har 499 (FB) (supra), a Full Bench of this Court upheld the vires of the Act and the said judgment having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, the question of vires of the Act, stands finally settled by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court. This appeal then came up for hearing before Hon'ble Chief Justice R. S. Narula, on February 13, 1975, when Shri K. N. Tewari, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that in view of the mandatory requirement of Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, this appeal could not be heard at any stage by a Bench consisting of less than two Judges and that no case having been stated or any definite point of law under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 98 of Civil P. C. , or under Rule 5 of Chapter IV-H of Volume V of the Rules and Orders of this Court, having been stated in the reference by the Division Bench, and the appeal itself having been referred to a third Hon'ble Judge for decision the same could not be heard by a Bench of less than two Judges. This contention having been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, Hon'ble the Chief Justice thought it safer that the surviving questions in the appeal as well as the third question as to whether this reference could be heard by a single Judge, may be decided by a Full Bench of this Court. It was in these circumstances that Hon'ble the Chief Justice constituted a Full Bench and this appeal is before us.
(3.) THE question, whether in the absence of any definite provision in the Act providing as to what would happen to an appeal which is heard by a Division Bench but is not decided by it in view of the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of the Bench, whether further proceedings in the appeal have to be governed by Section 98 of Civil P. C. or not, and whether Clause 26 of the Letters Patent of this Court, has any application to the situation like the one that has arisen in the instant case, is not being decided by us in this case and may be appropriately decided in some other case as the said question of law has not been debated before us. We are, therefore, not answering this question in this judgment.;