TRILOKI NATH BHARGAVA Vs. JASWANT KAUR
LAWS(P&H)-1975-3-12
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Decided on March 18,1975

TRILOKI NATH BHARGAVA Appellant
VERSUS
JASWANT KAUR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) MAJOR Triloki Nath Bhargava appellant No. 1 was driving his car No. RJL -3436 at about 10-50 A. M. on April 27, 1964, while going from Jullundur to his village Daroli Kalan in that district. His car ran from behind into the bicycle of late Ganesha Singh, a retired Junior Commissioned Officer, aged about 59 years, when the latter was pushing his bike in the kutcha portion on the left side of the road. The car was being driven by the first appellant himself. The car could not stop for several yards after the impact, the deceased was dragged with it. and sustained as many as 18 injuries, including several fractures. The first appellant took Ganesha Singh in his car to the hospital where the latter succumbed to his injuries. Jaswant Kaur respondent No. 1, widow of the deceased, filed a claim for Rs. 30,000.00 under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 19391 (hereinafter called the Act) in the Court of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Puniab. Since the car of the first appellant was insured with the second appellant, she preferred the claim against both the present appellants. She also impleaded as pro forma respondents the mother, the daughter and sons of the deceased, and claimed that they did not contest her right to receive the compensation which might be allowed to her. The claim was contested by the owner and insurer of the car. that is by both the appellants. From the pleadings of the parties the Tribunal framed the following three issues:-- (1) Whether the accident was due to the negligence of the driver of the car ? (2) What is the quantum of compensation due if any ? (3) Relief. By his judgment and award, dated August 18, 1966, the Tribunal held on issue No. 1 that the accident was due to the negligence of the driver of the car, i. e. , due to the negligence of the first appellant. The finding on issue No. 2 was that the deceased was 59 years old at the time of his death, that he was getting a pension of Rs. 102.00 per mensem besides his income from agricultural land, that out of his income the deceased used to spend about half the amount on his own person, and that the loss occasioned to the widow by the death of the deceased came to Rs. 50.00 per mensem. Treating the expectancy of the balance of the life of the deceased as 11 years, that is up to the age of 70, and calculating the quantum of loss on the above basis the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 6,364.00 as compensation to the first respondent under Section 110-B of the Act. He arrived at the figure of Rs. 6,364.00 by deducting from the sum of Rs. 6,600.00 (calculated at the rate of Rs. 50.00 per mensem for eleven years) the sum of Rs. 235. 60 P. representing one-fifth of the total sum of Rs. 1,178.00 which was lying to the credit of the deceased in his account with the Punjab National Bank.
(2.) NOT satisfied with the award of the Tribunal, the present appellants preferred F. A. O. 34 of 1967, against the said award to this Court on February 21, 1967. On getting notice of the appeal and within 30 days thereafter the first respondent filed on May 27, 1967, cross-objections for enhancement of the quantum of compensation from Rs. 6,364.00 to Rupees 30,000/ -. Suri. J. (as he then was) by his judgment and order, dated April 23, 1971, dismissed the appeal of the present appellants, but allowed the cross-objections of the first respondent and enhanced the amount of the award in her favour to Rs. 12,000/ -. The driver-owner of the car and its insurer have preferred this appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the cross-objections. The first respondent has not preferred any further appeal in the matter of the quantum of damages. Mr. Ravinder Mohan Suri, learned counsel for the appellants, has confined his arguments in this appeal to the following three points:-- (i) the judgment of the learned Single Judge is liable to be reversed and the order enhancing the amount of compensation is liable to be set aside as the first respondent had not preferred any appeal against the judgment and award of the Tribunal, and not having done so she was not entitled to file any cross-objections as the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure have no application to proceedings for award of compensation under the Act: (ii) the order of the learned Single Judge enhancing the amount of compensation is not justified even on the facts and merits of the case; and (iii) the learned Single Judge should have rejected the cross-objections of the first respondent even if the same are held to be maintainable on the ground that the same had not been sufficiently stamped. The court-fee payable On the cross-objections had to be calculated on ad valorem basis under Article 1 of Schedule I to the Court-fees Act, and not on fixed basis under Article 11 of Schedule II or otherwise.
(3.) IN support Of his first contention Mr. Suri has relied on the judgments of the Gauhati High Court in the Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Srimati Renuka Roy, AIR 1973 Gauhati 142 and Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nani Choudhury, 1974 Acc CJ 269 (Gauhati), as also on the judgment of a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in A. Rahiman v. M. Webber, 1973 Cri LJ 1682 (Mys ). The earliest of these judgments is of the Mysore High Court in the case of A. Rahiman (supra ). The learned Judges held in that case that the Motor Vehicles Act is a complete code by itself, and, therefore, the provisions of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be brought to bear on matters under the Act. They followed the earlier judgment of their Court in Union of India v. Narasivappa, (1970) 1 Mys LJ 319. The argument advanced on behalf of the claimant on the authority of the decision of the Madhva Pradesh High Court in Manjula Devi v. Manjusri Raha. 1968 Acc CJ 1 (Madh Pra), to the effect that when once an appeal is preferred to the High Court, the usual practice and rules of procedure applying to the appeals to be dealt with by the High Court should become applicable, and, therefore, a right to file cross-objections would accrue in such appeal was repelled. In adopting the view which prevailed with the learned Judges of the Mysore High Court they also differed from the decision of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Raj Kumari, 1972 Acc CJ 403 (Delhi ). In the case of the Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd, (supra), the learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court took the game view as had found favour with the Mvsore High Court particularly in view of the provision of Rule 20 of the Assam Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals Rules, 1960, which has made certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically applicable to the trial of a claim under the Act, and the fact that the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not covered by the said Rule 20. The judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of the Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. was followed and approved by another learned Single Judge (R. S. Bindra J. as he then was) of the Gauhati High Court (the High Court for the States of Assam. Nagaland, etc.) in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nani Choudhury, 1974 Acc CJ 269. ;


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