V.K.BALI, J. - (1.) KESHWA Nand and three others, who are Municipal Commissioners from various wards of Municipal Committee, Amloh, and who were respondents in Civil Writ Petition 13433 of 1992, appellants herein, seek setting aside of judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dated December 23, 1993 directing the Deputy Commissioner, Fatehgarh Sahib to take appropriate steps for convening a meeting of the Municipal Committee, Amloh for the purpose of completion of process of co-option within the time frame as prescribed under the Rules and further directing the Deputy Commissioner, Amloh, to ensure that the meeting is conducted in an orderly manner, in this Letters Patent Appeal filed by them under Clause X of the Letters Patent.
(2.) THE precise grievance of the appellants is that when the convener had cancelled the meeting scheduled for co-opting the persons belonging to Schedule Caste of Balmiki, Chura or Bhangi by elected members of the Committee, it then lay in the entire Jurisdiction and domain of the State Government to nominate such persons who were eligible to be co-opted. The defence projected by the appellants on the aforesaid plea it is contender was not discussed, thus, resulting into non-determination of this crucial issue a he learned Single Judge, under the circumstances, held that the meeting called for co-option was not canceled but only postponed. Since the plea that it is the Government alone which could nominate the persons eligible for cooption is largely dependent upon the meeting being postponed or cancelled, the appellants challenge the findings of the learned Single Judge on that count as well. Added to this, a new plea has become available to the appellants during the pendency of the appeal. The Punjab Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came into force w. e. f. June 1, 1994, has repealed Section 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E which provisions alone envisage co-option of persons belonging to scheduled caste etc. . It is contended that in view of the repealing of the sections aforesaid, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge have out-lived their utility and cannot as such be enforced. Before, however, the points noticed above are discussed any further, it will be useful to extract facts of the case, although briefly. Tejwant Singh and six other municipal commissioners from various wards of Municipal Committee, Amloh, Distt. Fatehgarh Sahib, sought writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents - Deputy Commissioner, Fatehgarh Sahib and Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) Convener to convene a meeting of the newly elected members of the Municipal Committee, Amloh, for the purpose of co-option of Balmikies, women and Backward Class members as required under Section 12-A of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911. Petitioners and respondents 5 to 8 were elected as Municipal Commissioners from Municipal Committee, Amloh and a notification regarding their election was published in the Punjab Government Gazette on September 14, 1992. Under Sections 12-A, 12-B and 12-C of the 1911 Act, two members from Balmikies, Churas or Bhangies, two women and one member from Backward Classes, if not already elected in the election, were to be co-opted by the elected members in a meeting which was to be convened by the Deputy Commissioner or any other Gazetted Officer appointed as convener for the purpose of administering oath to the newly elected members. The said meeting had to be held within 14 days from the date of notification. Respondent No. 3 was appointed as convener and he did convene the meeting which was to be held on September 25, 1992 at 3 PM in the office of the Municipal Committee, Amloh. On the date fixed, all the elected members were present and they were administered oath as required by law. The pleaded case of the petitioners is that when the convener started enquiring about the fact as to whether any of the members mentioned in Sections 12-A, 12-B and 12-C has already been elected or not, which he had to enquire under the Rules, the meeting was disturbed on account of pre-calculated conspiracy. Keshwa Nand - respondent No. 5, first appellant herein, started raising hue and cry on the pretext that a member from Backward Classes had been elected and that the notice stating that the cooption from Balmikies, women and Backward Classes was to be made, was bad and that meeting should be cancelled. The entreaties of petitioners to respondent-appellants to calm down and let the proceedings of the meeting be conducted properly failed. The appellants even went to the extent of assaulting the petitioners as they were in minority and knew that they would not be able to co-opt any member of their choice. The convener did not make any serious effort to control the meeting and rather cancelled the same and gave a note in the proceedings book that Keshwa Nand appellant was extending threats that he would not allow the meeting to proceed. The convener, however, fixed the second meeting for September 30, 1992 but the same too was cancelled for non-service of notice of the meeting to the members. Apprehending that concerted effort shall now be made by the appellants to do away with the right of elected members to co-opt and further see through that this exercise was taken-over by the Government as envisaged under Section 12-E of 1911 Act, the writ giving rise to the present Letters Patent Appeal was filed seeking directions in the manner, the same have been issued by the learned Single Judge.
(3.) INASMUCH as the meeting fixed for cooption was disturbed, the learned Single Judge framed the question involved in the petition as to what was meant by the term, 'in the event of failure to co-opt due to disturbance' as used in Section 12-E of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 and after discussion relevant provisions of the Act and taking into account the meaning of word 'cancelled', in the context and facts and circumstances of the present case, came to a positive conclusion that "the failure contemplated under Section 12-E would be something which is a positive act on the part of the members and they cannot be put to a disadvantageous position because of the failure on the part of the convener to take appropriate steps. If the meeting could not be held in an orderly manner, the proper course was to adjourn the same and if in any case even if the word 'cancelled' was used, it would not make any difference". While so deciding, learned Single Judge relied upon the word 'cancelled' as defined in Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary wherein it has been described as "to cross out, to annul or suppress, to abolish or wipe out, to counterbalance or compensate for, to remove as balancing each other e. g. like quantities from opposite sides of an equation, like factors from numerator and denominator of a fraction," as also on Division Bench judgment of this Court in Roshan Lal Singla v. Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda, A. I. R. 1980 Pb. & Hry, 155. The Division Bench in the aforesaid case observed that "under the circumstances, the Committee of the elected members did not forfeit their right to resort to the method of co-option and second meeting was in continuation of the original meeting and that meeting would have same character as the first meeting would have same character as the first meeting for the purpose of co-option. " The learned Single Judge, on account of the fact that there was no provision in the Punjab Municipal Act which might confer power on the convener to cancel or adjourn a meeting, came to the conclusion that even if the expression 'cancelled' was used by the convener, it would make no difference. Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in Chandra Kama Khaire v. Dr. Shanta Ram Kale and Ors. , A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 1165 in which various shades of term 'adjournment' came to be discussed and a conclusion was arrived at that "properly convened meeting could not be postponed and proper course was to hold the meeting as originally intended and then and there adjourn it to a more suitable date. If this course was not adopted, then the members had a right to go-ahead with the process of transacting the business which was originally supposed to be transacted. " While concluding the matter, learned Single Judge also held that "an omission which is not act or failure on the part of the person himself was beyond the scope of contemplated action and, therefore, the failure contemplated by Section 12-E would be something which is a positive act on the part of the members".;