INDERJIT AND OTHERS Vs. NARESH KUMAR AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is defendants second appeal against whom the suit for declaration and joint possession was dismissed by the trial Court, but decreed in appeal.

(2.) Harbans Lal was the owner of the suit property. He died on October 13, 1956 leaving behind his two sons, Krishan Kumar and Pritam Kumar and a daughter Indrani. The land measuring 47 kanals 17 marlas including the suit land (measuring 21 kanals 14 marlas), was earlier on lease with one Gulad Ali Shah as evidenced by Jamabandi for the years 1942 to 1952, Exhibit D-14. On February 2, 1950, vide lease deed, Exhibit D.W. 1/1 Harbans Lal leased out 47 kanals 17 marlas of land to Inderjit, defendant. The lease was for a period of two years from Kharif 1950 to Rabi 1952. The annual rent for two years was fixed at Rs. 768/- which was to be paid in advance. On July 28, 1951, Harbans Lal mortgaged the said land in favour of one Rup Lal for a sum of Rs. 2,000/-. The said Rup Lal issued a notice of ejectment against Inderji, lessee, which was contested by way of a suit as contemplated under the Punjab Tenancy Act. The said suit was decided in favour of Inderjit, lessee, on September 2, 1952, vide certified copy of the judgment, Exhibit D-6. Later on, Harbans Lal issued a notice for ejectment of Inderjit, lessee, which was again contested by him. That suit was also decided in favour of Inderjit, lessee, on July 25, 1955, vide certified copy of the judgment Exhibit D-5. Immediately thereafter, on August 22, 1955, Harbans Lal filed an application under Section 14-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (hereinafter called the Act). A copy of the said plaint/application is Exhibit DW-7/1. In the said application, Harbans Lal categorically stated that his area in the State of Punjab was more than 30 standard acres and that he had reserved the land, in dispute, and therefore, Inderjit, tenant, was liable to be ejected as he himself wanted to cultivate the land. Later on, the said application was withdrawn by Harbans Lal, as is clear from the document, marked B, dated September 1, 1956. As stated earlier, Harbans Lal died on October 13, 1956. After his death his heirs and legal representatives, i.e. both his sons and his daughter, executed a permanent lease-deed, dated May 21, 1958, Exhibit D-1, in favour of the defendants Inderjit, Raj Pal and Mohinder Pal, sons of Girdhari Lal. The rent fixed therein was Rs. 50/- per bigha per year. This lease deed, has been challenged by the plaintiffs who are the sons of Krishan Kumar and Pritam Kumar, lessors. The suit was filed on September 24, 1973, i.e., after about 15 years of the execution of the lease deed, Exhibit D-1. The said suit is for a declaration to the effect that the said lease-deed is illegal, void and for want of legal necessity and of no benefit to the estate with consequential relief of joint possession by the plaintiffs with defendant Nos. 4 and 5, i.e. the lessors. It was also alleged in the plaint that the lessors had no cause worth the name to alienate the land on such unreasonable terms as to deprive the family members of its benefits and as such, the lease deed was void and against the interests of the family members. The plaintiffs also claimed that being the coparceners and the members of the joint Hindu family with defendant Nos. 4 and 5 they were entitled to joint possession of the suit land. The suit was contested inter alia on the ground that the lease in question, was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate and as an act of good management because by virtue of the said lease. Inderjit defendant, surrendered the remaining area measuring 26 kanals 3 marlas to the lessors, which was under the tenancy vide lease-deed, exhibit DW-8/1, executed by Harbans Lal in his favour. Moreover, the rent was also increased from Rs. 32/- to Rs. 50/- per bigha per year. In any case, there is no allegation in the plaint that Krishan Kumar or Pritam Kumar were reckless and wanted to dispose of the property with any ulterior motive. The learned trial Court after appreciating the entire evidence, came to the conclusion under issue No. 6, which was to the effect whether the lease-deed, in question, was for legal necessity, for the benefit of the estate and an act of good management, that the defendants had succeeded in proving that the lease evidence vide, Exhibit D-1 was an act of good management on the part of defendant Nos. 4 and 5 and that the said act had benefited the estate. As a result, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge reversed the said finding of the trial Court as he came to the conclusion that neither the alienation was for legal necessity, nor the same was an act of good management. As a result, the plaintiffs' suit was decreed. Dissatisfied with the same, the lessees-defendants have come up in second appeal to this Court.

(3.) The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the lease evidenced by the lease deed, Exhibit D-1 was an act of good management, but the said binding has been reversed by the lower appellate Court arbitrarily and whimsically. According to the learned counsel, from the documentary evidence on the record, this finding was not possible, rather it would prove that the said lease was an act of good management on the part of defendant Nos. 4 and 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the lower appellate Court after discussing the evidence has been a finding of fact and therefore the same could not be interfered with in second appeal.